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3Abstract
The early termination of commercial mortgages represents a financial risk for
lenders. Default and prepayment risks are the two main options priced in the
main literature, where competing risk models are adopted to analyze both risks
simultaneously. In this research, we examines the impact of collateral underlying
real estate supply constraints on early mortgage termination. To achieve this,
we suggest three original ideas. First, as we need to estimate supply elasticities
of office markets in the US, we develop a mismatch conceptual model estimat-
ing long run supply elasticity and computing the correlation between structural
vacancy and supply constraints. The results imply that low controlling power
of landlords reduces the flexibility in adjusting equilibrium vacancies to respond
to market shocks. Second, we suggest adopting the installment option valuation
model for pricing early mortgage termination options. Early mortgage termi-
nation (joint mortgage default and prepayment) is analogous to an American
continuous installment option embedded with straddle or strangle like payoff as
this can capture the decision path that keeps the option alive by making scheduled
mortgage payments. Third, we suggest two pairs of early termination options:
(1) mortgage default vs restructuring; and (2) full prepayment in cash vs defea-
sance in empirical analysis. The significant impacts of tightening property supply
constraints on the likelihood of different types of early mortgage termination are
proved. Overall, we expect that these three original ideas offer a helpful insight
for mortgage originators and regulators as well as policymakers to manage related
risk by including the geographical composition of collateral by supply constraints
in risk models.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Background of Commercial Mortgage Mar-
ket in the US
A large dispersion of mortgage market scales measured by the percentage of bank
credits among G7 countries translates into a dissipative awareness of the poten-
tial instability of mortgage markets. The US catches the greatest global attention
considering that its loan underwriting amount makes the US by far the largest
lending market in the world. According to the Federal Reserve, mortgage lending
accounts for over 30% of bank credits, with half of the collateralized real estate
being commercial as represented in Figure 1.1.The great importance of the com-
mercial mortgage market over the last decade is led by growing securitization of
mortgages and a booming phase of the underlying real estate prices in the middle
of 2000’s. As underlying property prices have since turned and the commercial
mortgage market ballooned, policymakers, financial institutions and investors of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) monitor the health of the market
particularly in the era post-subprime home mortgage crisis.
Commercial mortgages are designed with much more complicated terms than
residential mortgages. The unique terms or covenants, in general, relate to the
collateral (including its produced income) and hence reflect the importance of un-
derlying buildings (not only measured by LTV) for commercial mortgage lenders.
For example, the ability to repay a mortgage does not necessarily depend on the
borrower’s income, but on the amount of income the property generates above
the mortgage service charge (i.e. features measured by the debt service coverage
ratio, DSCR). Furthermore, cross collateralization represents an exclusive protec-
tion where the portfolio of collateral properties is pledged to guarantee a pool of
mortgages. Therefore when any mortgage in the pool defaults, the lender facing
7
Figure 1.1: Commercial Mortgages: Percentage of Bank Credits (Source: Federal
Reserve)
the occurrence from cross-default is allowed to recall the remaining mortgages
within the pool. Another unique mortgage term in the commercial space refers
to “defeasance”, which is the right offered to the borrower to swap the settlement
method from “making payment as scheduled in cash” to “pledging Treasury se-
curities” with similar cash flow patterns and redeeming the collateral property in
return. These special designs of commercial mortgages related to the collateral
are the primary motivation of our research.
Studies normally emphasize the aspects of corresponding property price growth
and stability of rental income which is implicitly identified by tenant credibility,
lease structure, physical quality of property, and quality of management team -
Titman et al (2010 [163]). Apart from the specific collateral appraisal process,
overall market trends such as vacancy rate, unemployment as a demand factor,
and interest rate movements are also considered to examine mortgage risk. De-
spite some scholarly studies concentrate on the roles of originators or special
servicers who manage delinquent loans and identify the best workout strategy
to minimize default losses by negotiating with borrowers on payment streams -
Chen et al (2013 [37], An et al (2013 [16]) -, originators or special servicers still
rely on financial performance of the collateral and market conditions. However,
the driving forces of collateral performances are yet to be fully explored, espe-
cially considering an important aspect related to the supply side price dynamics
of underlying real estate markets.
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In fact, property market dynamics are driven by interactive responses of demand
and supply factors which may also affect the exercise of mortgage termination
options. Citywide data availability on the demand side, a prominent demand
shock during a financial crisis, and a calibrated identification of demand factors
in general favour the concentration on the impact of demand shock in existing
literature. In contrast, supply responses to these demand shocks are multidi-
mensional, hard to identify except for newly built space and endogenous to the
property market. These features somewhat hinder academic research to empiri-
cally study the links between property supply responses and mortgage risk.1 To
contribute to this under-explored area, this PhD research aims to quantify com-
mercial property supply elasticities by adopting the calibrated searching theory
based model and then examine how supply responses, in conjunction with de-
mand shocks in underlying collateral real estate markets may trigger a change in
the life cycle of commercial mortgages, which are modelled introducing a newly
theoretical option pricing model which includes two types of early termination
options - default and prepayment - and is empirically tested with two additional
early termination options (i.e. restructuring and defeasance) using a database of
US commercial mortgages.
1.2 Early Termination Options in Commercial Mort-
gages
The vast majority of existing literature merely investigates default and prepay-
ment as early termination options. The subprime mortgage crisis and an enor-
mous pool of home buyers which may bring more significant economic impact
capture the focus on default and prepayment risk of home mortgages. Figure 1.2
shows the yield spread of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) and
home mortgages which should embed the related option value of prepayment and
default. Since 2012 in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), CMBS
yield spreads have been greater than home mortgage spread. This suggests that
the value of the CMBS underlying default and prepayment options tends to be
higher than for home mortgages, requiring further investigation as set out among
1Tong(2014)[164]) investigated the impact of collateral underlying supply constrained market
on commercial mortgage default, representing the only empirical research focused on the prop-
erty supply response. However, the measurement of supply constraint in commercial property
markets hinged on the estimates sourced from the research conducted by the industry practition-
ers without the adoption of proper econometric models and hence data estimates are somewhat
questionable.
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the goals of this thesis. Moreover defeasance, as an exit strategy available to
commercial mortgages only, occurs quite often when interest rates hover at low
levels. Notwithstanding rare empirical studies on defeasance, its great importance
(considering lock-out cash prepayment clauses sometimes included in commercial
mortgage contracts) suggests further exploration is needed. We strictly define
early termination as a breach of “original mortgage contracts” with respect to
the scheduled payments. Despite mortgage restructuring is normally separately
studied in the existing literature of early termination options, we combine all
available options to jointly investigate the borrower’s decision in framework of
competing options which result in a change of cash flow pattern.
Figure 1.2: Comparison of Yield Spread: CMBS vs Home Mortgages (Sources:
CRE News and the Mortgage Bankers Association)
At the beginning of this research, we list four types of early termination options,
where default is paired with mortgage restructuring, and full prepayment in cash
competes with defeasance. We consequently argue that the “competition” hap-
pens between two options in each group while obligation denial and prepayment
have different triggering conditions. The principles are thoroughly explained by
creating our theoretical framework in Chapter Five. To provide a brief introduc-
tion, the termination options we consider are defined below.
Default Options
Default may occur when a property value is smaller than its mortgage value (i.e.
negative equity) or a borrower faces a problem of insolvency. A borrower surren-
ders his collateral property breaching his mortgage obligation. The decision to
default has been regarded as the compound of European put options in existing
10
literature (Epperson et al (1985) [65]). Since this analogy has obscured conse-
quential repetition of option purchases and the correlation between options, we
re-define default options as an American put installment option. In short,
mortgage default can be viewed as a series of default options which expire at
every payment date until scheduled mortgage payments cease. Borrowers (i.e.
option buyers) normally do not default at the first payment date. When they
make the first payment, they make an installment to continue a put option which
represents the possibility to default at the next payment date. If borrowers exer-
cise the put option, the mortgage is early terminated by the decision to default.
Otherwise, once borrowers make another payment, the put option still keeps alive.
Mortgage Restructuring Options
Restructuring is a mutual agreement between a borrower and a lender to termi-
nate an original mortgage contract and then redesign a new contract which may
extend maturity and / or reduce the charged interest rate based on the amount
that a borrower still owes to the lender and its financial ability to repay peri-
odically. This alteration is viewed as an exchange options between mortgages
with different cash flow streams.
Options of Full Prepayment in Cash
So far previous literature describes the decision to prepay as a call option. A
borrower basically considers full prepayment in cash when market interest rates
are lower than the agreed mortgage rate and a new refinancing rate would then
be lowering the service charge. This is analogous to the exercise of an American
call option. However, as the fixed exercise price is designed for a single call op-
tion, this does not represent the most appropriate analogy to model the exercise
price that varies depending upon the remaining balance of the mortgage. We
argue that full prepayment in cash should be analogous to an American call
installment option. Borrowers make scheduled payments, that means they pay
installments. If they prepay prior to the maturity of the mortgage, the call op-
tion is early exercised. No further installments are paid. The mortgage is early
terminated through full prepayment in cash and a prepayment penalty is also
charged as a result.
Defeasance
Defeasance refers to the process by which a mortgage is replaced with Treasury
securities that are able to replicate the remaining cash flow pattern of the mort-
gage contract and concurrently the collateral property is refinanced or redeemed.
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Defeasance is modelled as an exchange option between a mortgage and a riskless
debt by Dierker et al. (2005). We convene with this formulation and treat it
as an exchange option between two assets with different liquidity since
a borrower switches his settlement method from “paying in cash” to “pledging
Treasury securities”.
1.3 Research Objectives
The primary aim of this study is to investigate the impact of collateral underlying
property supply-constrained markets on early termination options of commercial
mortgages. To address this main research question, we divide the study into three
phases: (1) estimation of supply constraints of commercial real estate markets (in
particular offices) by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), (2) development of an
option pricing theoretical model to value early termination options of commer-
cial mortgages; and (3) empirical analysis of the impact of commercial property
supply constraints on four types of early mortgage terminations.
Contribution 1: Estimation of Commercial Property Supply Constraints
Supply constraints determine price responsiveness of supply and they play a key
role in determining the price responsiveness of real estate cycles to exogenous
shocks and the length and amplitude of boom and bust periods. The search
and matching theory can be used to explain the short-run fluctuation of vacancy
rate, rent and space absorption, alongside the market adjustment to long-run
equilibrium. (Wheaton et al. (1994 [178], 1997 [179])) Cyclicality constitutes
the short-run dynamics where the magnitude of amplification hinges on supply
constraints. At present, the links between matching behaviour and supply con-
straints have not been examined. Therefore, we separately identify frictional,
structural and cyclical vacancy following labour economics literature and con-
struct a conceptual model to analyse the link between “economic mismatch” and
supply constraints which are quantified by long-run supply elasticity. We show
that mismatch situations and the search effort level affect the long-run relation-
ship of demand and supply, as well as its short-run cyclicality. Simultaneously,
an empirical model is used to estimate long-run supply elasticities of commercial
real estate in 42 MSAs covering almost 60% of the US service related workforce
and 50% of the entire population. The intuition is made that landlords control
equilibrium vacancy through search and matching process and thus the supply
elasticity is estimated precisely with the consideration of the search and matching
process.
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Contribution 2: Mortgage Termination Option Pricing Theoretical
Model
We follow the prevailing approach to price options of mortgage default and pre-
payment by adapting Merton’s and Black-Schole’s models and assuming com-
plete markets. Moreover, the competing risk model in the existing literature is
employed to estimate default and prepayment risk simultaneously with the key
assumption that both risks compete with each other. In fact, their likelihood
contains the probability of negating the condition of the other termination op-
tion but it does not necessarily represent a situation of direct competition. In
this part, we model the interaction between prepayment and obligation denial
with installment options embedded with straddle or strangle like payoff (i.e. the
option in which put and call options are longed and prepayment and denial obli-
gation are analogous to call and put option respectively). Furthermore, it is
the first study to consider installment options in valuation of prepayment (call
installment options) and denial obligation (put installment options). Moreover,
borrowers consider execution costs for these two options (i.e. bankruptcy costs
for default and prepayment penalties for prepayment) during their decision mak-
ing about early termination. Thus, we add execution costs to strike prices of
underlying options for pricing early termination options. We also examine the
impacts of property supply constraints on early mortgage termination options.
The intuition in this part is that early mortgage termination is analogous to an
American installment option embedded with straddle or strangle like payoff and
its value is affected by property supply constraints. We offer insight in the linkage
between mortgage markets and property supply constraints.
Contribution 3: Real Estate Supply Constraints and Early Termina-
tion Options
As a final step, we address a key research question with an empirical study on how
collateral underlying property supply constraints affect choices of termination
options of commercial mortgages. We develop the conceptual framework with a
two stage approach which covers four types of early mortgage termination options.
A multinomial logit model is employed in the first stage and logit models are
applied in the second stage to analyze the behaviour related to early mortgage
terminations. We directly use office supply constraints estimated in the first
empirical work of this dissertation and identify its quantitative effect on the
probability of early termination for default vs restructuring and defeasance vs
prepayment in cash. The intuition is concluded that responses of four types
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of early mortgage termination on property supply elasticities are in different
level. Our findings have policy implications because financial institutions could
measure the portion of lending to more constrained supply property markets
and regulators act on the relaxation / tightening of such constraints to manage
mortgage risk at the systemic and or lender’s level.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The thesis contains six chapters. This introductory chapter provides the back-
ground of commercial mortgages in the US, explains the motivation of our re-
search with respect to early termination options and their link collateral un-
derlying property supply constraints. The second chapter offers an overarching
literature review on mortgage studies. In addition to offering a critical review
of the existing literature for both theoretical models and empirical methodology,
we identify niches for further studies and briefly explain our research direction
that aims to fill in these gaps. In the following three chapters (3-5), we meet our
research objectives in three key studies as described above. Lastly, the last chap-
ter concludes our research findings and discusses meaningful risk management
implications for policymakers, regulators and financial institutions.
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Chapter 2
General Literature Review
2.1 Overview
The termination behavior of mortgages can be classified into three paths: de-
fault, prepayment, and defeasance. Default and prepayment of mortgages have
been studied for over three decades, whereas the theoretical study of defeasance
emerged in 2005 from Dierker et al. [59]. Despite the early development of
research on the termination behavior of commercial mortgages, residential mort-
gages have dominated the theoretical framework and empirical work. The serious
lag in the development of commercial mortgages can be attributed to the un-
availability of commercial data, the lack of standardization of underwriting and
reporting commercial mortgages, and the lack of a mortgage insurance market
for commercial mortgages (Vandell (1993) [170]). Following the growth of the
market for commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) in the mid of 2000s,
more standardized records of commercial mortgage deals have been stored, thus
facilitating the study of commercial mortgages.
In the past three decades, the focal points of the study of early mortgage termina-
tion have shifted. In the meantime, the corresponding theoretical framework and
empirical methodology have been enhanced to tackle more complicated research
questions1. The initial focal point was to determine mortgage default risk in
accordance with mortgage terms (e.g., loan-to-value [LTV] ratio and age of mort-
gage), financial condition of borrower, and collateral property age. When interest
rates dropped, more prepayments in residential mortgages occurred. Academics
attempted to broaden the study of prepayment behavior as a new focal point.
1The earliest study of complicated alternative mortgage products was done by Vandell
(1978[167]) in which adjustable-rate mortgage, graduated payment mortgage and price-level
adjusted mortgage were modelled.
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Furthermore, a rapid growth of insured mortgage loan by government-sponsored
entities (i.e., the Federal Housing Administration, which insured loans for home
buyers, and Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, which purchased the loan) raised con-
cerns of catastrophic loss driven by mortgage default. This motivated the third
main shift in the focal point in academia.
To facilitate the shifts in research focus, empirical modeling techniques were
improved. For example, the competing risk model, such as multinomial logistic
model, was constructed to investigate the likelihood among borrowers’ choices,
including the continuation of scheduled payment, default and full prepayment.
This was not applied in the initial stage of study. In addition, proportional hazard
model was employed to examine timing to default and relative risk of default.
All shifts in research focus can be summarized into emphasis from three main
perspectives (i.e. lenders, borrowers, and institutions). Notwithstanding changes
from perspectives, mortgage default draws the greatest attention due to its impact
on every party. In contrast, prepayment causes disturbance of scheduled payment,
but there is no reduction of asset base. As a result, mortgage default dominates
the studies of mortgage termination risk (Foster et al. (1984)[76], Quercia et al.
(1992)[142]).
While this research focuses on the commercial mortgage, the related conceptual
development is inspired by the theoretical framework rooted in the studies of the
early termination of residential mortgages. This literature review thus criticizes
the theoretical work in the studies of residential mortgages and compares the
determinants of mortgage termination between residential and commercial mort-
gages. As a result, the following review is an overall critical analysis in terms
of theoretical and empirical aspects separately and is presented as follows: (1)
the role of securitization in mortgage markets, which is the key research topic in
mortgage studies, (2) contributions to related theories and potential extension,
(3) critique of empirical strategies in residential mortgage studies, (4) critique of
overall empirical studies of commercial mortgages and (5) expected contributions
of our research.
2.2 Key Research Topic: The Role of Securitization
in Mortgage Markets
As the securitization of debts or mortgages prevails, more information of mort-
gage markets are released for analysis. The vast majority of mortgage studies
focuses on the role of securitization in mortgage markets (Piskorski, Seru, and
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Vig (2010[135]), Agarwal et al. (2011[5]), Arentsen et al. (2015[21]), Downs and
Xu (2015[60]), Flavin and Sheenan (2015[73]), Fuster and Vickery (2015[77]),
Han, Park, and Pennacchi (2015[100]), Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2015[144]), Floros
and White (2016[74]), Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan (2016[84]), Griffin and Mat-
urana (2016[94]), Malkhozov et al. (2016[122]), Scheiser and Gross (2016[153]),
Black, Krainer, and Nichols (2017[29]), Liu and Sing (2018[119])). For instance,
the performance of securitized mortgages, particularly residential mortgages, is
investigated by comparing them with bank-held loans in terms of mortgage de-
fault. Because the growth of the secondary market for a security can have an
important incentive effect that affects the quality of the collateral behind the
security itself, this affects the probability of mortgage default. Moreover, the role
of securitization on debt renegotiation is also examined.
It is concluded that financial institutions are significantly more likely to extend
portfolio loans than securitized loans. This is because frictions introduced by
securitization create significant challenges to the effective renegotiation of mort-
gages. Furthermore, the characteristics of mortgage-backed securities are also
studied. The effects of yield curves and term structure of interest rates on du-
ration and convexity of mortgage-backed securities are analyzed. All of these
studies imply that securitization plays a significant role in mortgage contract de-
sign and allocation of risk among borrowers, lenders, and investors. In particular,
securitization played a pivotal role in the subprime mortgage crisis.
Before the crisis, rational mortgage borrowers were assumed and choices between
fixed-rate mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages could be optimized (Camp-
bell and Cocco (2003[34])). In the aftermath of the subprime mortgage cri-
sis, the rationality and financial sophistication of borrowers have been doubted,
and a handful of research investigates the impacts of borrowers’ literacy on
mortgage choices (Gurun, Matvos, and Seru (2016[97]), Keys, Pope, and Pope
(2016[117]), Van Ooijen and Van Rooij (2016[166]), Agarwal, Ben-David, and
Yao (2017[6]), Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, and Zhang (2017[7]), Bhutta, Dokko,
and Shan (2017[27]), Gathergood and Weber (2017[81])). They point out that
less sophisticated borrowers make mistakes in choosing mortgage terms such as
mortgage points, which allow borrowers to exchange an upfront amount for a
decrease in the mortgage rate, term premium, and complex alternative mortgage
products. More sophisticated borrowers, such as financial professionals, have
lower delinquency rates. Thus, the mortgage crisis, particularly in the US, is
more or less attributed to the financial sophistication of borrowers, but this may
be different from the situation in Europe, where less sophisticated borrowers are
more inclined to have traditional mortgages.
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As the subprime mortgage crisis caused a unprecedented collapse of the finan-
cial system, more research studies discuss risk management to prevent enormous
losses (Berg (2015[25]), Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2015[128]), Demyanyk and Lout-
skina (2016[53]), Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2016[90]), Favara et al. (2017[70])).
It is proved that effective risk management can help reduce default risk in spite
of high operating costs that may reduce the benefits of risk management. Risk
management measures include establishing mortgage companies by bank holding
companies to transfer riskier mortgages to subsidiaries, strengthening the enforce-
ment of the debt contracts related to investment and firms’ risk, expanding the
geography of bank holding companies, and implementing state-specific foreclo-
sure laws. We, in this research, suggest an alternative risk management measure
that is related to collateral. Collateral may involve some issues of asymmetric
information related to property quality, property tax, and property investments
in terms of repairs and maintenance (Anderson and Dokko (2016[19]), Stroebel
(2016[159]), Melzer (2017[126])). All these issues would influence collateral val-
ues and decisions to early terminate mortgages. Therefore, we emphasize our
suggested property price process for pricing early mortgage termination options.
2.3 Contributions to Related Theories and Potential
Extension
The Black-Scholes option pricing model is the cornerstone of studying early ter-
mination options of mortgages in terms of default and prepayment. Defeasance
option is viewed as an exchange option explained by Margrabe’s model in which
the principle differs from the Black-Scholes model. The first part of this section
thus depicts the theoretical development of each mortgage risk and discusses the
drawbacks. Suggestions for potential extension will be followed to fill in the gaps
in the extant literature.
• Default Risk
The decision to default is regarded as a compound of European put options
(Epperson et al. (1985)[65]). In other words, default is merely considered
when payment is due. If the property value is smaller than the mort-
gage value or insolvency occurs, a borrower will surrender the property and
breach the mortgage obligation. This action is a so-called exercise of put
option in which a borrower (i.e., option owner) sells the property to his
lender (i.e., option seller) at varying strike prices that are determined by
the remaining mortgage balance. Therefore, finding determinants of default
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risk is related to estimating default option values.
The theory of pricing of risky corporate debt developed by Merton (1974)[127],
which was an extension of the Black-Scholes option pricing model [28],
became a cornerstone of the theoretical framework for mortgage default
studies. Merton offered insight into the determinants of credit spread by
disentangling unanticipated changes in the probability of default of corpo-
ration from unanticipated changes in interest rates. Credit spread derived
from Merton’s model is “company-wide” instead of focused on individual
assets such as collateral; however, the framework is adopted in the mort-
gage default studies to find out the boundary condition of the decision to
default. It should be noted that no transaction costs and taxes are assumed
in Merton’s and Black-Scholes’ models. This is not realistic, however, and
indeed transaction costs hinder the immediate exercise of options to default
in spite of depreciation in property value that drops lower than mortgage
value. This stimulates further theoretical development of nonruthless mort-
gage default by Foster, Van Order, and Vandell (Foster et al. (1984) [76],
Vandell (1995)[171]). They verify that ruthless exercise for default cannot
be expected and advocated for the consideration of transaction costs for
the default risk model in empirical research.
Epperson, Kau, Keenan, Muller, and Vandell make contributions to estab-
lish the generalized theoretical model of mortgage default risk based on
the seminal work of Merton and Black and Scholes (Vandell (1984) [168],
Epperson et al. (1985) [65], Kau et al. (1995) [109]). Vandell developed
the theoretical model for determining the probability of default of com-
mercial mortgages by conditions of negative property equity and negative
cash flow derived from net property incomes and concluded that default
risk should be estimated in a multiperiod basis for capturing differences in
the effect of default over time. When both boundary conditions of negative
property equity and negative cash flow are satisfied, these translate into
a double trigger and cause the exercise of the options. Epperson took a
similar mathematical approach by constructing a partial differential equa-
tion to yield the solution of pricing default risk in residential mortgages
in terms of house prices and interest rates. However, both pricing default
risk models ignored the prepayment option with the argument support that
there is no value in prepayment during a decline in interest rate; therefore,
competing risk between default and prepayment (i.e., when the mortgage
is prepaid, the likelihood of default is also simultaneously influenced) was
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not considered yet. Until the further theoretical development for evaluat-
ing the commercial mortgages was accomplished (Kau et al. 1987 [112] and
1990 [113]), the correlation between values of prepayment and default was
captured by the valuation model. Prepayment negates the value of default,
so prepayment ceases to be of value when default occurs. As a result, ter-
mination and boundary conditions for default would involve the condition
when the prepayment value turns zero and the same token is also applied
to prepayment.
Endogenous bias causes challenges to related studies, and the complex feed-
back mechanism shall be introduced to solve this concern. The underwriters
require different thresholds in terms of LTV ratio, mortgage payment to in-
come ratio, and mortgage terms, such as the amortization rate for different
risk groups of borrowers. Meanwhile, borrowers simultaneously choose the
most suitable mortgage design based on their own situations. Posey and
Yavas (2001[139]) authored the first theoretical research to conceptualize
the self-selection of the borrowers between adjustable- and fixed-rate mort-
gages by forming a separating equilibrium under asymmetric information in
which the interrelation of borrowers’ choices between two types of mortgages
and feedback of lenders is captured into the model so that endogenous bias
is eliminated. In other words, borrowers’ choices can be used to determine
their probability of default. A dynamic model of home mortgage default
newly constructed by Campbell et al. [35] also helps to solve endogenous
bias by applying a zero-profit condition for lenders and incorporating het-
erogeneity in borrowers’ labor income risk to figure out optimal decisions
with equilibrium mortgage rates. Apart from the emphasis on equilibrium
of mortgage choices and mortgage rates, a handful of theoretical studies de-
veloped generalized collateral equilibrium models to explain credit rationing
that address the interaction of collateral threshold and default likelihood.
All their contributions perfect theoretical models for understanding default
risk (Inderst et al. (2007)[107], Geanakoplos et al. (2014)[82]).
• Prepayment Risk
The decision to prepay is regarded as a call option. When market inter-
est rates for refinancing are lower than mortgage rates, a borrower will
consider fully prepaying the loan. It is somehow an exercise of his call op-
tion to redeem the property at a varying payoff based on net equity values
(i.e., property values minus remaining mortgage balance). Thus, prepay-
ment risk is studied using the same option pricing approach as default risk.
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However, in general, the development of the prepayment risk model lagged
far behind the default risk model in the period of 1970-1990. The first the-
oretical research on prepayment penalty was published by Dunn and Spatt
in 1985[61]. They explained the optimal strategy of banks with asymmetric
information for designing mortgage contracts with respect to prepayment
penalty to manage prepayment risk. Partial or full prepayment penalty
critically depends on risk sharing between lenders and borrowers; therefore,
prepayment risk is measured on the basis of risk sharing.
Following the phenomenal work by Dunn and Spatt, no proceedings for the
development of prepayment model were delivered until the 1990s. A more
complex prepayment risk model for distinguishing nonfinancial termination
and financial termination was introduced by Kau et al. (1992)[114]. They
embedded specific determinants that identified nonfinancial reasons, such as
divorce or death of a family member, into the theoretical valuation model
and then adopted different models (i.e., Poisson process for nonfinancial
termination and stochastic process for financial termination) to describe the
occurrence of different types of termination. This offered a new approach
to illustrate the conceptual framework of how irrational behavior influences
prepayment risk that cannot be explained by the option pricing model.
• Defeasance Option
Apart from default and prepayment, defeasance is one of the paths to ter-
minate a mortgage early by replacing a mortgage with US Treasury secu-
rities that are supposed to replicate the remaining cash flow structure of
the mortgage to gain liquidity benefit and redeem the collateral (Dierker
et al. (2005) [59], Murray (2011)[133]). The replacement is treated as an
exchange, therefore, defeasance is regarded as an exchange option. The pi-
oneering theoretical model of pricing an exchange option was developed by
Margrabe [123]; however, Dierker and his co-authors did not refer to it but
instead priced a defeasance option that is determined by prevailing interest
rates, future rates of return generated by the released property equity, and
the features of mortgage terms. Compared with both theoretical frame-
works, the defeasance option based on Dierker’s model critically depends
on a correlation between unanticipated shock to property values and short-
term interest rates, which is similar to one of the features related to the
correlation between exchange assets found in Margrabe’s study. Dierker also
assumes, however, the constant credit spread of the borrower, which might
violate Margrabe’s proposition that discount bond values are stochastic un-
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til maturity. A discrepancy in the estimated option values will be caused if
different models are applied.
Overall, theories related to termination options, particularly default options, are
well established and are deep rooted in options pricing theory. There is still room
for further development, however, to depict more complex situations related to
mortgage termination nowadays.
• Concept of installment options embedded with straddle payoff
and perfect substitute for shaping competing risk framework
The competing risk model describes an interaction between default risk and
prepayment risk. As discussed, boundary conditions of default include the
condition that prepayment options are not exercised and vice versa. The
decision to default or prepay relies on the values of both options. If default
option values are higher than prepayment, then a borrower will decide to
default and vice versa. The straddle option (i.e., long call and put on the
same underlying asset with same strike price) can describe this decision
rule as default and prepayment as analogous to put and call options. The
straddle option has the feature that the holder exercises either a call or
a put as their triggering conditions are opposite. Moreover, we should
consider the stream of mortgage payments. When the payment is made,
the maturity of the early mortgage termination option (i.e., analogous to
the straddle option) extends to the next payment date. That means the
option remains alive when a regular mortgage payment is made. Thus, the
early mortgage termination option should be analogous to the installment
option embedded with a straddle-like payoff so as to precisely describe the
decision rule between mortgage default and prepayment.
When borrowers decide to prepay their mortgages, the ways to pay up the
mortgages earlier would be thoroughly considered. Borrowers can choose
between prepayment in cash and defeasance, hence redeem the collateral
property in return. The former involves cash payment plus prepayment
penalty, and the latter involves pledged Treasury securities and setup cost.
Lenders do not bear reinvestment risk in the case of defeasance, but this
concern will be raised if mortgages are terminated by full prepayment. Pre-
payment in cash and defeasance can be treated as a pair of perfect substi-
tutes for the decision to prepay the mortgages. On the other hand, when
borrowers are near insolvency, they struggle between default and mortgage
restructuring. Both lead to early termination of the original mortgages,
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but obviously loss of lenders would be reduced under mortgage restructur-
ing compared with default. In summary, choices between prepayment in
cash and defeasance, and between default and mortgage restructuring, are
two pairs of perfect substitutes. It is because borrowers only throw them-
selves into either path of ending up the original mortgages in each extreme
situation. Indeed, it is a critical issue in the lenders’ interest; however, the
existing competing risk model merely captures the interrelation between
prepayment risk and default risk and does not consider the installment op-
tion and two pairs of perfect substitutes. Therefore, an extension of the
competing risk model will be valuable so as to dissect the risk of early
mortgage termination in a deeper sense.
• Introduction of collateral underlying supply elasticity to model
the property price movement process
The probability of early termination is determined by the change in collat-
eral property price, the financial and nonfinancial situation of the borrowers,
and the mortgage terms. Most literature (e.g., Epperson et al. 1985[65],
Kau et al. 1987[112], 1992[114], 1995[111]) describes property price move-
ments using simple stochastic processes such as geometric Brownian mo-
tions (and rarely modeled by Poisson processes). The general movement
process is not simulated in the ground of property market dynamic in a
precise way that causes a loss of important information to explain the vari-
ation of early termination behavior by property markets. The property
market dynamic relates to the property supply constraint and real estate
cycle. Hilber and Vermeulen (2016[105]) studied the impact of property
supply constraints on property price and concluded that property price re-
sponsiveness is restricted to supply constraint. That means less vigorous
change in property price by a certain level of property demand shift is
seen in less supply-constrained markets compared with more severe supply-
constrained markets. The elasticity of collateral property price to supply
can quantify the degree of supply constraints. As frequency of early mort-
gage termination varies by collateral underlying property markets, and we
do not only consider property demand factors for investigating early mort-
gage termination, it is necessary to introduce supply elasticity to model the
price movement process for estimating the probability of early mortgage
termination. Furthermore, a supply constraint is exogenous to the decision
of mortgage termination, which also helps to solve endogenous bias. As a
result, the extension can contribute to solving one of the greatest concerns
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in the related studies.
2.4 Critique of Empirical Strategies in Residential Mort-
gage Studies
The theoretical framework has evolved from the pure default risk model into the
competing risk model for capturing the interaction of likelihood of default and
prepayment as well as conceptual framework of defeasance options. Different
theoretical framework stimulates the formation of different empirical strategies,
which are used to find empirical evidence and hence justify the related theoretical
framework. The exception is that there is no empirical study of defeasance. In
general, empirical studies can be divided into three approaches that are merely
default or prepayment focused and a dual purpose for studying both default and
prepayment. Despite different approaches, findings related to transaction costs
reach a consistent conclusion; however, inconsistency is found in the influence
of heterogeneous factors. In this part, we would critically discuss the empirical
strategies implemented in residential mortgage studies.
• The empirical models in which transaction costs are involved are
questionable
The impact of transaction costs on early mortgage termination is widely
explored (Kau et al. (1993[110]), Quigley et al. (1995[143]), Ambrose et
al. (1998[11]), Deng et al. (2005[54])). Their strategies involve option pric-
ing models that are based on the assumptions of a perfect capital market
where no transaction cost is supposed. Simulation coupling with empirical
modeling (i.e., hazard model and competing risk model) are carried out to
quantify the friction driven by transaction costs, reputation costs, and costs
of moving house. This examines the impact of friction on the likelihood of
default and refinancing after being fully prepaid by comparing models with
and without friction. Although their findings reach a consistent conclusion
(i.e., the friction avoids borrowers from defaulting, and higher transaction
costs suggest higher mortgage value and hence imply a greater likelihood of
refinancing), their strategies by simple substitution of transaction costs into
the frictionless model are questionable. This is because the more compli-
cated interaction of transaction costs with other variables, such as mortgage
value, is neglected. Then, the impact of transaction costs on early mortgage
termination may be misestimated.
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• Inconsistent performance of models with unobserved heterogene-
ity
Heterogeneity can be driven by differentials of transaction costs, income,
wealth and risk level of borrowers, and collateral underlying housing market
dynamic. Furthermore, heterogeneity can be distinguished as unobserved
and observable. Wealth and risk of borrowers as well as certain features
of housing market are unobserved (Deng et al. (2000[55]), Ambrose et al.
(2001a[12] and 2001b[14]), Agarwal et al. (2006[4]), Clapp et al. (2006[49]),
Pennington-Cross (2010[134])). Competing risk models, including hazard
and multinomial logit models with unobserved heterogeneity, are the most
frequently applied empirical strategy. Deng, Quigley, and Van Order were
the pioneers to formulate this strategy and figure out that the inclusion of
unobserved heterogeneity classified by the risk level of borrowers is crucial
for studying prepayment risk but does not matter for default risk. However,
subsequent empirical studies do not yield compatible results that compet-
ing risk models without unobserved heterogeneity had greater explanatory
power for prepayment risk than those with unobserved heterogeneity. This
is because different choices, including move, refinancing after fully prepaid
and default, were considered or only default was examined in ignorance of
prepayment, which was different from the leading empirical studies (Clapp
et al. (2006) and Pennington-Cross (2010)). Furthermore, the difference in
the time span of data (i.e., mortgages issued in 1976-1983 are studied in
Deng et al. (2000), Ambrose et al. (2001a) focuses on mortgages originated
in 1989, while Agarwal et al. (2006), Clapp et al. (2006), and Pennington-
Cross (2010) select mortgages originated in 1994-2001, 1993-1994, and 2001-
2005, respectively.) and data dimension (i.e., cross-sectional data in most
studies instead of panel data used by Deng et al.) are also attributed to
this divergence. As a whole, it is hard to conclude the impact of unobserved
heterogeneity on mortgage termination risk.
In conclusion, empirical strategies formulated in the residential mortgage stud-
ies so far strive for mitigating concerns about models that are detached from
reality. Of which, endogeneity bias owing to interaction between foreclosure
(i.e., a procedure for mortgage default) and house price movement, as well as
its contagion effect across neighboring areas, is successfully eliminated by iden-
tifying the foreclosure effect with repeated sales method and estimating con-
tagion discounts to house price (Harding et al. (2009[101]), Campbell et al.
(2011[36])). Furthermore, interaction between default and prepayment driven by
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direct and indirect effects of prepayment penalties or prepayment restrictions on
early mortgage termination are also studied (An et al. (2015[17]), Fuster and
Vickery (2015[77]), Steinbuks (2015[158]), Quercia, Pennington-Cross and Tian
(2016[141]), Beltratti, Benetton, and Gavazza (2017[23])). That means interac-
tive relationships between different types of early mortgage terminations cannot
be neglected. These concerns are also raised in the commercial mortgage studies.
As a result, the residential mortgage studies offer fascinating insight for com-
mercial mortgage studies, and, indeed, certain similar approaches are seen in the
existing literature on commercial mortgages.
2.5 Critique of Empirical Studies of Commercial Mort-
gages
Akin to the study of residential mortgages, the empirical studies and simulation
analysis of commercial mortgages can be also categorized into a single focus on
default, prepayment, or defeasance and into a dual purpose for simultaneously
studying more than one termination option. The striking contrast is exhibited
in the study of defeasance that is never discussed in residential mortgages but
is exclusively found in commercial mortgages because defeasance is a special
covenant stipulated by commercial mortgage lenders. Due to data limitation,
less academic contributions to the studies of commercial mortgages are found.
This is also the reason there is no empirical research on defeasance to examine
causation and merely a handful of simulations work for estimating defeasance
options in addition to sensitivity tests to change the LTV ratio and credit rating
of CMBS loans (Akat et al. (2012[9]), Varli and Yildirim (2015[173])). Mortgage
default also dominates in the termination risk studies of commercial mortgages.
Regarding the default studies, a double trigger by negative equity value of prop-
erty and insufficient cash flow is one of the main research focuses because a double
trigger is vindicated as the key driver of commercial mortgage default, followed
by transaction costs and tax considerations. Sometimes originators and special
servicers may be able to implement austerity measures related to mortgage re-
structuring to stimulate a turnaround when borrowers come close to default.
Therefore, the related impact of originators and special servicers on mortgage
default has been investigated (Vandell (1992[169]), Vandell et al. (1993[172]),
Episcopos et al. (1998[64]), Archer et al. (2002[20]), Ciochetti et al. (2002[44],
2003[45] and 2007[46]), Goldberg et al. (2002[91]), Grovenstein et al. (2005[95]),
Titman et al. (2005[161] and 2010[163]), Seslen and Wheaton (2010[154]), Cho
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et al. (2013[43])). Concerning prepayment, the decision to prepay heavily re-
lies on changes in market interest rates and transaction costs; therefore, related
prepayment studies are discussed in these aspects (Abraham et al. (1997[1]),
Follain et al. (1997[75]), Ciochetti et al. (2002[44] and 2003[45]), Ambrose et al.
(2003[15])). Compared with the studies on residential mortgages, there is less
empirical investigation on geographical variation of default rates or prepayment
rates in commercial mortgages and a lack of delineation in how property market
dynamic interacts with the early termination of commercial mortgages. However,
the theoretical framework about termination options has necessitated empirical
proof of this interaction. In summary, the overall development of commercial
mortgage studies has not been well established so far.
Despite the concept of competing risk between default and prepayment that
emerged in the late 1980s (Hendershott et al. (1987[103])) and well developed
in the early 2000s, the investigation of interdependent risk between them has
not prevailed. In contrast, the single approach for studying either default or
prepayment is still in the majority among recent studies (An, Deng, Nichols,
and Sanders (2013[16]), Chen and Deng (2013[37]), Cho, Ciochetti, and Shilling
(2013[43]), Liu and Quan (2013[120]), Tong (2014[164])). This phenomenon is
supported by relatively weak findings of competing risk in the termination of
commercial mortgages compared with residential mortgages. Merely, Ciochetti
and Ambrose separately proved the joint nature of call and put options was em-
bedded in mortgage default and prepayment based on around 2,600 mortgages
held in the life insurance company and around 4,300 securitized mortgages. It can
be argued, however, that a much smaller sample size (i.e., not more than 5,000
cases in most studies, which roughly represents three percent of the commer-
cial mortgage markets) cause severe censoring problem and hence cannot bring
a strong evidence of competing risk. Given the enhancement of data coverage
and availability, more phenomenal empirical research under the framework of
competing risk model will be conducted.
The data sources for commercial mortgage research can be classified into three
types: anonymous life insurance companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and
CMBS database providers. The life insurance companies provide data about
commercial and multifamily mortgages held in their portfolio. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac merely offer multifamily mortgage data. The main CMBS database
providers are Trepp, Morningstar, Intex, and Bloomberg, all of which provide se-
curitized commercial and multifamily mortgage data. Trepp database even covers
nonsecuritized mortgages. Accessibility of data from the life insurance compa-
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nies is restricted and only offered with the consent of a certain single insurance
company. As a result, it is impossible to obtain a significantly large data size
from insurance companies. In contrast, data from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
as well as CMBS database providers, are available to public upon purchase. Ac-
cording to the Mortgage Bankers Association, 35% of commercial and multifamily
mortgages are held by government-sponsored entities (GSE) and CMBS and col-
lateralized debt obligation issuers in total. In other words, usage of GSE-provided
data and the CMBS loan database can help conduct more comprehensive studies
rather than data from life insurance companies, as only 13% of commercial and
multifamily mortgages are held by them2.
In terms of data dimension, life insurance companies and Bloomberg can provide
cross-sectional data, but the remaining data sources offer panel data. There is
no doubt that panel data are more helpful when certain mortgage terms and
LTV ratio, as well as debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), etc., are time-varying.
Regarding database coverage, Trepp and Bloomberg obtain detailed information
of each securitized mortgage, including every mortgage term and collateral detail,
by zip code level and collateral underlying tenancy; however, only Trepp provides
longitudinal data as mentioned. In general, academic researchers have tended to
use the CMBS loan database instead of data from the life insurance companies
due to the higher reliability and more comprehensive data coverage.
The estimation and analysis can be divided into two streams: the finance mathe-
matical model for simulation and the econometric model for empirical strategies.
Regarding the finance mathematical model, because of the framework of option
pricing theory, the contingent claim model by the Monte Carlo method is ap-
plied to estimate the related risk premium and timing to default or prepayment
(Titman et al. (1989[162]), Riddiough et al. (1993[145]), Childs et al. (1996[41]
and 1997[42]), Kelly et al. (2001[116])). Different estimates of option value were
yielded in cited research due to different assumptions on unobservable costs driven
by transaction, cross-default clauses, and prepayment penalties.
Concerning econometric models, the binary logistic model, multinomial logistic
model, and hazard model are the main methods to investigate mortgage termi-
nation behavior. The binary logistic model considers two outcomes and is most
frequently employed in default studies that mainly discussed the impact of a dou-
ble trigger (coexistence of negative property equity and negative cash flow) and
tax consideration on likelihood of default (Episcopos et al. (1998[64]), Archer et
al. (2002[20]), Goldberg et al. (2002[91]), Cho et al. (2013[43])). The multino-
2Unsecuritized mortgages issued by commercial banks account for about 50% of commercial
and multifamily mortgages.
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mial logistic model is used to predict the probability of more than two discrete
outcomes. This is a type of competing risk model to study the interaction of
default and prepayment. The competing risk hazard model with unobservable
heterogeneity is even more complicated. Hazard models are applied for examining
time to default or prepayment, which is the preferable approach for analyzing how
originators and special servicers influence default risk (Ciochetti et al. (2003[45]),
Black et al. (2012[30]), Chen et al. (2013[37])).
In general, a wide variety of datasets and methodology employed in existing
literature result in inconsistent findings, and this pushes controversial debates
about the main determinants of mortgage risk. The debate is discussed below.
On the contrary, geographical variation of default and prepayment risk was overall
concluded with consistent estimation results. Thus, it implies that the in-depth
dissection of termination risk at the geographical level will be insightful and more
reliable results will be expected.
• Endogenous underwriting process leads to inconsistent explana-
tory power of LTV ratio and DSCR
The problem of endogeneity arises from underwriters who would determine
thresholds of LTV ratio and DSCR at origination for risk management.
Academic researchers suggest different methods for solving this endoge-
nous concern. For instance, Archer[20] captured more detailed multifamily
mortgage terms as well as collateral characteristics as a proxy of risk man-
agement by underwriters; hence, the LTV ratio and DSCR were supposed
to explain unexpected default. Ambrose [15] adopted an approach similar
to Archer for securitized commercial mortgages and omitted DSCR as an
independent variable. Grovenstein et al. [95] tried to deal with endogene-
ity by replacing the original LTV ratio and DSCR with pricing margin.
Seslen and Wheaton [154] replaced the LTV ratio and DSCR at origination
with contemporaneous ones to solve the endogenous concern with the ar-
gument that contemporaneous LTV ratio and DSCR are not controlled by
underwriters and therefore are decoupled from the status at origination.
The first two approaches might not completely solve this problem and, in
contrast, generated astonishing findings that there is no relationship be-
tween LTV ratio and probability of default or prepayment. However, the
majority of studies that captured similar mortgage terms, but employed
different models other than the competing risk model used by Archer and
Ambrose, verified significantly the positive relationship of LTV ratio with
the probability of default or prepayment and the secondary importance of
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DSCR. In convention, endogeneity is solved by an instrumental variable ap-
proach or by constructing a system of simultaneous equations. The existing
literature does not tackle the concern of these approaches, and there are no
clear strategies for identifying endogeneity; thus, it is hard to justify the
explanatory power of the LTV ratio and DSCR at origination until the most
appropriate strategy is formulated. As a result, such core determinants of
default or prepayment risk cannot be ascertained.
• Inconsistent conclusion about LTV ratio and DSCR results in
possible mistakes of double triggered default
The justification of a double trigger may not be affirmed in the controversy
of the explanatory power of LTV ratio and DSCR at origination. Goldberg
et al. (2002[91]) and Vandell et al. (1993[172]) confirmed the significant
impact of joint probability of negative equity and negative cash flow on
mortgage default by simulation and empirical modeling, respectively. How-
ever, both joint functions of a double trigger consist of LTV ratio and DSCR
as inputs. If the relationship of LTV ratio and DSCR with mortgage default
or prepayment cannot be verified (as discussed above), then the statistically
significant impact driven by a double trigger will be still questionable.
• Inconsistent findings of secondary determinants of prepayment
risk
Undoubtedly, changes in market interest rates are the primary determinant
of prepayment risk. The discrepancy of statistical significance of secondary
determinants, including collateral property type and expiration of lock-
out provision, is found in related studies. Regarding collateral property
type, Ciochetti[45] attained insignificant results for explaining prepayment
by property type, whereas Ambrose[15] found that mortgage collateralized
with office property bears a greater prepayment risk but hotel collateral
helps reduce prepayment risk. The difference can be attributed to different
mortgage pools: the former is the mortgages held by the insurance com-
pany that contain a much longer history starting from the 1970s and the
latter is securitized mortgages whose time period is restricted to the 1990s
and 2000s. On the other hand, Selsen and Wheaton[154] found that the
expiration of the lockout provision can significantly explain the prepayment
risk with a positive relationship. This finding is inconsistent with the re-
sults estimated by Ambrose. Selsen and Wheaton modified the multinomial
logit model with a loan age fixed effect so as to measure the probability of
prepayment or default based on performance in the last time period rather
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than the simple multinomial logit model applied by Ambrose. In addi-
tion, delinquency was also pooled in the outcome of default by Selsen and
Wheaton, but Ambrose did not do so. Therefore, extreme inconsistency is
exhibited in the impact of prepayment provision terms on prepayment risk.
In general, the endogenous problem and data from a variety of data sources re-
sult in inconsistent findings related to termination risk of commercial mortgages.
The existing literature has not provided the best solution for dealing with the en-
dogenous problem; hence, even the explanatory power of core determinants (i.e.,
LTV ratio and DSCR at origination) lack consensus. In addition, unobserved
heterogeneity has not been in-depth examined in commercial mortgages while
there is a growing number of related empirical studies in the residential mort-
gages. Heterogeneity can be driven by a differential of special service process and
originator decisions as well as collateral characteristics. The first two have been
investigated (Chen et al. 2013[37], Titman et al. 2010[163]), but there is lack
of insightful over empirical research for examining the last one. Heterogeneous
collateral characteristics can be caused by geographical discrepancy, collateral un-
derlying property market, and variation of tenancy of collateral property. Apart
from the demand factors of property market, others are not thoroughly exam-
ined when studying the termination risk of commercial mortgages. Furthermore,
default studies dominate the existing literature, and there are only two simu-
lation studies about defeasance option (Akat et al. 2012[9], Varli and Yildirim
2015[173]). However, when property value has been climbing in the near future,
more exercises of defeasance option can be foreseen. Related empirical study
will offer fascinating insight to originators or investors. There is a lot of room
for enhancement in terms of advancement of methodology, research focus and
extension of theoretical concept.
2.6 Expected Contributions of Our Research
To contribute to the literature in the field of early termination risk of commercial
mortgages, we will deliver an original idea to extend the existing theoretical
framework. The first conceptual idea relates to installment options and perfect
substitutes for shaping the competing risk framework, as discussed in Section
2.3. Early mortgage termination is analogous to an installment option embedded
with a straddle-like payoff. The borrower can choose default (put) or prepayment
(call) options to maximize the value of early mortgage termination. We apply
this analogy in Chapter Four to build the theoretical model.
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All five outcomes-defeasance, prepayment in cash, continuation of scheduled pay-
ment, mortgage restructuring and default-will be considered in the new concept
developed in Chapter Five, in which a two-step decision process is conceptualized
as the two-stage option pricing theoretical framework. The first step involves
three options: surrendering the collateral, continuing scheduled mortgage pay-
ment and redeeming the collateral. The second step is to consider which way
to surrender the collateral or to redeem the collateral in each extreme situation;
therefore, mortgage restructuring and default is the pair of perfect substitutes
for the way to deny the obligation and to surrender the collateral, and defea-
sance and prepayment is another pair of perfect substitutes for the approach to
redeem the collateral. The new framework depicts this decision process. On the
other side, property supply elasticity is introduced into the theoretical frame-
work. The reasoning is discussed in Section 2.3. The property price movement
process is modified by bounding with supply elasticity, that is in line with the
restriction of price responsiveness by supply constraints. This helps to model
mortgage termination risk with greater attachment to real property market dy-
namic. To precisely estimate the long-run supply elasticity for modeling mortgage
risk, we attempt to empirically identify the mismatch between landlords and ten-
ants that causes disequilibrium in the commercial property market. This is the
main contribution to the research field of property supply constraints because
extant empirical studies do not cover commercial real estate. To conclude, we ex-
pect the study sheds light on pricing commercial mortgage risks and quantifying
commercial property supply constraints.
Our key hypotheses include: (1) the supply of commercial property markets is
highly inelastic because of zoning and, more importantly, structural vacancy;
landlords may intend to keep property vacant so as to seek “targeted” tenants,
(2) positive correlation between supply elasticity and structural vacancy offers
an alternative indicator for measuring supply constraints, and (3) impacts of
property supply constraints on four types of early termination options, which are
significant. Mortgages collateralized with properties in supply inelastic areas are
more likely early terminated through the denial of obligations.
Based on our estimation results of the long-run supply elasticity of office markets
in 42 metropolitan area, all markets are supply inelastic. Office rent response is
more sensitive to change in mismatch rate compared with fundamental demand
factors (i.e., increase in the rate by 1% reduces real rent by 0.02-0.7%.) This
finding verifies our first hypothesis. For the second hypothesis, we have yielded a
positive correlation between supply elasticity and structural vacancy as hypoth-
esized. The third hypothesis have been also verified in the third research, thus
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the important role of property supply constraints in determining the likelihood
of early mortgage termination is proved.
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Chapter 3
Supply Elasticity and Search
Equilibrium in Office Markets
3.1 Abstract
In the current shift from fixed to flexible office space demand, we focus on the offer
response to demand changes by presenting a new conceptual model for the esti-
mation of office supply elasticity in commercial real estate markets. We transfer
concepts from labour economics to define frictional and structural vacancy and
develop a theoretical framework where the presence of physical and economic
mismatch leads to either permanent or temporary levels of vacant space within
a fundamental real estate cycle model.
Empirically, we identify economic mismatch by observing landlords who re-let
occupied space. Estimating an error correction model with 4 simultaneous equa-
tions, we determine the long-run equilibrium and matching process from short-run
disequilibrium to estimate elasticity and structural vacancy rate in 42 Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (MSAs) covering almost 50% of the entire US population
and 60% of the office workforce. We find that MSAs are supply inelastic and our
results are consistent with previous studies in housing markets. We also prove
that the search and matching process is significant and improves the ability to
explain our results. Finally, a positive correlation between estimated supply elas-
ticity and structural vacancy implies that the low controlling power of landlords
reduces the flexibility in adjusting equilibrium vacancies to respond to market
shocks, thus supply elasticity is likely to be explained entirely by geographical
and regulatory constraints.
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3.2 Introduction
The price responsiveness to property supply always draws great interest among
policy makers, particularly in the literature investigating house price bubbles.
Over the last decade, we have witnessed a revolutionary shift in the nature of of-
fice space demand from individual offices to collaborative space. On one hand, all
major corporations (e.g. Facebook, Google, Ernst and Young, PricewaterhouseC-
oopers) have been advocating for open and shared workspace and adopted work-
from-home policies. On the other hand, smaller companies (especially ventures
and sole traders) have been using shared office facilities to efficiently maximize
networking opportunities offered by new providers of workspace. Moreover, less
demand in office space is foreseen when more on-site tasks are assigned and more
tedious work is superseded by automation. Facing all these changes, the ability
of supply to adjust to new requirements and temporary mismatch (hence the
presence of supply constraints in the office sector) can be used to predict the
impact of a negative demand shock on property prices.
Supply constraints are generally classified into two main categories: regulatory
and physical. Regulatory constraints are measured by the tightness of the devel-
opment approval process, which is usually identified through surveys (Gyourko
et al 2008 [99], Saks 2008 [150]). Saiz 2010([149]) introduced a new empirical
strategy where land unavailability is measured to solve the endogenous problem,
identifying the tightness of both regulatory and physical constraints of housing
supply. Overall constraints are quantified by supply elasticity, which is mostly
estimated using an urban growth-based econometric model.
We may argue that supply elasticity for offices should be positively correlated
with the one in housing markets because the tightness of planning regulation and
geographical barriers should not differ within the same area. However, lacking
empirical evidence for non-residential markets, different dynamics of market com-
petition between suppliers and divergent incentives to control the restrictiveness
of supply constraints between different property markets motivate the focus of
our study in office supply elasticity by metropolitan statistical area (hereafter
MSA).
In fact, the higher proportion of informed investors in the office sector compared
to the residential markets leads to a “strategically managed” availability of office
space supply. In equilibrium, supply could be influenced by investors’ approach
to control the flow of available office space as their strategy is rooted in the
search and matching theory, initially applied in housing markets by Wheaton
(1990[175]). Since lease contracts are long-term and have fixed rents, landlords
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strategically keep aside a predefined amount of vacant space for high-profile ten-
ants who will afford higher rents in the future, maximizing their profits. This
amount of space may also vary over boom and bust cycles.
In our research, we define this situation as economic mismatch where a bid-
ask rental gap exists until landlord and tenant’s requirements match and the
vacant space is occupied. This mismatch situation may also be present in a
long run equilibrium increasing the natural vacancy rate. Simultaneously, the
vacant space in non-prime (i.e. class B or C) office buildings is due to its old-
fashioned and worn-out physical design that requires a refurbishment to reach
prime quality before their use can be guaranteed. We define this phenomenon
as physical mismatch and we argue that it can also increase the long-run natural
vacancy rate due to long lease terms (even above 5-6 years) locking in tenants
for predefined time periods in sometimes physically mismatched space. Unlike
in housing markets where households act as both buyers and sellers and the
searching process mainly affects the short-run disequilibrium, office landlords
(i.e. sellers of a space rental service) with higher controlling power are capable
of altering the long-run equilibrium of supply. As a consequence, we believe that
equilibrium vacancy is highly important because it may distort the responsiveness
of rents to office supply.
Moreover, the analogy of real estate and labour markets (where a well-established
search and matching model can be applied) helps us to transfer the concept of un-
employment to unoccupied space, distinguishing three types of vacancy: cyclical,
structural and frictional. This set up also sheds light on the three components
driving long-run vacancy: mismatch rate, search effort level (for structural) and
demand of refurbishment (for frictional). We find that a search equilibrium does
exist and we show that equilibrium vacancy should be determined at the time of
the search equilibrium.
We initially build a conceptual framework to link supply elasticity and long-run
vacancy. We then suggest an empirical strategy to identify economic mismatch
(i.e. space in use which is available for re-let to new tenants instead of existing
tenants), to quantify the search effort (i.e. relative size of available letting space
listed), and to determine a simultaneous equilibrium in the market and the search
and matching process using an error correction model.
Our empirical findings support the argument that a search equilibrium is essential
to estimate office supply elasticity, which is found to be positively correlated with
structural vacancy. As low structural vacancy implies less control by landlords,
we argue that the price responsiveness to supply changes is almost completely
explained by regulatory and geographical issues when office sectors are supply
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inelastic.
This chapter is organized as follows: the next section provides a literature review
related to supply constraints, vacancy and search equilibrium; section 3.4 presents
our conceptual model. In section 3.5, we explain our empirical strategy including
data description and error correction model framework. Sections 3.6 and 3.7
include main results, robustness tests and a discussion about supply elasticity
rankings by MSA. Finally, we draw our conclusions and present further research
directions in the last section.
3.3 Literature Review
Property supply is a crucial factor in property market dynamics together with
demand shocks and, as a result, we find a growing number of studies on supply
constraints and their policy implications. However, as the variation of supply
elasticity by city/municipality is found significant, a data shortage for commercial
property markets exists globally, so the main literature focuses on US housing
markets. Green et al. (2005) [92] argued that the variation of supply elasticity
among 44 MSAs is explained by the difference in local regulation. Saiz (2010)
[149] suggested an empirical strategy to prove Green et al.’s (2005) argument, to
solve the endogeneity issue, and to identify physical and regulatory constraints for
95 MSAs by quantifying land unavailability through Geographical Information
System (GIS) and referring to the Wharton residential land regulatory index.
Wheaton et al. (2014) [176] provided a unique approach, merging the stock-flow
framework and urban growth theory to disentangle the short-run disequilibrium
from the long-term trend of housing prices and to estimate both long-run and
short-run supply elasticities for 68 MSAs.
Furthermore, large-scale surveys on the planning approval process are used to
measure the stringency of regulatory supply constraints using intensive resources
and well-designed questionnaires to mitigate the "selection bias" in information
disclosure by interviewees. So far, the Wharton Residential Land Use Index com-
piled by Gyourko et al (2008) [99] and the Saks’s composite index (2008) [150] are
frequently cited and the most influential measures. The former consists of 11 sub-
indices regarding political pressure, ease of zoning approval, supply, and density
restrictions for 293 MSAs. Data was collected through the largest survey where
planning directors of around 2600 municipalities were interviewed in the 2000’s.
Because of the high response rates, the dataset represents the most reliable mea-
surement of regulatory constraints to date. The latter, instead, was constructed
by taking the average of six independent surveys related to the processing time
37
of zoning approval, severity of population growth controls, protection of historic
sites and environmental regulation conducted for 83 MSAs between 1975 and
1990. Although Saks covered fewer MSAs, the index is considered robust and
often cited in the literature.
Table 3.1 exhibits the Spearman rank correlation matrix of the five main regu-
lation indices, estimations of supply elasticities in the US housing markets, and
two versions of our measure for offices. Since some measures refer to elasticities
and others to constraints, we report absolute values to make the comparison eas-
ier1. In general, findings for housing supply constraints are consistent. Overall,
correlation coefficients of Saiz’s supply elasticity with other indices (except for
Wheaton’s long-run supply elasticity) are the highest, followed by the Wharton
index. This evidence may be attributed to similar methodologies adopted by Saiz
(2010), Gyourko et al. (2008) and Saks (2008). Since Green et al. (2005) and
Wheaton et al. (2014) applied different methods relatively lower correlations are
found. Finally, the correlation coefficients of our estimated office supply elasticity
with these studies (last two rows and columns) show consistency with previous
housing market measures (further discussion will be included in Section 3.7).
1All coefficients have expected signs: positive between two measures of elasticity (or con-
straint) and positive between an elasticity measure and an inverse of regulatory constraint
index
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Table 3.1: Spearman Rank Correlation Matrix of Supply Elasticity between Housing and Offices in the US
WRLURI Saks Green Saiz Wheaton(LR) Office(With RSI) Office (Without RSI)
WRLURI 1
Saks 0.552*** 1
Green 0.357** 0.511*** 1
Saiz 0.545*** 0.613*** 0.627*** 1
Wheaton(LR) 0.435*** 0.368** 0.331** 0.370*** 1
Office(With RSI) 0.371* 0.284# 0.122 0.121 0.141 1
Office(Without RSI) 0.421*** 0.460*** 0.242 0.239# 0.449*** 0.818*** 1
Notes: WRLURI and Saks are regulation indices measured by number of standard deviation of regulatory restrictiveness in housing
markets (greater value indicates looser regulation), others estimate housing supply elasticity. For Saiz index, supply elasticity is
presented in 2 decimal places. Data is slightly adjusted by extrapolation when same figures are shown but in different ranks. LR
denotes “Long Run” elasticity respectively. Signs ***, ** and * as well as # represent significant results at 1%, 5%, 10% and 20%
level respectively.
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Compared to housing markets, regulatory constraints in commercial real estate
curtail fiscal revenues to a greater extent, but they reduce negative externali-
ties such as congestion and pollution. As a result, the restrictiveness of supply
constraints in commercial property markets is even more driven by local cir-
cumstances when local governments attempt to reconcile their fiscal need with
concerns for the living environment (Fischel 1973 [72]). Since commercial data
is hard to access, rare empirical studies on supply elasticity are found in non-
residential markets. Benjamin et al. (1998) [24] are an exception and studied
retail space supply elasticity for 34 MSAs, distinguishing short- and long-run by
adopting a stock-flow model. Since an endogenous cycle driven by longer produc-
tion lags and lease terms in commercial markets adds complexity to the structure
of housing ones, the short-run disequilibrium shall not be ignored as a biased
estimation of supply constraints may be obtained. Moreover, a stock-flow model
proves to be the appropriate approach to disentangle the short-run disequilibrium
from the long-run state.
So far, a causal relationship between supply constraints and vacancy is not con-
sidered to estimate supply elasticity. Only two aforementioned studies - Benjamin
et al. (1998) [24] and Wheaton et al. (2014) [176] - implicitly involved imbal-
ances between supply and demand by using a stock-flow model where vacancy is
captured in the estimation of supply elasticity. Cheshire et al. (2018) [38] filled
this gap and showed that tightening regulatory constraints on housing markets
in the UK significantly increased vacancy rates because inflexible planning hin-
ders the matching process - i.e. demand for housing characteristics is satisfied.
Furthermore, they point out that in office markets an increase in price volatility
motivates landlords to keep properties empty since the value of real options (e.g.
option to defer) increases. Fluctuations in vacancy rates driven by mismatch
hinge on supply constraints and may function as an alternative test on the plau-
sibility of supply elasticity estimates. Hence, importantly, equilibrium vacancy
has to be considered.
When markets clear, an equilibrium is reached but the vacancy rate may still not
be necessarily equal to zero. Academic researchers have started to investigate
equilibrium vacancy rates since the late 1980s. Most scholars - Rosen and Smith
(1983)[148], Gabriel et al. (1988[78] and 2001[79]), Shilling et al. (1987)[156],
Jud et al. (1990)[108], Englund et al. (2008)[63], Hendershott et al. (2013)[104]
- have referred to it as natural vacancy, or the rate of unoccupied space where
rents remain unchanged. Others - e.g. Wheaton and Torto (1988)[177], Sivi-
tanides (1997)[157] - have referred to it as structural vacancy, but their definition
and estimation approach - rental adjustment originally developed by Eubank and
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Sirmans (1979)[66] - do not differ from the former. Moreover, frictional vacancy is
discussed similarly to structural vacancy (Wheaton and Torto (1988[177]). How-
ever, if we fully transfer the concept of unemployment in labour markets to the
one of vacancy in real estate markets, we may be able to better understand the
role of natural vacancy, its components, and the causes of disequilibrium. We,
therefore, can also develop a more coherent conceptual framework of real estate
cycles in conjunction with supply constraints.
Search frictions inevitably derail competitive price formation in property markets
and cause vacancy. This requires studies with the assumption of imperfect prop-
erty markets, where clearance is not instantaneous and without cost. The search
and matching theory is developed by Diamond (1971)[57] to explain unemploy-
ment in labour markets. Diamond’s (1971)[57] paradox suggests that even small
search costs drive equilibrium from a competitive to a monopoly price. Further,
theoretical work by Diamond (1982)[58] features multiple steady-state rational
expectations equilibriums implying that the economy with trade frictions - (Salop
1979)[151] - does not have a unique natural rate of unemployment due to search
externalities generating inefficient outcomes at the macro level - i.e. time-varying
features of natural unemployment exist. Since the concept of natural vacancy
in property markets is similar to the one of natural unemployment in labour
markets, we can expect time-varying characteristics for natural vacancy as well.
Diamond’s equilibrium model is rooted in the lifetime utility earned by an indi-
vidual who switches from employment to unemployment. This has become the
foundation of equilibrium models featuring search and matching, and further de-
velopments are presented by Mortensen and Pissarides (1985[138], 1994[131] and
1999[132]) who analysed how aggregate shocks lead to cyclical fluctuations in
unemployment, job vacancy, and employment flow simultaneously. An aggregate
matching function was set up to describe the search process between workers and
firms. Whether a search process is sequential (i.e. an action taken in one period
leads to several new actions becoming available in next period) or non-sequential
depends on the searching methods, a search equilibrium does exist - Keller and
Oldale (2003)[115], Van Ommeren and Russo (2014)[165]. The search equilibrium
is reached when unemployment is maintained at the equilibrium state (i.e. nat-
ural rate of unemployment) and three components can be identified separately:
• structural unemployment is unemployment that results when wages are
set above the level that brings supply and demand into equilibrium. The
number of jobs available is insufficient to provide a job for everyone who
wants one;
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• frictional unemployment is due to the difficulty of matching workforce
skills with requirements from demand. It takes time for workers to search
for the jobs that best suit their tastes and skills;
• cyclical unemployment is related to short term fluctuations due to tem-
porary phenomena (e.g. workforce mobility). It is the deviation of unem-
ployment from its natural rate.
On one hand, the existing literature in real estate markets studies the creation of
temporary inventories by landlords to maximize net rental receipts during peri-
ods of strong demand - Rosen et al. (1983), Shilling et al. (1987), Gabriel et al.
(1988), Wheaton et al. (1988). In fact, landlords sometimes hold vacant space
deliberately until they reach ideal tenants who can afford higher rents, i.e. with a
rental floor above the equilibrium level (economic mismatch, even with a physical
match). And, if we also consider the search process, deliberately holding vacant
space may lead to an extension of the searching time. On the other hand, we
could also observe vacant space because the physical characteristics of a build-
ing become obsolete for the new demand and hence a refurbishment becomes
necessary to reach occupation. So far in the literature, these two features are
not jointly studied and we believe it is insightful to combine them in a model to
investigate how this behaviour determines equilibrium vacancy and market dise-
quilibrium. In order to do so, we firstly identify three types of vacancy mirroring
the labour market literature:
• structural vacancy derives from landlords holding empty buildings to
wait for higher future rents which might be above equilibrium level (eco-
nomic mismatch)
• frictional vacancy relates to the space on offer whose physical character-
istics cannot be matched with tenants’ requirements and hence this space
is not absorbed until being refurbished (physical mismatch)
• cyclical vacancy refers to the excess property supply due to a short-term
fluctuation in economic or business conditions (economic mismatch)
Importantly, the simultaneous effect of cyclical and structural/frictional factors
on unemployment represents an obstacle to the empirical identification of each
unemployment type - Rissman (1986)[146]. However, while cyclical factors lead
to short-run unoccupied space, structural and frictional factors tend to affect
the long-run equilibrium state; therefore, the estimation of an error correction
model offers a suitable approach by separating the short-run impact from the
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long-run trend. In our model, short-term fluctuations will result from search
disequilibrium and economic shocks.
Wheaton (1990)[175] extended the search and matching model from labour mar-
kets to housing markets and assumed structural vacancy being equivalent to
natural vacancy computed as (1 - number of households/housing units) upon
the condition that expected house prices equal marginal supply costs. Matching
statuses vary by changes in households, which turn into new demand for larger
or smaller houses, and the matching speed relies on the search effort required.
To smooth the matching process, vacant houses are necessary in the long-run
and structural vacancy can be explained by market activities. In our conceptual
model, we jointly determine structural vacancy with a matching process. Build-
ing our conceptual model, we also empirically demonstrate the importance of
search and matching to estimate supply elasticity.
3.4 Conceptual Framework
We set up the conceptual model to determine the relationship between natural va-
cancy and supply elasticity in commercial real estate rental markets following the
previous work of Wheaton (1990)[175] in housing markets. We classify mismatch
between landlords and tenants into two categories: economic and physical.
Economic mismatch is defined as the point at which desired rent levels (rD) of a
landlord cannot be satisfied. In other words, all bid rents offered by tenants (rB)
are lower than the landlord’s asking rent.
For physical characteristics, instead, we distinguish property space S as defined
by N heterogeneous characteristics (i.e. building facilities such as ventilators,
lifts, car parks, panoramic views, size, etc.), with i referring to the element of the
set (I = 1, · · · , N ). Tenants’ required property characteristics j can be divided
into two groups: (1) matched with space characteristics provided, and (2) par-
tially unmatched characteristics. Some provided space characteristics may also
be redundant and no tenant requires them. J denotes the set of tenants’ required
characteristics, and its major part is the overlapping subset with I.
Physical mismatch is identified by the second group of J and redundant space
characteristics offered. Suppose some i match with j belonging to the first group
of J . We denote i as im indicating with subscript m that characteristics are
matched. Instead, bundles of characteristics i not matching j are defined as in,
where subscript n stands for non-matched (i.e. mismatched) characteristics. If
we consider the time-varying feature of property space in the long-run, the supply
of space can be categorized as follow: Sim,l,t and Sin,l,t, where t represents time.
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Combining physical and economic matching, space supply is divided into four
main groups:
• Both economic and physical match: Sim|rBt ≥rDt ,l,t
• Economic mismatch and physical match: Sim|rBt <rDt ,l,t
• Economic match and physical mismatch: Sin|rBt ≥rDt ,l,t
• Both economic and physical mismatch: Sin|rBt <rDt ,l,t
3.4.1 Vacancy Type
Vacancy (classified as mismatched space) depends on both economic and physical
matching. If both economic and physical characteristics are matched, the space is
occupied by tenants. At time 0 (i.e. when a rental contract is signed), all deals are
made in the condition that both economic and physical requirements are satisfied.
Long-term leases lead to changes in mismatch status of occupied space because
of immediate rent adjustments by landlords and/or tenants moving to suitable
office space based on their latest requirements. This short- vs long-run dynamic
implies that the mismatch status of occupied space may switch among the four
aforementioned groups, with a minor role played by the last group. On the other
hand, new tenants may introduce new requirements of space characteristics and
bid and/or asking rents may change as a consequence. Clearly, the status of
vacant space may vary over time among the last three types (excl. joint economic
and physical match). We further classify space supply according to its tenancy
(occupied vs vacant) and the mismatch status (matched vs non-matched and
economic vs physical) in the following equation:
Si,l,t = Sim|rBt ≥rDt ,l,t(occupied) + Sim|rBt <rDt ,l,t(occupied)+
Sin|rBt ≥rDt ,l,t(occupied) + Sin|rBt <rDt ,l,t(occupied)+
Sim|rBt <rDt ,l,t(vacant) + Sin|rBt ≥rDt ,l,t(vacant) + Sin|rBt <rDt ,l,t(vacant)
(3.1)
When the search and matching process is completed, a long-run stable equilibrium
is reached, where physically mismatched space would not be occupied any longer;
2 therefore, equation 3.1 collapses into equation 3.2 in the long-run:
2The second line of equation 3.1 - Sin|rBt ≥rDt ,l,t(occupied) and Sin|rBt <rDt ,l,t (occupied) - equal
zero because occupied and physically mismatched space either becomes vacant or refurbished
and then matched in the long-run.
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Si,l,t = Sim|rBt ≥rDt ,l,t(occupied) + Sim|rBt <rDt ,l,t(occupied)+
Sim|rBt <rDt ,l,t(vacant) + Sin,l,t(vacant)
(3.2)
Following a three-way decomposition of the vacancy rate taken from the labour
literature, we then identify the three types of vacancies as follows:
Structural vacancy: Landlords deliberately hold vacant space (maybe un-
listed) until reaching out to their ideal tenants who can afford rents exceed-
ing an equilibrium level, i.e. a rent floor is set above the equilibrium level.
Assuming that the space characteristics match tenants’ requirements but bid
rents are lower than asking rents, structural vacancy (V sl,t) is a percentage rate
of Sim|rBt <rDt ,l,t(vacant)/Si,l,t that we classify as economically mismatched and
physically matched.
Frictional vacancy: The process of matching physical characteristics of build-
ings may lead to the formation of a vacancy. A certain amount of space may
not match tenants’ requirements and therefore it may not be occupied until it is
renovated. We qualify this type of vacant space as physically mismatched, and ac-
cording to equation 3.2, frictional vacancy (V fl,t) is obtained as Sin,l,t(vacant)/Si,l,t
3.
Cyclical vacancy: Excess property supply results from short-term fluctuations
in the general economy or the specific business sector that requires office space.
However, responses of tenants and landlords to short-term shocks are delayed
because of fixed-term leases and construction lags. This type of vacant space
(V cl,t) is supposed to match with tenant’s requirements, and we classify it as eco-
nomically mismatched and physically matched.
To summarize, a natural vacancy rate (V nl,t) exists in the long-run, and the sum of
structural and frictional vacancy represents its measure. Particularly, structural
vacancy represents the non-cyclical component of Sim|rBt <rDt ,l,t(vacant)/Si,l,t.
3.4.2 Short Run and Long Run Supply Curve
Following Helsley and Strange (2008) [102], we construct the increasing and con-
vex construction function with respect to building height and the concave profit
function of a developer. To benefit from economies of scale, a developer decides
3The last term of equation 3.2 is obtained by adding the last two terms of equation 3.1
without distinguishing economic match vs mismatch for physically mismatched properties in
the long-run.
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how many floors should be built to maximize the profit. This convex construction
function implies a convex kinked long-run supply curve:
pi(hl,t) = rl,thl,t − c(hl,t) (3.3)
pi: developer’s profit
hl,t: building height for a developed property which is located in city l at time
t
rl,t: rent per floor for a property in city l at time t
c: construction function.
When rl,t = c′(hl,t), the profit is maximized. New supply is assumed to match
tenants’ needs as developers thoroughly study tenants’ demand and their pref-
erences of property characteristics before building. In addition, we assume that
developers also base their investment decision on expected rental growth, with
demand shocks in property markets leading to changes in expectations about fu-
ture rents. The short-run supply is extremely inelastic as weak responsiveness to
rental changes is the result of construction lags.
3.4.3 Short- and Long-Run Equilibrium Rent
The demand function (Dl,t) of commercial properties is driven by factors linked
to industry-related revenues and expectations about the future business environ-
ment. The income growth for residents may reflect the prosperity of the business
environment, as more bonuses would be shared with employees in a robust econ-
omy. A demand shock is normally triggered by a business environment change
such as a shock in employment for sectors requiring office space. At the same
time, we assume that corporations can execute an immediate plan to adjust the
workforce after anticipating the future business outlook. In other words, current
employment (EMl,t) in city l at time t indicates the expectation about the fu-
ture business environment, which drives demand for space. Along with aggregate
income for residents (RIl,t) and rents (rl,t), equation 3.4 describes the long-run
demand.
Dl,t = f(EMl,t, RIl,t, rl,t) (3.4)
Figure 3.1 shows the effect of a positive shock to the aggregate demand (from AD1
to AD2) due to a sudden increase in employment caused by a company relocation
to the city. Rents increase and, as a consequence, the amount of supply slightly
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increases; however, the growth is curtailed by an inelastic short-run supply.
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Figure 3.1: Long- and Short-Run Aggregate Demand and Supply Curve of Property
Space
At the point of long-run equilibrium, the demand (Dl,t) for office space should
exactly equal the amount of supply (Sl,t) after some adjustments. However, a
small component of supply remains unoccupied because of market frictions (a
costly search and matching process generates frictional vacancy (V fl,t) and the
landlords’ strategy of holding vacant space for future gains gives rise to structural
vacancy (V sl,t). Therefore, we expect that in equilibrium demand equals supply
only after deducting vacant space due to frictional and structural vacancy as
follows:
Dl,t = (1− V fl,t)(1− V sl,t)Sl,t (3.5)
In the short-run, changes in demand are not completely met by changes in supply.
The satisfaction, quantified by space absorption, hinges on matching rates (ωl,t)
of tenants in market l. As suggested in Cheshire et al. (2018)[38], a matching rate
is determined by the level of search effort required (l,t) and the ratio of vacant
property to mismatched tenants (θl,t = Sl,t(vacant) / Sim|rBt <rDt ,l,t(occupied))
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through a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas matching function (Cheshire et
al. 2018):
ωl,t = α ∗ βl,t ∗ θ(1−β)l,t (3.6)
where α is a constant and β represents the weighting. Therefore, space absorption
can be described by equation 3.7. If demand was fully met, the distance “ab” in
the Figure 1 would indicate the net absorption in the short-run.
ABl,t = ∆Dl,t ∗ ωl,t (3.7)
Simultaneously, a construction lag hinders immediate supply responses and, as
a result, changes in supply are not fully realized. In order to reflect an effect
of construction lag in our empirical investigation, a lagged change in supply is
singled out to determine a change in vacancy and z in equation 3.8 represents
the number of construction lags.
∆Vl,t = ∆Sl,t−z −∆Dl,t ∗ ωl,t (3.8)
Assuming that one unit of demand shock in the market stimulates a one percent
increase in rents, equation 3.8 suggests that a change in vacancy can be estimated
by subtracting the matching rate from the responsiveness of supply. A match-
ing rate model is used to identify structural vacancy and, assuming negligible
frictional vacancy rates, the change in vacancy can be decomposed into supply
elasticity and change in structural vacancy.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
The systems of long- and short-run simultaneous equations are constructed based
on the above conceptual framework to find empirical evidence for our arguments:
• the cyclicality of a commercial real estate market is determined by a search
and matching process, which identifies structural vacancy;
• the search and matching process is necessary to estimate supply elasticity
consistently.
3.5.1 Empirical Model
Our empirical model captures the mismatch between landlords and tenants and
the search effort required to find the search equilibrium. First, we derive the
48
equation of long-run real rent from the demand function (equation 3.4) and, sub-
sequently, we add the mismatch variable, which proxies for the need of searching.
Second, we assume that landlords are capable of controlling the matching process;
therefore, the long-run supply equation contains both a mismatch rate and search
effort level, which are determined by the quantity of information about available
properties. Moreover, operating expenses charged by property management firms
and the difference between capitalization and mortgage rates are considered cost
shifters.
Third, because of a concern about endogeneity in the matching process, we in-
troduce simultaneous equations for search effort level and mismatch rate. The
equation of search effort level is constructed with real aggregate personal income
(exogenous), which proxies for business outlook, and rents and supply as the two
endogenous factors in the search process. A change in city size, which is iden-
tified by a change in population, alters the mismatch rate because new tenants
may increase demand by moving in from other cities. Shifts in business outlook
are also considered because the tenants’ plan for expansion and the landlords’
strategy to seek “targeted” tenants may be altered. Therefore, the equation of
mismatch rate contains population and aggregate personal income as proxies for
business outlook along with property supply.
As a whole, four long-run equations are built in a simultaneous system, where
variables are transformed to natural logarithms (excl. mismatch rate, search
effort level, and cap minus mortgage rates), and fixed time effects and fixed MSA
effects are used to capture any unobserved time-varying or local characteristics.
The residual of each long-run equation is represented by µl,t, and its lagged term
µl,t−1 is the error correction term used in the short run equations to compute the
speed of adjustment to reach a long-run equilibrium. The simultaneous system
is solved using a three-stage least squares estimation.
Covering 43 MSAs, the system of long-run simultaneous equations can be repre-
sented as follows (please refer to Table 3.2 for notations):
ln(RRIl,t) = d0 + d1ln(Sl,t−1) + d2ln(EMPl,t−2orINEMIl,t−2) + d3ln(RIPCl,t−4)+
d4MRl,t−1 + d5 ∗Recession+ d6ATHt +
49∑
n=7
dnMSA× ln(Sl,t−1) + µRRIl,t
(3.9)
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ln(Sl,t) = e0 + e1ln(RRIl,t−12) + e2ln(ROPEXl,t−12) + e3SELl,t−1+
e4MRl,t−1 + e5CMl,t−2 + e6 ∗Recession+ e7ATHt + e8HUl+
e9ATHt ×HUl + e10ATHt × ln(RRIl,t−12) + e11HUl × ln(RRIl,t−12)+
e12ATHt ×HUl × ln(RRIl,t−12) +
55∑
m=13
emMSA× ln(RRIl,t−12) + µSl,t
(3.10)
MRl,t = f0 + f1ln(POPIl,t−1) + f2ln(EMPl,t−1) + f3ln(RIPCl,t−1) + f4ln(Sl,t−1)+
f5 ∗Recession+ µMRl,t
(3.11)
SELl,t = g0+g1ln(RRIl,t−1)+g2ln(Sl,t−1)+g3ln(RIPCl,t)+g4∗Recession+µSELl,t
(3.12)
Our aim is to estimate the long-run supply elasticity for each MSA. We compute
it by adding coefficients e1 to em of the corresponding MSA. In order to check
the robustness of our model, we also compute demand elasticity by taking the
reciprocal of the sum of d1 and dn of the corresponding MSA.
Construction costs are theoretically a significant determinant of property supply;
however, we would need to restrict our analysis to only 30 MSAs if we were
to include construction costs in our model because construction data is hardly
available for all MSAs. Hence, we present the main results using the full sample of
MSAs excluding construction costs and present an estimation of models including
construction costs for the reduced sample as a robustness test. Results are not
significantly different.
To capture short-run dynamics, we also solve four short-run simultaneous equa-
tions in an Engle-Granger framework. The reciprocal of the error correction term
coefficient indicates the quarterly percentage of adjustment of each dependent
variable (i.e. real rent, office stock, search effort level, and economic mismatch
rate) to its long-run equilibrium. We expect coefficients to be negative and with
an absolute value between 0 and 1.
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∆ln(RRIl,t) = d50 + d51∆ln(Sl,t−1) + d52∆ln(EMPl,t−2orINEMIl,t−2)+
d53∆ln(RIPCl,t−4) + d54∆MRl,t−1 + d55µRRIl,t−1 + νRRIl,t
(3.13)
∆ln(Sl,t) = e56 + e57∆ln(RRIl,t−12) + e58∆ln(ROPEXl,t−12) + e59∆SELl,t−1
e60∆MRl,t−1 + e61∆CMl,t−2 + e62µSl,t−1 + νSl,t
(3.14)
∆MRl,t = f6 + f7∆ln(POPIl,t−1) + f8∆ln(EMPl,t−1) + f9∆ln(RIPCl,t−1)+
f10∆ln(Sl,t−1) + f11µMRl,t−1 + νMRl,t
(3.15)
∆SELl,t = g5+g6∆ln(RRIl,t−1)+g7∆ln(Sl,t−1)+g8∆ln(RIPCl,t)+g9µSELl,t−1+νSELl,t
(3.16)
Lag Selection
As the business outlook is normally projected based on actual performance over
the previous year and corporations adjust their headcount over the following two
quarters, an expansion of office space should be decided following a change in
their work plan. We, therefore, choose a four-quarter lagged aggregate income
per capita, two-quarter lagged employment to population, and one-quarter lagged
office stock in our estimation. Furthermore, landlords may adjust asking prices
based on recent evidence of economic mismatch and hence a rental adjustment
may be realized upon a deal being agreed. As a result, a one-quarter lagged
economic mismatch rate is selected.
As far as the supply equation is concerned, we rely on the findings of time-to-plan
and time-to-build for non-residential buildings by Millar et al. (2012[129]) and
Montgomery (1995[130]) and use a total time lag to plan and build 12 quarters for
real rents, real construction costs, and real operating expenses. Although costs
for funding should be considered in parallel with rents for appraisal purposes, we
also need to consider the timing needed to release almost or just completed space
based on foreseeable profitability, which can be proxied by the difference between
a capitalization rate and costs of funding. If a good timing to catch high prof-
itability is foreseen, the newly completed offices will be released to the market.
Pre-let activities normally begin around two quarters before completion and this
51
time is then used as a lag for the difference between cap rates and mortgage rates.
As credit markets mis-price risk (Wachter 2016[174]), the difference between cap
rates and mortgage rates would be exogenous. Since supply in equilibrium is ad-
justed by structural vacancy, one-quarter lagged search effort level and mismatch
rate are used to explain current supply.
As landlords can adjust the quantities of listed properties based on recent mar-
ket developments and the current exogenous business environment, we expect
the search effort level to be explained by one-quarter lagged real rent and office
stock, as well as simultaneous real income per capita. Similarly, for the economic
mismatch rate equation, one-quarter lagged office stock and current exogenous
conditions of real income per capita and population index are selected. Real mar-
ket rents are not included in this equation because landlords deliberately retain a
certain amount of vacant space to seek opportunities of positive deviations from
market rents.
Impact of Recession Period
We define recession as the period where real personal income per capita in MSA
level declines. The most frequent recession period spans between 2008Q3 and
2009Q3 for almost all 43 MSAs. 2013Q1 is also defined as recession period for 43
MSAs.
Hurricane Effects
We limit our inclusion of hurricanes to the ones that originated in the Atlantic
Ocean as others are much less intense and do not cause very significant damage
in accordance with track records starting from 1851 (source: National Hurricane
Center). To address hurricane effects in office supply, we include dummies of
hurricane-threatened areas and occurrence of hurricanes from the Atlantic Ocean
in equation 3.10. We separate the location (by MSA) and time dimension of
hurricanes, but we also include interaction terms between the two dummies to
capture the actual incidence in the supply equation. For the demand component,
we only use the occurrence dummy to capture a temporary change in overall
sentiment. Finally, we assume that the matching process is insulated from a tem-
porary natural hazard effect and therefore no related dummies are added to the
equations of economic mismatch and search effort level.
Lack of Transportation
Transportation infrastructure may be considered by developers/landlords in their
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supply function. We create a proxy for lack of transportation by using residents’
travel time to work. We identify an area with lack of transportation when the
travelling time is one standard deviation larger than the average. We capture
this effect in the supply equation to conduct a robustness check on possible mul-
ticollinearity arising from the relatively high correlation (around +0.4) between
the hurricane dummy and lack of transportation. Our results are not significantly
affected.
Likelihood of Change in Frictional Vacancy
Alongside our main model, which currently estimates structural vacancy assum-
ing a negligible impact of frictional vacancy, we also construct another set of
simultaneous equations adding the likelihood of change in frictional vacancy. We
assume that physical mismatch is found in non-prime offices only when a major
refurbishment is required to make the space characteristics meeting demand re-
quirements. Landlords can either look for more financially viable tenants to rent
the existing non-prime quality space or upgrade the building to prime quality to
earn higher rents and extend the economic life in the long-run. We assume that
switching between physical and economic mismatch would occur at the “right”
timing of refurbishment, which is one to two years long. We expect that the tim-
ing of refurbishment (and hence the likelihood of change in frictional vacancy)
depends on the rental gap between prime and nonprime offices. We compile a set
of six dummy variables with value 1 when the gross asking rent for prime offices
is 10-60% higher than the one for non-prime offices. In our model, we add an
interaction term between the four-quarter, or six-quarter or eight-quarter lagged
dummy and current mismatch rate to proxy for the likelihood of physical mis-
match turning into economic mismatch after refurbishment. A drawback of this
approach is the need to use the current (rather than one-quarter lagged) economic
mismatch rate to mitigate for the confusion of the lagged impact. Furthermore,
the equation of mismatch rate also includes these dummies.
3.5.2 Dataset and Data Sources
We collect raw property data with a quarterly frequency from CBRE Econometric
Advisors (CBRE EA hereafter), formerly Torto Wheaton Research. CBRE EA is
an independent research firm owned by CBRE, which is one of the largest property
consultancy firms in the US. They provide a comprehensive property market
database to real estate investors. The database covers fundamental market and
investment data at MSA level by property sectors, which include apartments (61
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MSAs), offices (63), retail (63) and industrial (52) properties. Basic data such
as rent, stock, vacancy, completion, net absorption and capitalization rate are
provided in every property sector over time. Despite a possible discontinuity in
time series for some MSAs, the office sector database is the most comprehensive
in terms of time span (starting from the second quarter 1988) and greater depth
of market data compiled by CBRE EA with information provided by property
owners (e.g. availability rate, available but occupied space, total return, gross
income and net operating income). Mortgage rates are obtained from the Federal
Reserve, hurricane information from the National Hurricane Center and structure
cost data from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Other demographic and
economic data on population, aggregate personal income, and employment base
in the office sector are estimated by Moody’s Analytics (formerly economy.com)4
and obtained through the CBRE EA database.
To estimate the long-run supply elasticity of office markets using the mismatch
model, we capture mismatch situations that are identified by available (i.e. listed
for rental) but occupied space. Due to data availability starting only from the first
quarter of 2005 for 43 MSAs (i.e. 47% of US population), a balanced panel dataset
(dataset43) from the first quarter of 2005 to the fourth quarter of 2015 is used for
this study. Construction cost data is also available and collected in 30 MSAs for
the same period and they are included in the dataset used in the robustness test
section (dataset30). Our main results are based on 43 MSAs and do not include
construction costs. However, we still report the main descriptive statistics of
both datasets in Table 3.2 showing the similarity of aggregate measures. A full
set of estimation results including construction costs obtained with dataset30 is
also reported in the Appendix. We also prepare longer time series data starting
from the first quarter 1998 to the fourth quarter of 2015 except for the data of
“available but occupied stock”, which are unavailable before 2005 for robustness
check.
If we exclude dummies, ten main variables are used in our model: four endogenous
[real rent index (RRIl,t), office stock (Sl,t), mismatch rate (MRl,t) and search
effort level (SELl,t)] and six exogenous [real construction structure cost index
(RSIl,t)5, real operating expense (ROPEXl,t), real personal income per capita
(RIPCl,t), difference between capitalization and mortgage rates (CMl,t), ratio of
employment in the office using sectors to population (EMPl,t) and population
index (POPIl,t)]. These variables are obtained as follows:
4Economy.com has been the subsidiary of Moody’s Analytics since 2005. They provide
data and analysis on regional economies by country. Particularly in the US, labour markets,
demographics, industries and other variables are offered at MSA level.
5It is used for panel B only.
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Real Rent Index (RRIl,t). A nominal rent index is taken from CBRE EA,
which uses a hedonic modelling approach based on over 200,000 office leases
on the basis of the non-discounted sum of all rental payments considering free
rent periods but excluding tax. We deflate the nominal rent index using the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) at the MSA level obtained from the Bureau of
Labour Statistics.
Mismatch Rate (MRl,t). We identify economic mismatch using the “avail-
able but occupied stock”, which indicates office space listed by landlords while it
is still occupied. This variable suggests that the existing tenant is not prepared to
pay the asking rent at renewal and there is no incentive for a major refurbishment
to be carried out after the existing tenant moves out. If the landlord is intending
to carry out a refurbishment (suggesting the presence of a physical mismatch),
the property would not be listed and made available for rental to new tenants. In
our main model, the percentage of “available but occupied stock” is computed as
the economic mismatch rate. As a robustness check, we also follow Cheshire et
al. (2018)[38] and compute this rate as the ratio between “available but occupied
stock” and vacant stock. This ratio indicates the extent to which the economic
mismatch can be accommodated by the currently vacant stock.
Search Effort Level (SELl,t). Non-transparent information may hinder the
search and matching process: the less the information provided by landlords, the
greater is the effort for tenants to search for the matching. Hence, we quantify
the search effort level by using the ratio between the following measures:
• the difference between the maximum number of buildings with asking rents
in any quarter of the previous five years and the number of buildings with
asking rents within the quarter, and
• the difference between the maximum and the minimum number of buildings
with asking rents in any quarter of the previous five years.
Real Construction Structure Cost Index (RSIl,t). Construction costs of
offices are estimated by multiplying ratios of structure cost to house prices with
office values. We deflate estimated costs with the CPI at the MSA level. This
estimation might be affected by the difference of price growth between offices and
housing.
Real Operating Expense (ROPEXl,t). Nominal operating expenses are yielded
by subtracting net operating income and tax from gross income. We deflate the
nominal value by using the CPI at the MSA level.
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Real Personal Income Per Capita (RIPCl,t). We deflate aggregate personal
income earned by residents with the CPI at the MSA level and divide it by
population.
Cap Rate minus Mortgage Rate (CMl,t). Capitalization rates exceeding the
cost of funding signal the right timing for marketing nearly completed develop-
ments. Thus, we assume the existence of a positive relationship with office supply.
As previously mentioned, this variable can be considered exogenous because of
credit markets’ mis-price risk as shown in Wachter (2016)[174].
Employment to Population (EMPl,t). The employment base refers to the
number of employees for financial and professional service industries. We compile
the ratio of employment in these industries to population in MSA level.
In addition, we construct five dummy variables to capture the effect of recession,
hurricane threat, lack of transportation for robustness check, and the likelihood
of changes in frictional vacancy.
Recession Period. We define recession as the period where real personal income
per capita declines as mentioned above.
Hurricane Threatened Area (HUl): Tropical cyclones are cast from the At-
lantic or East Pacific Ocean. Because most powerful hurricanes originate in the
former, we define the threatened MSAs (including neighbouring areas) as the ones
where at least one hurricane occurred within our sample period. According to the
records from the National Hurricane Center, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Columbus,
Fort Lauderdale, Houston, Indianapolis, Miami, Raleigh, Tampa, Trenton, West
Palm Beach and Wilmington are selected among the MSAs we identify as HU.
Atlantic Hurricane Occurrence (ATHt): To compile this dummy, we track
the dates of hurricane occurrences (value of 1 if it occurs and 0 otherwise). The
purpose of separating time and location dummies is to address both overall nat-
ural hazard risk and actual incidence.
Travel Time To Work (TTWDl): If residents in certain cities spend more
than one standard deviation above the MSAs average time to commute to work,
the transportation infrastructure is regarded as insufficient.
Asking Rent Gap Between Prime and Non-prime Offices: Physically
mismatched offices require a major refurbishment to avoid holding vacant space
for long time periods. We assume this situation is limited to non-prime offices.
Along with an extension to the economic life of a building, a major refurbishment
also raises rents back to levels asked for prime quality buildings. Therefore, a
gross asking rent gap between prime and non-prime offices can be used as a proxy
for the likelihood of exercising a refurbishment option. After refurbishment, the
previous physical mismatch (i.e. frictional vacancy) turns into an economic match
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(if space is occupied) or mismatch (if still vacant). The gap between prime and
secondary rents can signal the likelihood of changes in a physical mismatch (the
higher the gap the higher the incentive to refurbish), but it does not directly
identify the amount of physical mismatch or frictional vacancy. We create six
dummy variables where the asking rent gap is 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50% and
60% to find out which level of the gap generates the greatest the likelihood of
change in frictional vacancy.
Data statistics are summarized in Table 3.2. In general, there are no obvious
outlier problems in the dataset.
Finally, to investigate the relationship between structural vacancy and supply
elasticity, we use the components of our estimated long-run supply equation to
estimate structural vacancy as a combination of economic mismatch rate and
search effort level, dividing the exponential of [e3SELl,t−1 + e4MRl,t−1] by total
supply (please refer to Equation 3.10).
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Table 3.2: Data Summary Statistics
Dataset43 Dataset30
Acronym Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis Mean S.D.
RRIl,t Real Rent Index (2015Q4=100) 101.310 13.205 58.343 158.271 0.447 4.705 98.893 11.788
Sl,t Office Stock (million sqf) 78.823 85.651 4.799 491.340 2.867 12.515 99.398 94.768
SELl,t
(a) Search Effort Level 0.365 0.374 0 1 0.624 1.812 0.361 0.376
MRl,t
(b) Economic Mismatch Rate (%) 4.668 1.719 0.739 12.274 0.228 3.229 4.569 1.579
ROPEXl,t
(c)∗ Real Operating Expense (2015Q4p:USDmn) 161.045 70.993 7.258 504.062 2.168 10.860 162.057 75.335
RIPCl,t
(d)∗ Real Personal Income Per Capita (USDth) 51.670 10.722 36.757 94.273 1.655 6.100 50.397 9.710
CMl,t
(e)∗ Capitalization Minus Mortgage Rate (%) 1.163 1.270 -2.157 4.527 -0.216 2.385 1.200 1.303
POPIl,t
∗ Population Index (2015Q4=100) 94.484 5.123 70.924 102.410 -1.136 4.207 94.657 4.875
EMPl,t
∗ Employment in Office Using Sectors to Population 0.107 0.023 0.062 0.212 0.926 4.660 0.107 0.023
EMIl,t
∗ Corresponding Employment Index (2015Q4=100) 92.210 7.306 63.855 108.200 -0.997 4.170 91.660 6.813
INEMIl,t
∗ Information Industry Employment (2015Q4=100) 103.846 21.643 45.542 265.714 2.941 20.867 104.940 23.805
RSIl,t
(f)∗Real Structure Cost Index (2015Q4=100) 89.797 21.281
HUl
∗ Hurricane Threatened Area 0.209 0.407 0 1 1.429 3.042 0.233 0.423
ATHt
∗ Atlantic Ocean Hurricane Occurrence 0.523 0.500 0 1 -0.091 1.008 0.523 0.500
TTWDl
∗ Dummy for Travel Time to Work 0.14 0.347 0 1 2.081 5.329 0.133 0.340
GRG50l,t (g) Asking Rent Gap ≥ 40% (Prime vs Non-Prime) 0.077 0.266 0 1 3.183 11.131 0.089 0.284
SVl,t Estimated Structural Vacancy Rate (%) 2.663 2.883 0.200 20.471 3.501 17.660 1.668 0.980
Notes: All statistics are based on a sample of 1892 panel observations (44 quarters by 43 MSAs) for each variable (except RSI). (a) Search effort level is calculated as
difference between maximum number of buildings in which asking rents are reported to CBRE over last 5 years and current number of reports divided by difference
between maximum and minimum number of reports over last 5 years. (b) This indicates preference of landlords to letting the property to new tenants instead of existing
tenants and is identified by rate of available but occupied stock. We define this situation as “economic mismatch” since by intuition landlords search for new tenants only
when existing rent paid by current tenants is lower than their desired level. (c) Before deflating with consumer price index (CPI), operating expenses are estimated by
subtracting net operating income and tax from gross income. (d) Aggregate personal income earned by residents are deflated with CPI. Real personal income is divided
by population to compute income per capita. (e) This identifies that investment opportunities with leverage in office sectors are suitable to market. Positive gap implies
that capitalization rate is greater than cost of fund. (f) We obtain the ratios of residential structure costs to house prices for 30 MSAs and estimate real construction
costs of office buildings by multiplying these ratios with office values. However, we notice that difference in growth of prices between housing and offices may misestimate
construction costs of office buildings. (g) The rent gap is the main criteria for landlords who own non-prime offices exercising refurbishment options in addition of refur-
bishment costs. If prime rents far exceed non-prime rents, landlords are motivated to renovate physical mismatched property and hence reduce leading frictional vacancy.
This condition is captured into the model in order to mitigate distortion of structural vacancy by change in frictional vacancy, however cannot be used for identifying fric-
tional vacancy that is unlike structural vacancy which can be identified by search and matching adjusted stock. * indicates exogenous variables (all others are endogenous).
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3.5.3 Multicollinearity
In order to eliminate multicollinearity issue, we compile real personal income per
capita, ratio of employment to population and population index. The correlation
matrix shows low correlation among nine variables.
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Table 3.3: Correlation Matrix
ln(RRIl,t) ln(Sl,t) SELl,t MRl,t ln(ROPEXl,t) ln(RIPCl,t) CMl,t ln(POPIl,t) ln(EMPl,t)
ln(RRIl,t) 1
ln(Sl,t) -0.351*** 1
SELl,t -0.267*** 0.059** 1
MRl,t -0.275*** 0.173*** 0.123*** 1
ln(ROPEXl,t) 0.022 0.266*** 0.101*** 0.087*** 1
ln(RIPCl,t) -0.153*** 0.188*** 0.137*** 0.250*** 0.468*** 1
CMl,t -0.341*** -0.046** 0.063*** 0.444*** -0.268*** -0.202*** 1
ln(POPIl,t) -0.043* 0.094*** 0.327*** 0.399*** 0.151*** 0.153*** 0.334*** 1
ln(EMPl,t) -0.045** 0.238*** 0.126*** 0.047** 0.204*** 0.363*** -0.246*** -0.024 1
Note: In order to mitigate multicollinearity concern, we compile population index (POPIl,t), ratio of office using employment to population
(EMPl,t) and real personal income per capita (RIPCl,t). Correlation coefficients among nine variables remain at low level. That means
multicollinearity problem is solved by compiling index or ratios variables. RRIl,t, Sl,t, SELl,t, MRl,t, ROPEXl,t and CMl,t mean real rent
index, office supply, search effort level, economic mismatch rate, real operating expense and capitalization minus mortgage rates. (*:p<0.1;
**:p<0.05; ***:p<0.01)
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3.5.4 Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
To confirm the existence of short-run dynamics, we conduct panel unit root and
cointegration tests. Because of heterogeneous characteristics of property mar-
kets across MSAs, we select the Im-Pearson-Shin (IPS hereafter) panel unit root
test and the Pedroni panel cointegration test, where we assume heterogeneous
intercepts and trends. The IPS panel unit root test results confirm that all vari-
ables (except real construction cost index) are integrated of order one - i.e. I(1)
- as the residual series of the nine variables in their level and first differences
are respectively non-stationary and stationary at 1% significant level6. In par-
ticular, since stock is accumulated and demolition rarely occurs, we assume that
its non-stationarity is characterized as a deterministic trend process and hence a
deterministic non-stationarity of ln(Sl,t) is tested. We also prove that ln(Sl,t) is
an I(1) time series7.
Since all variables satisfy the requirements of cointegration, we also conduct the
residual-based Pedroni panel cointegration test for the four equations in our sys-
tem and use seven statistics including four within-dimension-based (i.e. panel-ν,
panel-ρ, semi-parametric panel-t (PP) and parametric panel-t (ADF)), and three
between-dimension-based (i.e. group-ρ, semi-parametric group-t (PP) and para-
metric group-t (ADF)). Among all statistics, panel-ν and parametric group-t
(ADF) have the highest and lowest power respectively8. The within-dimension
based statistics are computed using estimators that pool the autoregressive co-
efficient across different MSAs for the unit root tests on the estimated residuals.
In contrast, the between-dimension based statistics rely on estimators that av-
erage individually estimated coefficients for each MSA. All four equations show
the rejection of the null hypothesis of “no cointegration” (with the only exception
of panel- and group-ρ) and therefore we can confirm the need to use an Engle-
Granger based error correction model assuming a cointegration in the long-run
and a short-run adjustment9.
Our aim is to examine the importance of search and matching theory by com-
paring the main models with others where either or both variables SELl,t and
MRl,t are dropped. However, in our empirical exercise, we could drop either
SELl,t or MRl,t simultaneously maintaining a cointegrated relationship in office
stock to validate the error correction model; therefore, we build an alternative
6The capture of I(0) variable would not affect cointegration among I(1) variables, therefore
we still include construction costs in our robustness tests with 30 MSAs
7Please refer to Table 3.4 for a full set of results.
8It refers to a proportion of times that the null hypothesis (i.e. no cointegration) is rejected
when some or all time series in the panel are cointegrated.
9Please refer to Table 3.5 for a full set of these statistics.
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simultaneous system without required search effort or economic mismatch rate
for the robustness check. In addition, our conclusion of cointegration is also sup-
ported by most test statistics being significant. To exercise the strictest rule,
we also construct first difference models to analyse long-run relationships for the
robustness check and further comparison.
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Table 3.4: Im-Pearson-Shin Panel Unit Root Test Results
Variable Im-Pearson-Shin W Statistic I(1) (Y/N)
Level First Difference 1% 5% 10%
Dataset43: 43 MSAs
Ln(Real Rent Index) [ln(RRIl,t)] 0.749 -22.862*** Y Y Y
(a)Ln(Stock) [ln(Sl,t)] 2.221 -19.667*** Y Y Y
+Mismatch rate [MRl,t] 0.073 -38.662*** Y Y Y
+Search Effort Level [SELl,t] 3.752 -29.311*** Y Y Y
Ln(Real Operating Expense) [ln(ROPEXl,t)] -1.141 -27.032*** Y Y Y
Ln(Real Personal Income Per Capita) [ln(RIPCl,t)] 3.282 -41.212*** Y Y Y
+(Cap - Mortgage Rate) [CMl,t] -0.061 -18.867*** Y Y Y
Ln(Employment to Population) [ln(EMPl,t)] 4.217 -11.253*** Y Y Y
Ln(Population Index) [ln(POPIl,t)] 7.992 -13.224*** Y Y Y
Dataset30: 30 MSAs
Ln(Real Rent Index) [ln(RRIl,t)] 0.493 -19.736*** Y Y Y
(a)Ln(Stock) [ln(Sl,t)] 3.744 -17.997*** Y Y Y
+Mismatch rate [MRl,t] 0.450 -31.780*** Y Y Y
+Search Effort Level [SELl,t] 3.530 -24.233*** Y Y Y
Ln(Real Structure Cost Index) [ln(RSIl,t)] -2.841*** -11.574*** I(0)
Ln(Real Operating Expense) [ln(ROPEXl,t)] -1.068 -21.510*** Y Y Y
Ln(Real Personal Income Per Capita) [ln(RIPCl,t)] 4.174 -34.550*** Y Y Y
+(Cap - Mortgage Rate) [CMl,t] -0.468 -8.487*** Y Y Y
Ln(Employment to Population) [ln(EMPl,t)] 2.522 -8.448*** Y Y Y
Ln(Employment Index of Information Industry)[ln(INEMIl,t)] 3.157 -18.188*** Y Y Y
Ln(Population Index) [ln(POPIl,t)] 5.617 -11.949*** Y Y Y
Notes: (a) Individual intercept and trend are assumed since the series are non-stationary along trend. Other series assume individual intercept only in the panel unit
root test. + Natural logarithm is not taken and original rates (%) are used as input in the model since the series contain zero value. Other variables are transformed in
the form of natural logarithm. Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 3.5: Panel Cointegration: Pedroni Test Results
Variables Panel Statistics Group Statistics Cointegrated
V Rho PP ADF Rho PP ADF (Y/N)
Dataset43:
RRI equation:
(Trend) ln(RRIl,t), ln(Sl,t), ln(EMPl,t), ln(RIPCl,t) and MRl,t 5.617*** 0.040 -4.507*** -5.371*** 1.077 -5.770*** -6.319*** Y
(Trend) ln(RRIl,t), ln(Sl,t), ln(EMPl,t) and ln(RIPCl,t) 4.339*** 0.196 -2.749*** -2.157** 0.998 -3.413*** -2.993*** Y
S equation:
(Trend) ln(Sl,t), ln(RRIl,t), ln(ROPEXl,t), SELl,t, MRl,t and CMl,t 2.157** 1.868 -2.521*** -3.215*** 3.803 -2.665*** -3.151*** Y
(Trend) ln(Sl,t), ln(RRIl,t), ln(ROPEXl,t), MRl,t and CMl,t 2.598*** 1.411 -1.833** -1.574* 3.124 -1.406* -1.026 Y
(Trend) ln(Sl,t), ln(RRIl,t), ln(ROPEXl,t), SELl,t and CMl,t 2.579*** 1.223 -2.043** -2.523*** 2.948 -1.963** -2.469*** Y
(Trend) ln(Sl,t), ln(RRIl,t), ln(ROPEXl,t) and CMl,t 7.629*** 3.758 0.930 -0.500 5.026 1.409 -0.552 N
SEL equation:
(No) SELl,t, ln(RRIl,t), ln(Sl,t) and ln(RIPCl,t) 2.494* -0.600 -1.858* -2.213** 1.740 -0.485 -1.362* Y
MR equation:
(No) MRl,t, ln(POPIl,t), ln(EMPl,t), ln(RIPCl,t) and ln(Sl,t) 5.457*** -0.558 -3.078*** -2.996*** 0.312 -3.494*** -3.585*** Y
Dataset30:
RRI equation:
(Trend) ln(RRIl,t), ln(Sl,t), ln(EMPl,t), ln(RIPCl,t) and MRl,t 1.759** -2.951*** -7.196*** -6.895*** -1.501* -6.934*** -6.616*** Y
(Trend) ln(RRIl,t), ln(Sl,t), ln(EMPl,t) and ln(RIPCl,t) 2.830*** -4.710*** -8.020*** -7.230*** -3.092*** -7.615*** -6.817*** Y
(Trend) ln(RRIl,t), ln(Sl,t), ln(INEMIl,t), ln(RIPCl,t) and MRl,t 5.006*** 0.216 -2.741*** -3.892*** 1.872 -2.294** -3.397*** Y
(Trend) ln(RRIl,t), ln(Sl,t), ln(INEMIl,t) and ln(RIPCl,t) 5.514*** -0.896# -3.297*** -3.759*** 0.618 -3.250*** -4.107*** Y
(Trend) ln(RRIl,t), ln(Sl,t), ln(INEMIl,t), ln(RIPCl,t), ln(POPIl,t) and MRl,t 1.755** -0.080 -4.434*** -4.055*** 1.312 -4.367*** -3.539*** Y
(Trend) ln(RRIl,t), ln(Sl,t), ln(INEMIl,t), ln(RIPCl,t) and ln(POPIl,t) 2.260** -0.889# -4.182*** -4.302*** 0.669 -3.98*** -4.098*** Y
S equation:
(Trend) ln(Sl,t), ln(RRIl,t), ln(RSIl,t), ln(ROPEXl,t), SELl,t, MRl,t and CMl,t 1.368* 3.632 -1.442* -3.748*** 5.382 -1.113 -4.281*** Y
(Trend) ln(Sl,t), ln(RRIl,t), ln(RSIl,t), ln(ROPEXl,t), MRl,t and CMl,t 0.305 1.393 -2.803*** -4.103*** 3.489 -2.527*** -2.929*** Y
(Trend) ln(Sl,t), ln(RRIl,t), ln(RSIl,t), ln(ROPEXl,t), SELl,t and CMl,t 14.686*** 2.751 -0.671 -1.344* 4.204 -0.619 -1.922** N
(Trend) ln(Sl,t), ln(RRIl,t), ln(RSIl,t), ln(ROPEXl,t) and CMl,t 8.308*** 3.650 1.054 0.829 5.056 1.902 0.965 N
SEL equation:
(No) SELl,t, ln(RRIl,t), ln(Sl,t) and ln(RIPCl,t) 2.306* -0.873 -1.950* -2.828** 1.189 -0.666 -1.912** Y
(Trend) SELl,t, ln(RRIl,t), ln(Sl,t) and ln(RIPCl,t) 2.671** -0.277 -2.388** -4.156*** 1.536 -1.455* -3.701*** Y
MR equation:
(No) MRl,t, ln(POPIl,t), ln(EMPl,t), ln(RIPCl,t) and ln(Sl,t) 1.271 -1.173 -3.722*** -4.855*** 0.508 -3.548*** -4.637*** Y
(Trend) MRl,t, ln(POPIl,t), ln(EMPl,t), ln(RIPCl,t) and ln(Sl,t) -0.892 0.372 -3.592*** -5.105*** 2.044 -4.346*** -4.031*** Y
Notes: We assume deterministic trend in long run state of RRI and S based on the straightforward law of demand and supply. However, mismatch is caused by landlords’ strategy
for seeking exceedingly rent opportunities which strongly positively deviate from market level. Furthermore, information released by landlords may not have heterogeneous trend. Thus, we do
not assume deterministic trend in MR and SEL for Dataset43. Signs ***, **, and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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3.6 Estimation Results
We initially present the estimation results of long-run relationships and subse-
quently report the speed of adjustment for short-run dynamics. A full set of
results for short-run relationships is available in the Appendix.
3.6.1 Long-Run Relationships
We construct six versions of our simultaneous system. To be consistent with our
findings on heterogeneous trends across MSAs in panel unit root and cointegration
tests, all versions include an interaction term between MSA dummies and supply
(MSA × ln(Sl,t−1)) in the rent equation and between MSA dummies and real
rents (MSA × ln(RRIl,t−12)) in the supply equation. Since property market
dynamics are usually localized due to supply constraints, this assumption is also
in line with our objective function. Models M1 to M4 differ for the inclusion of
the aforementioned interaction terms between MSAs and lagged rent and supply
in:
• equations of rent and supply only (M1);
• equations of rent, supply and economic mismatch rate (M2);
• equations of rent, supply and search effort level (M3);
• all four equations (M4).
Model M5 uses three equations only excluding search effort level and model M6
uses three equations only excluding the economic mismatch rate equation to test
their significance in our system.
Real Rent
Table 3.6a exhibits the long-run relationship of real rents derived from the de-
mand function, where we find that supply, demand factors, and mismatch rate
are significant to set real rents, with supply being the dominant factor: a 1%
increase in supply, mismatch rate, and real personal income per capita or em-
ployment to population respectively lead to a reduction of 1.9-2% and 0.02-0.7%,
and an increase of 0.57% and 0.62-0.64%. The coefficient on recession period
is consistently negative across models, confirming the belief that the GFC has
brought a bust in office markets. Furthermore, the occurrence of hurricanes origi-
nated in the Atlantic Ocean increases real rents (probably through a reduction in
supply). Overall, statistically insignificant coefficients for the interaction terms in
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the economic mismatch equation in models M2 and M4 and the lowest Bayesian
Information Criteria among models M1 to M4 suggest that model M1 is the pre-
ferred choice. Finally, distortion driven by interaction terms in the economic
mismatch equation may occur in other systems. Similar circumstances are found
when adding interaction terms with MSAs to model M3, but changes are a bit
more vigorous. These may imply that the search and matching process does not
have strong local factors. Comparing M1 with M5 (excluding search effort level),
results seem to suggest that determinants of real rents do not have significant
changes. Similar conclusion is drawn when comparing M1 with M6 (excluding
economic mismatch rate).
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Table 3.6a: Panel A: Long Run Relationship of Real Rent (ln(RRIl,t))
Independent Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Constant 9.288*** 9.704*** 9.161*** 9.572*** 9.182*** 9.704***
(2.441) (2.443) (2.442) (2.444) (2.443) (2.441)
ln(Sl,t−1)a -2.007 -1.861 -2.033 -1.867 -2.064 -1.968
ln(EMPl,t−2) 0.633*** 0.624*** 0.635*** 0.627*** 0.636*** 0.637***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.007) (0.052) (0.052)
ln(RIPCl,t−4) 0.574*** 0.565*** 0.574*** 0.566*** 0.575*** 0.57***
(0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066)
MRl,t−1 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.007*** -0.002 -0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Recession Period -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ATH 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fixed MSA Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
F-Stat 76.73 76.79 76.71 76.77 76.71 77.59
BIC - Simultaneous System -8200 -8171 -8183 -8149 -7951 -12289
R-sq 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Observation 1376 1376 1376 1376 1376 1376
Notes: (a) Median values. We build the simultaneous system which consists of four equations. We report the results of first equation in
this table. Real rent index (ln(RRIl,t)) is the dependent variable. Supply (ln(Sl,t−1)), employment in office using sectors to population
(ln(EMPl,t−2)), real personal income per capita (ln(RIPCl,t−4)), economic mismatch rate (MRl,t−1), recession period dummy and Atlantic
Ocean Hurricane Occurrence dummy (ATH) as well as interaction terms of MSA with lagged supply are independent variables. Signs ***, **,
* represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
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Office Stock
Table 3.6b summarizes the long-run relationship of office supply. According to the
first four models, a 1% increase in real rents leads to an increase in supply by 0.11-
0.13%, while real operating expenses do not seem to influence supply economically
(-0.01%). Relatively to real rents, the impact of the economic mismatch rate is
similar (-0.1%), while a very small economic impact of search effort level is found.
We use the lagged difference between cap and mortgage rates to proxy for pre-let
activities (to indirectly enhance the accuracy in measuring vacancy adjustments),
which exert a minimal impact on overall supply (+0.01%).
Focusing on the hurricane effect, we use a three-way interaction term to estimate
differential impacts and find some discrepancies in results among models. We
mainly discuss results in M1 as it represents the model with the best fit (see dis-
cussion above). For MSAs bearing hurricane risk, supply is about 2% smaller than
for others without hurricane risk, however this estimation is statistically insignif-
icant. Whether we ignore or consider the occurrence of hurricanes, a 1% increase
in real rents in an area facing hurricane risk would lead to a 0.23% decrease
in supply. Coupling with insignificant impacts of interactions between changes
in real rent and hurricane occurrence, this implies that a long-term hurricane
risk, not only its occurrence, may moderately affect developers and landlords’
decisions.
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Table 3.6b: Panel B: Long Run Relationship of Office Supply (ln(Sl,t))
Independent Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Constant 4.211*** 4.207*** 4.226*** 4.223*** 4.167*** 4.216***
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.119) (0.118)
ln(RRIl,t−12)a 0.126 0.127 0.121 0.113 0.132 0.129
ln(ROPEXl,t−12) -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SELl,t−1 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
MRl,t−1 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
CMl,t−2 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Recession Period 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ATH 0.027
(0.021)
HUl -0.019 -1.627*** -0.001 0.002 -1.516*** -0.060
(0.205) (0.217) (0.205) (0.205) (0.217) (0.204)
ATH × HUl 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.009 0.017
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
ATH × ln(RRIl,t−12) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
HUl× ln(RRIl,t−12) -0.233*** -0.235*** -0.236*** -0.146*** -0.241*** -0.223***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.038) (0.031) (0.031)
ATH ×HUl× ln(RRIl,t−12) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Fixed MSA Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
F-Stat 83619 83619 83619 83619 83205 83974
R-sq 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Observation 1376 1376 1376 1376 1376 1376
Notes: (a) Median values. This table reports the results of the second equation in the simultaneous system. Office supply (ln(Sl,t)) is the dependent variable. Real rent
index (ln(RRIl,t−12)), real operating expense (ln(ROPEXl,t−12)), search effort level (SELl,t−1), economic mismatch rate (MRl,t−1), capitalization minus mortgage
rates (CMl,t−2), recession period dummy, and hurricane related dummies (ATH and HUl) including interaction terms with lagged real rent index as well as interaction
terms of MSA with lagged rent are independent variables. Signs ***, **, * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
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Economic Mismatch and Search Effort Level
The equilibrium state of the search and matching process is represented by the
long-run equations of economic mismatch rate and search effort level in Tables
3.6c and 3.6d. The inclusion of interaction terms related to office supply and real
rent in these two long-run equations causes significant differences in the estima-
tion results across models M2, M3 and M4. Because the search and matching
process is unlikely to be heterogeneous across MSAs, the interaction of MSA
dummies with office supply and/or real rents may lead to over-identification. As
a consequence, the results estimated in model M1 are found to be more reliable
and plausible.
A 1% increase in office stock reduces the economic mismatch rate by 0.05 in
value (i.e. linear-log relationship), corresponding to a 0.83% drop if compared
to its average value. A 1% increase in real personal income per capita, city
size (measured by population) and ratio of employment to population leads to
respectively a decrease of 1.05%, an increase of 0.71%, and an increase of 0.27% in
mismatch rates. Furthermore, in the recession period, economic mismatch rates
rise by 2.51%.
Search effort level is explained (at 1% significant level) by real rents, office stock
and real income per capita, whose 1% rise reduces the required search effort by
0.51% and 9.7% and increases it by 4.38%. We hereby find evidence of strategic
games played by landlords who may wait for better deals to happen in the future,
holding vacant space and hence increasing the search effort in periods of higher
income per capita. In addition, a greater quantity of property offers listed in the
market may lead to a reduction in search effort instead of prolonging the decision
process to consider more choices. Finally, we test for a possible endogeneity issue
of the search effort level equation by conducting the Hausman test on the error
term, and the results confirm that this variable is exogenous in our system of
equations as assumed in our main model.
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Table 3.6c: Panel C: Long Run Relationship of Mismatch Rate (MRl,t)
Independent Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Constant 28.487** 322.569*** 28.449** 321.280*** 28.388**
(12.094) (49.556) (12.095) (49.604) (12.095)
ln(Sl,t−1) -3.888** -18.371a -3.845* -18.489a -3.885**
(1.977) (1.977) (1.977)
ln(RIPCl,t−1) -4.896*** -7.145*** -4.865*** -7.134*** -4.849***
(1.389) (1.606) (1.389) (1.607) (1.390)
ln(EMPl,t−1) 1.241 4.378*** 1.205 4.253*** 1.164
(1.128) (1.478) (1.128) (1.479) (1.129)
ln(POPIl,t−1) 3.333** -3.188 3.251** -3.121 3.275**
(1.621) (3.051) (1.621) (3.053) (1.621)
Recession Period 0.117* 0.082 0.117* 0.079 0.117*
(0.068) (0.064) (0.068) (0.064) (0.068)
MSA Dummy × ln(Sl,t−1) N Y N Y N
Fixed MSA Effect Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effect Y Y Y Y Y
F-Stat 31.80 27.31 31.79 27.26 31.79
R-sq 0.64 0.70 0.64 0.70 0.64
Observation 1376 1376 1376 1376 1376
Notes: (a) Median values. This table reports the results of the third equation in the simultaneous system. Economic mismatch rate (MRl,t)
is the dependent variable. Office supply (ln(Sl,t−1)), real personal income per capita (ln(RIPCl,t−1)), employment in office using sectors to
population (ln(EMPl,t−1)), population index (ln(POPIl,t−1)) and recession period dummy are independent variables. Signs ***, ** and *
represent significant level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 3.6d: Panel D: Long Run Relationship of Search Effort Level (SELl,t)
Independent Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M6
Constant 12.160*** 12.154*** 11.364 10.148 12.119***
(2.102) (2.102) (14.285) (14.285) (2.102)
ln(RRIl,t−1) -0.187* -0.183* 1.052a 1.028a -0.192*
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
ln(Sl,t−1) -3.539*** -3.538*** -4.816a -4.742a -3.529***
(0.390) (0.390) (0.390)
ln(RIPCl,t) 1.599*** 1.594*** 1.241*** 1.248*** 1.604***
(0.271) (0.271) (0.330) (0.330) (0.271)
Recession Period -0.002 -0.002 0.006 0.006 -0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
MSA dummy × ln(Sl,t−1) N N Y Y N
MSA dummy × ln(RRIl,t−1) N N Y Y N
Fixed MSA Effect Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effect Y Y Y Y Y
F-Stat 63.62 63.62 51.34 51.32 63.63
R-sq 0.78 0.78 0.86 0.86 0.78
Observation 1376 1376 1376 1376 1376
Notes: (a) Median values. This table reports the results of the fourth equation in the simultaneous system. Search effort level (SELl,t) is
the dependent variable. Real rent index (ln(RRIl,t−1)), office supply (ln(Sl,t−1)), real personal income per capita (ln(RIPCl,t)) and recession
period dummy are independent variables. Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
72
Importance of Search and Matching Process
Based on Pedroni test results, we cannot omit economic mismatch rate and search
effort level in the system of simultaneous equations at the same time. Both
economic mismatch rate and search effort level plays a dominant role in the
search and matching process. The comparison among M1, M5 and M6 reflects
this phenomenon and suggests that exclusion of economic mismatch rate or search
effort level leads to moderate changes in significance of hurricane effect. Although
there are no obvious differences about the importance of search and matching
process, one more MSA records negative supply elasticities estimated using M5
and M6. Even if considering a Bayesian Information Criteria, M6 seems the best
fit, as the presence of a higher number of negative supply elasticities suggests the
existence of possible biases in these estimates when the economic mismatch rate
is omitted.
Estimated Long-Run Elasticities of Supply and Demand
We rely on coefficients of interaction terms for each MSA with lagged supply and
real rent to estimate demand and supply elasticities by MSA. Table 3.7 reports
all estimates for both dataset43 and dataset30. Focusing on the larger dataset
and findings from model M1, the supply elasticities range between -0.17 and 0.38
and show less pronounced skewers than demand elasticities that range between
-3.85 and +1.35. We summarize our estimations in a map (Figure 3.2), which
shows our geographical coverage (corresponding to an overall 47% of the entire
US population and almost 60% of the office workforce). All markets are supply
inelastic and a negative supply elasticity estimated for San Jose, Charlotte, and
San Francisco as well as New York implies no response of supply to changes in real
rents. Because of no zoning or loose zoning laws, Houston and Fort Lauderdale
are the least inelastic.
As far as demand elasticities are concerned, six MSAs (Charlotte, Fort Worth,
Washington DC, Austin, Raleigh and West Palm Beach) are demand elastic and
the vast majority are demand inelastic. We find a surprising positive demand
elasticity in San Francisco, Denver, Dallas and Houston which may reflect a
“Veblen effect” (i.e. signalling theory) where wealthy individuals consume more
when the price is higher so as to advertise their business and achieve a greater
status (Baowell et al 1996[22]). San Francisco, as the best-known CBD in the
West region, may actually exhibit its Grade A offices as Veblen goods. More
than 60% of office space is prime quality graded and a relatively strong Veblen
effect would influence the overall rent. At the same time, San Francisco is the
most supply inelastic, suggesting the possibility that landlords in this market
hold some vacant space to gain from a higher future rental income. This strategy
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may clearly coexist with the Veblen effect. Denver, Dallas and Houston are the
hubs of regional offices in West and South regions. More than half of office space
is prime quality graded. Therefore, Veblen effect may also exist in these MSAs
although supply elasticities are higher than San Francisco.
We also estimate elasticity for dataset30 with models including construction costs.
Comparing the estimates with the larger dataset, we respectively find a wider
range of supply and demand elasticities. The presence of a high correlation
(+0.8) between the two sets of estimates supports our choice to exclude real
construction costs to expand our study to a larger number of MSAs (from 30 to
43).
A final discussion of the regulatory and geographical constraints that may cause
cross-sectional differences in the supply elasticity estimates are reported after the
section on robustness tests.
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Table 3.7: Estimates of Long Run Supply and Demand Elasticity of the Office
Market by MSA
Model Dataset30 Dataset43
MSA Supply Demand Supply Demand
San Jose -0.176*** -0.591 -0.172*** -0.576
Charlotte -0.145*** -1.429 -0.147*** -1.353
San Francisco -0.033*** 0.288***
New York 0.201 -0.340* -0.002*** -0.363
Denver -0.005*** 1.057*** 0.007*** 0.966***
Pittsburgh 0.009*** -0.512 0.012*** -0.485
Ventura 0.013*** -0.315***
Phoenix 0.025*** -0.617 0.021*** -0.603
Seattle 0.019*** -0.919 0.029*** -0.877
Boston 0.028*** -0.484 0.036*** -0.514
Baltimore -0.046*** -0.700 0.055** -0.669
San Diego 0.064*** -0.381** 0.062*** -0.389**
Sacramento 0.071*** -0.375*** 0.067*** -0.376***
Fort Worth 0.052*** -3.584 0.071* -3.380
Orlando 0.072*** -0.477*
Orange County 0.081** -0.184**
Los Angeles 0.087** -0.252*** 0.091* -0.269***
Newark 0.101* -0.130***
Dallas 0.093 1.352*** 0.108 1.346***
Jacksonville 0.122 -0.728
Washington, DC 0.101 -4.309 0.125 -3.847
Long Island 0.127 -0.221***
Oakland 0.125 -0.316* 0.130 -0.341
Cleveland 0.126 -0.190*** 0.132 -0.193***
St. Louis 0.146 -0.398** 0.138 -0.390**
Kansas City 0.163 -0.349** 0.143 -0.350**
Philadelphia 0.341*** -0.543 0.144 -0.554
Austin 0.150 -1.310
Atlanta 0.169*** -0.930** 0.151*** -0.891**
Detroit 0.181 -0.036*** 0.165 -0.036***
Raleigh 0.171 -1.010
Stamford 0.204 -0.405
Trenton 0.205 -0.922
Columbus 0.150 -0.300*** 0.244*** -0.297***
Indianapolis 0.248*** -0.335***
Chicago 0.464*** -0.496 0.254*** -0.498
Cincinnati 0.205 -0.302*** 0.278*** -0.298***
Tampa 0.199 -0.455* 0.29*** -0.449*
Wilmington 0.292*** -0.185***
West Palm Beach 0.317*** -2.309
Houston 0.293*** 1.226*** 0.378*** 1.325***
Fort Lauderdale 0.380*** -0.663
Notes: Negative value in supply elasticity is interpreted as no response of supply
to change in office rent. Signs ***, ** and * represent significant levels at 1%,
5%, 10% respectively.
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Figure 3.2: Map Chart of Supply Elasticity in 42 MSAs
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Unobserved Heterogeneity
We include MSA fixed effects in four simultaneous equations and the majority
of MSAs have statistically significant results (see Table 3.8). This implies that
we successfully capture unobserved heterogeneity in the model. Unobserved het-
erogeneity may include overall property age or tenants’ preferences in terms of
property characteristics that information is not available. After including MSA
fixed effects, we have high R2 in the model.
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Table 3.8: Significance of MSA Fixed Effect
Equation
MSA ln(RRIl,t) ln(Sl,t) MRl,t SELl,t
Austin -2.756 -1.242*** -4.772* -4.603***
Baltimore 0.498 0.643*** -2.596 -3.569***
Boston 4.302 0.825*** 4.275*** 0.450***
Charlotte -2.625 0.238 -5.385** -3.928***
Chicago 5.388 0.061 2.445** 1.516***
Cincinnati 8.085*** -0.399* -4.014** -3.279***
Cleveland 15.004*** -0.908*** -2.882 -3.574***
Columbus 5.806* -0.871*** -6.033** -5.394***
Dallas -9.468*** 0.305 1.736*** 0.099
Denver -10.395*** 0.293 0.180 -1.575***
Detroit 110.940*** -0.779*** -3.458** -2.236***
Fort Lauderdale -0.348 -1.582*** -5.582* -5.862***
Fort Worth -4.236 -1.341*** -6.561* -6.354***
Houston -9.193*** 0.160 2.510*** -0.068
Indianapolis 4.938* -0.816*** -3.995 -5.076***
Jacksonville -1.225 -1.733*** -8.415** -6.639***
Kansas City 5.394 -1.053*** -5.125** -3.898***
Long Island 10.108** -1.367*** -3.396 -5.899***
Los Angeles 13.880*** 0.582*** 1.270* 0.888***
Miami -2.129 -0.050 -5.119** -4.064***
New York 11.295* 2.000*** 5.196** 4.062***
Newark 25.486*** -0.633*** 0.267 -3.328***
Oakland 5.979 -0.866*** -2.124 -4.065***
Orange County 17.418** -0.317** 0.278 -2.722***
Orlando 2.216 -0.999*** -5.988** -4.655***
Philadelphia 2.873 -0.220 0.825 -1.309***
Phoenix 1.814 -0.006 -4.01*** -2.034***
Pittsburgh 3.355 0.031 -1.177 -2.288***
Raleigh -1.545 -4.672** -3.672***
Sacramento 4.822* -0.781*** -4.216* -4.264***
San Diego 4.865 -0.466*** -2.212 -3.444***
San Francisco -22.019*** 0.434*** 1.539 -2.490***
San Jose 0.414 0.215 -3.657 -5.064***
Seattle -0.664 0.088 -0.994 -2.116***
St. Louis 4.157 -1.140*** -3.955* -4.268***
Stamford 2.766 -1.667*** 0.326 -6.160***
Tampa 2.792 -0.814*** -5.436** -4.492***
Trenton -3.180 -1.612*** -8.962* -9.318***
Ventura 0.503 -2.499*** -8.685 -11.402***
Washington, DC -4.363 0.903*** 5.643*** 1.870***
West Palm Beach -4.144* -1.379*** -5.476 -6.752***
Wilmington 8.159*** -1.942*** -9.151* -8.507***
Note: Signs ***, ** and * represent significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respec-
tively.
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Likelihood of Changes in Frictional Vacancy
As for non-prime vacant space, if an economic mismatch can switch to a physical
one (and vice versa), a change in frictional vacancy may occur. To capture this
switch, we add the condition that major refurbishments may be carried out in the
equations of supply and economic mismatch rate. We create dummy variables of
asking rental gaps from 10% to 60% and also investigate the impacts of lagged
asking rental gaps on supply and economic mismatch rate (i.e. 4, 6 and 8 quarter
lag). We find that the asking rental gap of 40% with 6 quarter lag generate
the most statistically significant results referring to table 3.9. Results related to
rental gap with different number of quarter lag can be found in the Appendix -
tables 3.17 to 3.19.
For the supply equation, the lagged asking rental gaps increase the overall supply.
Assuming that refurbishment takes one and a half years, the interaction term
(GRG40l,t−4×MRl,t) shows that refurbished space brings a negative adjustment
to economic mismatch on supply as a decrease in frictional vacancy (indicated by
the interaction term) leads to an increase in overall supply. Although we are able
to capture changes in frictional vacancy into the model, a moderate alteration
is found in coefficients of interaction terms between MSAs and lagged real rent,
with moderate changes in estimated supply elasticity as a result. As far as the
mismatch rate equation is concerned, we do find evidence that the economic
mismatch is lower when refurbishment options are more likely to be exercised
and it becomes higher after one and a half years because physical mismatch may
turn into an economic mismatch after the actual refurbishment takes place.
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Table 3.9: Long Run Relationships - Likelihood of Change in Frictional Vacancy with Different Gross Rental Gap (6 Quarter Lag)
GRG10 GRG20 GRG30 GRG40 GRG50 GRG60
Panel A: Supply(ln(Sl,t))
MRl,t -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
GRGl,t−6 -0.031*** -0.011*** 0.008** 0.034*** 0.030*** -0.077
(0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.010) (0.053)
GRGl,t−6 ×MRl,t 0.006*** 0.003*** -0.0008 -0.004*** -0.004** 0.010
(0.002) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007)
MSA dummy × ln(RRIl,t−12) Y Y Y Y Y Y
F-Stat 81250 81041 83003 85284 82580 82078
R-sq 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Panel B: Mismatch Rate(MRl,t)
GRGl,t−6 0.243 0.00005 0.018 0.455*** 0.783*** -0.044
(0.153) (0.077) (0.089) (0.148) (0.177) (0.376)
MSA dummy × ln(Sl,t−1) N N N N N N
F-Stat 31.55 31.56 31.51 31.85 32.19 31.54
R-sq 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.64
Interaction Terms in SEL N N N N N N
Fixed MSA Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
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3.6.2 Short Run Dynamics
Among all models, M1 is the best fit for the long-run equilibrium; therefore, we
build short-run equations using M1 and excluding fixed time and MSA effects.
We present four versions of the same model with inclusion/ exclusion of recession
period or occurrence of hurricanes from the Atlantic Ocean. All four systems
obtain results in line with theoretical predictions, where changes in supply and
mismatch rate negatively affect real rents, and ratio of employment to population
and real income per capita are positively related to rents. Table 3.10 summarizes
the speed of adjustment. All models find that 16.1-16.4% of real rents adjust
to equilibrium every quarter. In other words, full adjustment to equilibrium of
real rents might take approximately 6.2 quarters. All models also obtain similar
results for the short-run supply equation. The adjustment speed for office supply
is lower than the one for rents as it is estimated to be around 12.6% per quarter,
i.e. equilibrium reached within 7.9 quarters.
The adjustment speed in the search and matching process is higher than for
supply. Particularly, 21.5% and 15.5% per quarter are adjusted in the economic
mismatch and search effort, respectively, suggesting a shorter period (4.7 and
6.5 quarters) necessary to reach the long-run equilibrium. This finding may
imply that landlords tend to control the search and matching process instead of
responding to the market through development activities. Their strategy adjusts
structural vacancy, which affects adjusted office supply. If the adjustment speed
in the supply equation includes vacancy adjustment and delivery speed of new
development, the supply adjustment to equilibrium would be much slower than
for the economic mismatch due to a low construction speed. We obtain related
empirical evidence by estimating the speed of adjustment for dataset30. Referring
to table 3.15b in the Appendix, much lower speed to equilibrium (7.2%) is found
in supply when models include real construction costs. As 13.9 quarters are
necessary to reach an equilibrium state, we argue that the adjustment period is
prolonged if landlords build new developments to respond to demand shocks.
Finally considering the likelihood of changes in frictional vacancy, similar results
for the short-run models are found, with a slight increase in the speed of adjust-
ment to long-run equilibrium in the supply equation (by 0.3 quarter). We also
present the full results of short run models in the Appendix (see tables 3.13a to
3.13d).
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Table 3.10: Short Run: Speed of Adjustment (Panel A)
Error Correction Term Quarterly Adjustment Quarters to Long-Run Equilibrium
Real Rent 16.1% 6.2
Office Supply 12.6% 7.9
Mismatch Rate 21.5% 4.7
Search Effort Level 15.5% 6.5
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3.6.3 Robustness Tests
In this section, we present a series of further results where we test the robustness
of our main models.
Inclusion of Construction Costs and Impact of Innovations
To include residential construction costs (as a proxy of office construction costs) in
our estimation models and test for demand and supply disruptions due to techno-
logical innovation of tenants, we use a restricted sample of 30 MSAs (dataset30),
which show time series data on construction costs and employment figures in
information industries (i.e. we assume that higher innovation of tenants leads to
higher depreciation of office properties as tenants need to change the setting of
their offices in order to fit in the latest technology). First, we find that a 1%
increase in real construction costs has an economically negligible impact on office
supply (i.e. -0.003-0.005%), while other coefficients (incl. the one for real estate
operating expenses) do not change significantly. Second, a 1% change in employ-
ment in information industries determines a +0.34-0.35% change in real rents,
which is in line with the effect we find for the ratio of general employment in the
office sector to population. We, therefore, find confirmation that our main results
hold and are not affected by technology-driven demand shocks. For parsimonious
reasons we only report a full set of results in the Appendix - tables 3.14a to 3.14d
and 3.15a to 3.15d.
First Difference Models and Mismatch Rate Measure
As a further step in our analysis, we estimate models using first differences rather
than levels. Since this approach does not allow us to separate long- and short-run
models, we only present one set of estimations. Model R1 mirrors the specifi-
cation of model M1 in our original estimation. In model R2, we use a different
mismatched rate measure, defined as the ratio between available but occupied
stock and vacant stock.
Results are consistent with our original models but they show homogeneous trends
across MSAs (i.e. coefficients for interaction terms are not significant in either
rent or supply equations) when both theoretical predictions and previous findings
in the literature suggest heterogeneity - see Tables 3.11a and 3.11b (Panels A to
D). Therefore, we find confirmation that long- and short-run dynamics should be
jointly modelled using an Engle-Granger based error correction model with vari-
ables in levels. This result also suggests that the MSA heterogeneity of demand
and supply responses may be different in the long- and short-term. Finally, our
results are robust to the use of the alternative mismatch rate measure except mis-
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match rates with different definitions make opposite impact on real rent. Similar
findings are also obtained for dataset30, and results are reported in the Appendix
- tables 3.16a and 3.16b.
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Table 3.11a: First Difference Models of Long Run Relationships: Real Rent & Office Stock
Panel A: Real Rent
Independent Variable R1 R2
Constant -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
∆ln(Sl,t−1)a 0.095 0.173
∆ln(EMPl,t−2) 0.528*** 0.538***
(0.056) (0.056)
∆ln(RIPCl,t−4) 0.199*** 0.204***
(0.034) (0.034)
∆MR(1)l,t−1 -0.001
(0.001)
∆MR(2)l,t−1 0.0003**
(0.0001)
Recession Period -0.005*** -0.005**
(0.001) (0.001)
ATH 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001)
F-Stat 4.21 4.25
BIC - Simultaneous System -14946 -9373
R-sq 0.22 0.22
Observation 1333 1333
Panel B: Office Stock
Independent Variable R1 R2
Constant 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
∆ln(RRIl,t−12)a -0.010 0.001
∆ln(ROPEXl,t−12) 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002)
∆SELl,t−1 -0.0001 -0.00004
(0.001) (0.001)
∆MR(1)l,t−1 -0.0003
(0.0002)
∆MR(2)l,t−1 -0.0001**
(0.00002)
∆CMl,t−2 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Recession Period -0.0003 -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003)
ATH -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
HUl 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
ATH ×HUl 0.0001 0.0001
(0.001) (0.001)
ATH ×∆ln(RRIl,t−12) 0.031** 0.031**
(0.014) (0.014)
HUl ×∆ln(RRIl,t−12) 0.031 -0.036
(0.069) (0.077)
ATH×HUl ×∆ln(RRIl,t−12) -0.027 -0.026
(0.028) (0.028)
F-Stat 4.78 4.81
R-sq 0.31 0.31
Observation 1333 1333
Notes:
(a) Median values.
MR(1) is the mismatch rate computed by (available but occupied stock / total stock). MR(2) is the mismatch rate computed by (available but occupied stock / vacant stock).
***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table 3.11b: First Difference Models of Long Run Relationships: Mismatch Rate & Search Effort Level
Panel C: Mismatch Rate
Independent Variable R1 R2
Constant 0.040 -0.109
(0.163) (1.319)
∆ln(Sl,t−1) -15.864*** -123.699***
(3.816) (30.863)
∆ln(RIPCl,t−1) -0.152 17.354
(1.845) (14.964)
∆ln(EMPl,t−1) -0.863 -23.138
(2.463) (19.972)
∆ln(POPIl,t−1) 32.883 206.505
(22.526) (182.677)
Recession Period 0.026 0.039
(0.045) (0.365)
F-Stat 1.76 1.14
R-sq 0.09 0.06
Observation 1333 1333
Panel D: Search Effort Level
Independent Variable R1 R2
Constant -0.003 -0.003
(0.027) (0.026)
∆ln(RRIl,t−1) 0.018 0.019
(0.17) (0.17)
∆ln(Sl,t−1) -0.514 -0.517
(0.724) (0.724)
∆ln(RIPCl,t) -0.259 -0.25
(0.387) (0.388)
Recession Period -0.012 -0.011
(0.009) (0.009)
F-Stat 1.76 2.43
R-sq 0.09 0.12
Observation 1333 1333
Notes:
MR(1) is the mismatch rate computed by (available but occupied stock / total stock) which is used in model R1. MR(2) is the mismatch rate
computed by (available but occupied stock / vacant stock) which is used in model R2.
***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Hurricane Effects
Hurricane affected areas may also be represented by port cities or cities which
lack transportation infrastructure (proxied by commuting time). To test the
appropriateness and interpretation of our hurricane measure (which may be cap-
turing other factors linked to transportation), we include dummies of port cities
or cities with lack of transportation infrastructure in model M1 and only report
results of real rent and supply equations in table 3.12. We find that all original
coefficients in the rent equation do not change significantly but the interaction
term of hurricane threatened area with rent changes sign in the supply equation.
Port cities or lack of transportation infrastructure may also affect office supply,
however the inclusion of port cities and cities with lack of transportation infras-
tructure worsens the estimates of office supply elasticities. Therefore, we confirm
our identification of hurricane risk and occurrence that should be only included
in our main model.
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Table 3.12: Panel A: Robustness Check On Hurricane Effects
Panel A: Real Rent H1 H2 H3
Recession Period -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ATHt 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PORTl 11.295*
(5.937)
TTWDl 11.295*
(5.937)
MSA dummy × ln(Sl,t−1) Y Y Y
F-Stat 76.73 76.73 76.73
BIC - Simultaneous System -8200 -8200 -8200
R-sq 0.83 0.83 0.83
Observation 1376 1376 1376
Panel B: Supply H1 H2 H3
ATHt 0.038*
(0.02)
HUl -0.019 -1.631*** -1.631***
(0.205) (0.217) (0.217)
ATHt × HUl 0.015 0.015 0.015
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
ATHt × ln(RRIl,t−12) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
HUl× ln(RRIl,t−12) -0.233*** 0.146*** -0.136***
(0.031) (0.028) (0.038)
ATHt ×HUl× ln(RRIl,t−12) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
PORTl -0.22
(0.277)
PORTl× ln(RRIl,t−12) -0.152***
(0.03)
TTWDl 0.061
(0.183)
TTWDl× ln(RRIl,t−12) -0.184***
(0.032)
MSA dummy × ln(RRIl,t−12) Y Y Y
F-Stat 83619 83619 83619
R-sq 0.99 0.99 0.99
Observation 1376 1376 1376
Notes:
Signs ***, **, * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
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Imposing Constraints to Avoid Negative Supply Elasticities
We impose four constraints on three interaction terms of MSAs (Charlotte, New
York, San Francisco, and San Jose) with lagged rents in the supply equation to
avoid negative supply elasticities. We confirm the robustness of our main results
finding similar coefficients and significance in all estimates of supply and demand
elasticities.
Extended Sample Period
Our dataset could be extended to 1998 with the exception of the economic mis-
match rate, which is only available from 2005. Hence, we compare the estimates
using our main and extended sample periods (respectively starting from 2005
and 1998) using a three-equation system with real rents, supply, and search ef-
fort. Our results with the extended sample period are not significantly different
from the original ones.
At the same time, dropping the fourth equation from our system worsens the
estimates of supply elasticities. We, therefore, find confirmation that the search
and matching model is important to determine agents’ responsiveness to price
changes, and it should be included in our system of equations.
3.7 Final Discussion on Supply Elasticities
To justify our estimation of office supply elasticity in forty-two MSAs10, we need
to determine the geographical and regulatory constraints, which are respectively
linked to the following two questions:
(1) Are new CBDs likely to emerge?
(2) How tight is the building density and height restriction in existing CBDs?
As far as the first question is concerned, land availability increases the likelihood
of new CBDs forming. The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between unde-
velopable area as measured by Saiz (2010)[149]11 and our estimated office supply
elasticity is -0.25 at an 85% confidence level. Land scarcity reduces the elasticity
of both residential and commercial real estate supply. Among three MSAs with
perfectly inelastic office supply, San Jose and San Francisco (refer to Panel B)
contain more than 50% of the undevelopable area. Furthermore, Ventura - one
of top 10 supply inelastic MSAs - contains the most undevelopable area - almost
80%. All of them are coastal cities that imply geographic constraints driven
10One out of 43 MSAs (Miami) is automatically omitted while regressing the models for
estimating elasticities. Therefore, we can estimate supply elasticities for 42 MSAs.
11Saiz(2010) estimated the area within the cities’ 50-kilometer radii corresponding to wetlands,
lakes, rivers or other internal water bodies to quantify land availability.
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by the Pacific Ocean. The coastal barrier is also supported by Rose’s finding
(1989)[147], which was obtained using a different approach to measure the area
net of water bodies. As a result, developing new CBDs to replenish office supply
is unlikely feasible.
Since topology is not the only source of supply constraints, Charlotte and Bal-
timore - with almost no natural barriers - show very inelastic office supply. Ex-
tremely strong monopoly zoning power stored in these MSAs deters the supply
response. Based on three calibrations of monopoly power of zoning governments
including two concentration ratios of four largest suburb urbanization areas and
counts of zoning governments conducted by Rose (1989), these MSAs retain
the greatest monopoly zoning power, which crucially determines the tightness
of height restrictions or redevelopment. In contrast, more than 200 zoning gov-
ernments are involved in New York City, Chicago, and Philadelphia, and low
concentration ratios are also seen in Columbus, Los Angeles and St Louis. Rela-
tively less inelastic supply elasticity is estimated in these office markets (with the
exception of New York City, which shows stricter height restrictions as discussed
below). Therefore, the strength of monopoly zoning power gives responses to
both questions.
Furthermore, “regulatory shadow tax” is an alternative approach to proxy for the
tightness of regulatory constraints specifically driven by building height restric-
tions and it directly responds to our second question. Bertaud and Brueckner
(2005)[26], Glaeser et al. (2005)[88], and Cheshire and Hilber (2008)[39] claimed
that height restrictions imposed by governments minimize externalities, and the
difference in price setting between regulated and unregulated markets (i.e. price
minus marginal cost of construction) can be used to quantify the degree of re-
strictions’ so-called “regulatory tax”. Glaeser et al. (2005)[88] investigated height
restrictions in housing markets in the US and found that zero regulatory taxes
are present in some cities (e.g. Houston, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia and
Tampa). They then measured constraints of the office market in Manhattan only
(i.e. 0 in trough period and 0.5 in peak period); however, these estimates may
not be used to explain our office supply elasticities because the gap between mar-
ket price and marginal cost is sometimes explained by the monopoly power held
by developers in industries that are not very competitive. Cheshire and Hilber
(2008)[39] analysed UK office markets and adopted a similar approach to quan-
tify regulatory tax due to height restriction finding that regulatory constraints in
London are much tighter than in Manhattan. We assume regulatory taxes in of-
fice markets are positively proportional to housing markets and therefore deduce
that height restrictions in the US could be weaker than those in London.
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Finally, cross-sectional differences of supply elasticities across MSAs are also at-
tributed to competition between states or cities driven by the incentives to local
government revenues. Since sale and individual income taxes are the most impor-
tant sources of state government revenues, governments are motivated to develop
cosmopolitan CBDs to attract highly skilled residents. Rivalry among neigh-
bouring state governments may exist and regulatory constraints of office space
supply may be weaker in states with higher CBD status. For example, New York
and Boston offer incentives (i.e. low tax rates) to attract human capital and,
as a result, they find a larger proportion of the labour force is highly educated
relative to Philadelphia (Gyourko et al 2005)[98]. Moreover, the access to mo-
bility leads firms to choose their location in highly competitive cities and, as a
result, Glaeser (2005)[86] showed Boston being the most skilled city. If local gov-
ernments in Philadelphia decide to enhance the city’s competitiveness to attract
both firms and talents, they may relax constraints on the supply of commercial
real estate to a certain degree. This implies a relatively less inelastic supply in
Philadelphia compared with New York and Boston. Overall, we find that regu-
latory constraints may be moderately adjusted based on fiscal conditions of local
governments.
3.8 Conclusion
Our research contributes to the studies related to supply constraints in several
ways. Firstly, we build a conceptual framework distinguishing between physi-
cal and economic mismatch to obtain an estimation of frictional and structural
vacancy as main components of the natural vacancy rate similar to the labour
market literature. Secondly, we adopt an empirical strategy, which allows us
to distinguish between long- and short-run dynamics and obtain supply elastic-
ities at the MSA level that are found to be correlated with the housing market
elasticities obtained in previous studies. Particularly, our estimations are highly
correlated with the Wharton’s residential regulatory constraints (WRLURI) and
housing supply elasticities measured by Saks (2008) and Wheaton et al. (2014) -
please refer to Table 3.1.
We conclude that US office markets are generally supply inelastic, with San Jose,
Charlotte, San Francisco and New York (dataset43) as well as Denver and Bal-
timore (dataset30) showing a perfectly inelastic supply that could be explained
by land unavailability and monopoly zoning power. In contrast, MSAs without
zoning, such as Houston and Tampa, show a relatively high supply elasticity, al-
though still below one. Moreover, in San Francisco, we find a Veblen effect, which
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could be explained by the presence of landlords strategically holding vacant space
to seek for higher future rents. To achieve precise estimations, we identify eco-
nomic mismatch by observing occupied space that is listed to be re-leased (i.e.
signalling a mismatch with an existing tenant). Furthermore, we build a model
to link the search and matching process with a framework of the fundamental
real estate cycle. The empirical strategy is not limited to estimate supply and
demand elasticity, but it simultaneously attempts to estimate structural vacancy
rates.
So far our estimated structural vacancy and supply elasticity are positively cor-
related (Spearman rank correlation of +0.27). These results may show that the
low controlling power of landlords reduces the flexibility in adjusting equilibrium
vacancies to respond to market shocks and, therefore, supply elasticity tends
to be mostly explained by regulatory and geographical constraints. Landlords’
controlling power varies over the cycle - in a boom period controlling power is
stronger than in a bust period - and hoarding may more likely occur in a boom
period.
Finally, we also attempt to capture the likelihood of change in frictional vacancy
in our empirical strategy and find confirmation of our previous results. In fact,
considering frictional vacancy in an equilibrium model may improve our existing
strategy as we may be able to deliver insightful research on the linkages between
supply constraints and specific types of vacancy (i.e. structural and frictional)
sequentially.
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3.9 Appendix
For panel dataset30, twelve models are compiled. Models B1, B4, B7, and B10 contain a variable of general employment in office
using sectors in rent equations. In the models B2, B5, B8, and B11, this variable is replaced by employment in information
industries. Population is added to rent equations in other models. Supply elasticity in only 28 MSAs is estimated.
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Table 3.13a: Panel A: Short Run Relationship of Real Rent (∆ln(RRIl,t))
Independent Variable M1a M1b M1c M1d
Constant -0.003*** 0.0003 -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ln(Sl,t−1) -0.123 -0.049 -0.074 -0.022
(0.113) (0.112) (0.11) (0.11)
∆ln(EMPl,t−2) 0.481*** 0.405*** 0.505*** 0.445***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.05) (0.051)
∆ln(RIPCl,t−4) 0.202*** 0.200*** 0.186*** 0.186***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
∆MRl,t−1 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ECTRRIl,t−1 -0.161*** -0.164*** -0.162*** -0.164***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Recession Period -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
ATH 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001)
F-Stat 85.93 79.46 86.22 77.75
R-sq 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.28
Observation 1333 1333 1333 1333
Notes: Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
All four versions of the model keep consistent results. The impacts of short term change in supply and employment become weaker
when the dummy of Atlantic Ocean hurricane occurrence is included in the model. In contrast, the effect of recession period
becomes weaker by comparing M1b with M1d. Overall, coefficients of error correction term of real rent almost remain same.
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Table 3.13b: Panel B: Short Run Relationship of Office Stock (∆ln(Sl,t))
Independent Variable M1a M1b M1c M1d
Constant 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
∆ln(RRIl,t−12) 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
∆ln(ROPEXl,t−12) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆SELl,t−1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆MRl,t−1 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
∆CMl,t−2 0.001** 0.001* 0.001** 0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
ECTSl,t−1 -0.126*** -0.129*** -0.126*** -0.128***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Recession Period 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.0002) (0.0003)
ATH 0.0004 0.0006**
(0.0002) (0.0003)
F-Stat 25.27 24.42 22.1 22.22
R-sq 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.12
Observation 1333 1333 1333 1333
Notes: Signs ***, **, * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
All four versions of the model maintain consistent results. Error correction term makes the strongest impact on short term change
in office supply in terms of magnitude.
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Table 3.13c: Panel C: Short Run Relationship of Mismatch Rate (∆MRl,t)
Independent Variable M1a M1b M1c M1d
Constant 0.06** 0.026 0.061** 0.027
(0.027) (0.031) (0.027) (0.031)
∆ln(Sl,t−1) -4.666 -5.155 -4.729 -5.216
(3.329) (3.335) (3.329) (3.335)
∆ln(RIPCl,t−1) 1.151 1.188 1.099 1.125
(0.983) (0.982) (0.983) (0.981)
∆ln(EMPl,t−1) -8.055*** -7.070*** -8.038*** -7.063***
(1.516) (1.587) (1.515) (1.587)
∆ln(POPIl,t−1) 6.697 6.618 6.492 6.453
(8.355) (8.339) (8.351) (8.336)
ECTMRl,t−1 -0.215*** -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.214***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Recession Period 0.075** 0.075**
(0.033) (0.033)
F-Stat 35.89 30.99 35.86 30.98
R-sq 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Observation 1333 1333 1333 1333
Note: Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
All four versions of model keep consistent results. Short term effects of supply and population on mismatch rate are very negatively
significant. Coefficients of error correction terms of mismatch rate are the highest comparing rent, supply and search effort level.
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Table 3.13d: Panel D: Short Run Relationship of Search Effort Level (∆SELl,t)
Independent Variable M1a M1b M1c M1d
Constant 0.029*** 0.03*** 0.029*** 0.031***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
∆ln(RRIl,t−1) 0.159 0.153 0.162 0.156
(0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
∆ln(Sl,t−1) -2.227*** -2.196*** -2.271*** -2.238***
(0.635) (0.637) (0.635) (0.637)
∆ln(RIPCl,t) 0.347* 0.298 0.311* 0.267
(0.182) (0.218) (0.182) (0.218)
ECTSELl,t−1 -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.156*** -0.156***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Recession Period -0.003 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
F-Stat 25.81 20.71 25.8 20.8
R-sq 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Observation 1333 1333 1333 1333
Notes: Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
All four versions of the model keep consistent results. The impact of short term change in supply on the first difference in search
effort level is the most significant among other variables.
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Table 3.14a: Panel A: Long Run Relationship of Real Rent (ln(RRIl,t))-Dataset30
Independent Variable B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12
Constant 8.838*** 5.785** 4.854* 9.152*** 6.281*** 5.385** 8.644*** 5.583** 4.744* 8.931*** 6.056*** 5.24**
(2.414) (2.296) (2.435) (2.416) (2.438) (2.438) (2.417) (2.299) (2.439) (2.418) (2.302) (2.441)
ln(Sl,t−1)a -1.985 -1.485 -1.323 -1.885 -1.515 -1.365 -2.042 -1.518 -1.398 -1.925 -1.548 -1.431
ln(EMPl,t−2) 0.606*** 0.599*** 0.609*** 0.602***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
ln(INEMIl,t−2) 0.342*** 0.339*** 0.339*** 0.337*** 0.346*** 0.344*** 0.343 0.341***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
ln(POPIl,t−2) -0.143 -0.139 -0.126 -0.124
(0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129)
ln(RIPCl,t−4) 0.62*** 0.975*** 1.009*** 0.616*** 0.967*** 0.9997*** 0.622*** 0.978*** 1.008*** 0.619*** 0.97*** 0.999***
(0.079) (0.054) (0.062) (0.079) (0.054) (0.062) (0.079) (0.055) (0.062) (0.079) (0.054) (0.062)
MRl,t−1 -0.002 -0.005** -0.005*** -0.003 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.005** -0.005*** -0.003 -0.005*** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Recession Period -0.006* -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.006* -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.006* -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.006* -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ATH 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008* 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008* 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
MSA dummy × ln(Sl,t−1) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed MSA Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
F-Stat 78.62 83.64 82.54 78.7 83.75 82.65 78.56 83.64 82.54 78.64 83.76 82.65
BIC - Simultaneous System -5978 -6018 -6008 -6025 -6065 -6055 -5950 -5994 -5983 -5993 -6038 -6027
R-sq 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.85
Observation 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960
Notes: (a) Median values. Signs ***, **, * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
We investigate the effect of technological innovation of tenants on office market dynamics. Comparing models (B1 vs B2; B4 vs B5; B7 vs B8; and B10 vs B11), an inclusion of employment in
the information industry as a proxy of technological innovation reflects smaller impact of technological innovation relative to general employment. The impact even becomes a bit less significant
after including population in models B3, B6, B9 and B12. Moreover, an inclusion of population leads to the negative impacts of supply on real rent less significant respectively.
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Table 3.14b: Panel B: Long Run Relationship of Office Supply (ln(Sl,t))-Dataset30
Independent Variable B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12
Constant 4.171*** 4.181*** 4.176*** 4.165*** 4.174*** 4.17*** 4.182*** 4.193*** 4.189*** 4.178*** 4.188*** 4.184***
(0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124)
ln(RRIl,t−12)a 0.113 0.092 0.091 0.098 0.093 0.092 0.092 0.088 0.087 0.093 0.089 0.088
ln(RSIl,t−12) -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(ROPEXl,t−12) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SELl,t−1 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
MRl,t−1 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
CMl,t−2 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Recession Period 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ATHt 0.039 0.041* 0.040 0.040 0.038 0.041 0.039
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
HUl -0.783*** 0.740*** -0.786*** -0.766*** -0.771*** 0.749*** 0.796*** -0.746*** -0.744*** -0.729*** 0.759*** 0.767***
(0.183) (0.207) (0.183) (0.183) (0.183) (0.207) (0.207) (0.184) (0.184) (0.183) (0.208) (0.208)
ATHt × HUl -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006
(0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061)
ATHt × ln(RRIl,t−12) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
HUl× ln(RRIl,t−12) -0.147*** -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.151*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.156*** -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.158***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
ATHt ×HUl× ln(RRIl,t−12) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
TTWDl -0.058 -0.095 -0.095 -0.042 0.135 -0.078 -0.053 0.120 0.121 -0.042 -0.081 0.118
(0.285) (0.285) (0.285) (0.284) (0.286) (0.285) (0.285) (0.191) (0.191) (0.285) (0.285) (0.191)
TTWDl× ln(RRIl,t−12) -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.216*** -0.216*** -0.216*** -0.218*** -0.215*** -0.215*** -0.217*** -0.216*** -0.216*** -0.218***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
MSA dummy × ln(RRIl,t−12) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed MSA Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
F-Stat 51089 51089 51089 51089 51089 51089 51089 51089 51089 51089 51089 51089
R-sq 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Observation 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960
Notes: (a) Median values. Signs ***, **, * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
In general, all versions of model maintain consistent results except for hurricane threatened area and travel time to work. Comparing with the results based on dataset43, the estimates of
coefficients do not have significant changes.
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Table 3.14c: Panel C: Long Run Relationship of Mismatch Rate (MRl,t)-Dataset30
Independent Variable B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12
Constant 35.258*** 35.193*** 35.215*** 283.621*** 279.971*** 279.556*** 34.929*** 34.869*** 34.885*** 282.608*** 279.215*** 278.832***
(12.789) (12.786) (12.786) (47.649) (47.631) (47.635) (12.799) (12.796) (12.796) (47.815) (47.798) (47.802)
ln(Sl,t−1) -4.609** -4.608** -4.573** -18.671a -18.205a -18.130a -4.459** -4.449** -4.418** -17.719a -17.377a -17.265a
(2.139) (2.138) (2.139) (2.140) (2.139) (2.140)
ln(RIPCl,t−1) -2.923* -2.930* -2.936* -4.396*** -4.333** -4.318** -2.788* -2.798* -2.803* -4.371** -4.314** -4.302**
(1.517) (1.517) (1.517) (1.709) (1.707) (1.707) (1.519) (1.518) (1.518) (1.712) (1.710) (1.710)
ln(EMPl,t−1) -2.293* -2.312* -2.307* 1.178 1.055 1.067 -2.501** -2.526* -2.523** 0.956 0.826 0.834
(1.242) (1.242) (1.242) (1.608) (1.606) (1.606) (1.245) (1.245) (1.245) (1.612) (1.610) (1.610)
ln(POPIl,t−1) -0.689 -0.680 -0.715 -4.212 -3.852 -4.023** -0.990 -0.991 -1.022 -4.549 -4.231 -4.368
(1.907) (1.906) (1.907) (3.903) (3.899) (3.903) (1.911) (1.910) (1.911) (3.912) (3.909) (3.912)
Recession Period 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.002 0.0001 -0.0002 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.0003 -0.001 -0.002
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
MSA dummy × ln(Sl,t−1) N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y
Fixed MSA Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
F-Stat 25.32 25.36 25.36 25.32 25.37 25.37 25.32 25.37 25.37 25.29 25.34 25.34
R-sq 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.71 0.71 0.71
Observation 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960
Notes:
(a) Median values across 30 MSAs.
(b) Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
An inclusion of interaction terms of MSA with office supply causes significant differences in estimated coefficients. As discussed, the search and matching process is unlikely to be heterogeneous
across MSAs, the interaction of MSA dummies with office supply may lead to over-identification. Therefore, the results estimated in models B1, B2 and B3 are more reliable.
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Table 3.14d: Panel D: Long Run Relationship of Search Effort Level (SELl,t)-Dataset30
Independent Variable B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12
Constant 13.358*** 13.172*** 13.193*** 13.338*** 13.153*** 13.174*** -4.893 -5.424 -5.299 -6.969 -7.464 -7.338
(2.377) (2.377) (2.377) (2.377) (2.377) (2.377) (14.200) (14.192) (14.193) (14.202) (14.195) (14.195)
ln(RRIl,t−1) -0.426*** -0.425*** -0.433*** -0.439*** -0.438*** -0.446*** 0.770a 0.821a 0.821a 0.776a 0.829a 0.830a
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
ln(Sl,t−1) -3.648*** -3.622*** -3.619*** -3.643*** -3.617*** -3.614*** -3.481a -3.481a -3.494a -3.483a -3.492a -3.504a
(0.431) (0.431) (0.431) (0.431) (0.431) (0.431)
ln(RIPCl,t) 1.726*** 1.739*** 1.741*** 1.741*** 1.754*** 1.756*** 1.741*** 1.736*** 1.735*** 1.736*** 1.732*** 1.731***
(0.295) (0.295) (0.295) (0.295) (0.295) (0.295) (0.361) (0.361) (0.361) (0.361) (0.361) (0.361)
Recession Period -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
MSA dummy × ln(Sl,t−1) N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
MSA dummy × ln(RRIl,t−1) N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed MSA Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
F-Stat 66.19 65.86 65.80 66.20 65.88 65.82 55.18 55.24 55.25 55.17 55.23 55.24
R-sq 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Observation 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960
Notes:
(a) Median values across 30 MSAs.
(b) Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
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Table 3.15a: Panel A: Short Run Relationship of Real Rent (∆ln(RRIl,t))-Dataset30
Independent Variable B1 B2 B3
Constant -0.002** -0.0004 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ln(Sl,t−1) -0.154 -0.426*** -0.451***
(0.163) (0.163) (0.167)
∆ln(EMPl,t−2) 0.559***
(0.064)
∆ln(INEMIl,t−2) 0.238*** 0.236***
(0.035) (0.035)
∆ln(POPIl,t−2) 0.474
(0.402)
∆ln(RIPCl,t−4) 0.216*** 0.311*** 0.314***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
∆MRl,t−1 -0.002 -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ECTRRIl,t−1 -0.168*** -0.175*** -0.170***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
F-Stat 63.55 52.06 42.46
R-sq 0.23 0.20 0.20
Observation 930 930 930
Notes: Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
Comparing models B2 with B1, the change in first difference of employment in information industry has less significant positive
impact on short term change in real rent relative to the ratio of general office using employment to population.
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Table 3.15b: Panel B: Short Run Relationship of Office Stock (∆ln(Sl,t))-Dataset30
Independent Variable B1 B2 B3
Constant 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
∆ln(RRIl,t−12) 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
∆ln(RSIl,t−12) -0.005* -0.005 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ln(ROPEXl,t−12) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆SELl,t−1 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆MRl,t−1 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
∆CMl,t−2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
ECTSl,t−1 -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
F-Stat 11.08 11.37 11.31
R-sq 0.08 0.08 0.08
Observation 930 930 930
Note: Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
The estimates are consistent among three versions of models. Error correction terms generate the most significant impact on short
term change in office stock.
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Table 3.15c: Panel C: Short Run Relationship of Mismatch Rate (∆MRl,t)-Dataset30
Independent Variable B1 B2 B3
Constant 0.068** 0.067** 0.066**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
∆ln(Sl,t−1) -3.921 -4.116 -4.160
(4.181) (4.181) (4.182)
∆ln(RIPCl,t−1) 1.594 1.596 1.596
(1.058) (1.059) (1.059)
∆ln(EMPl,t−1) -8.691*** -9.011*** -9.017***
(1.657) (1.657) (1.657)
∆ln(POPIl,t) 1.638 2.055 2.624***
(9.649) (9.651) (9.664)
ECTMRl,t−1 -0.215*** -0.216*** -0.216***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
F-Stat 26.76 27.29 27.31
R-sq 0.13 0.13 0.13
Observation 930 930 930
Note: Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
All versions of models estimate consistent results. Short term changes in office supply and ratio of office using employment to
population make the most significant impact on short term changes in mismatch rate.
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Table 3.15d: Panel D: Short Run Relationship of Search Effort Level (∆SELl,t)-Dataset30
Independent Variable B1 B2 B3
Constant 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ln(RRIl,t−1) 0.119 0.128 0.126
(0.147) (0.147) (0.147)
∆ln(Sl,t−1) -2.303*** -2.316*** -2.316***
(0.834) (0.834) (0.834)
∆ln(RIPCl,t) 0.493** 0.484** 0.482**
(0.207) (0.207) (0.207)
ECTSELl,t−1 -0.169*** -0.170*** -0.171***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
F-Stat 20.59 20.71 20.80
R-sq 0.09 0.09 0.09
Observation 930 930 930
Note: Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
All versions of models estimate consistent results. Short term changes in office supply make the most significant impact on short
term changes in mismatch rate.
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Table 3.16a: First Difference Models of Long Run Relationships: Real Rent & Office Stock - Dataset30
Panel A: Real Rent
Independent Variable R1 R2
Constant -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
∆ln(Sl,t−1)a 0.061 0.123
∆ln(EMPl,t−2) 0.610*** 0.622***
(0.071) (0.071)
∆ln(RIPCl,t−4) 0.202*** 0.205***
(0.043) (0.043)
∆MR(1)l,t−1 -0.002
(0.001)
∆MR(2)l,t−1 0.0002**
(0.0002)
Recession Period -0.004*** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001)
ATH 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001)
F-Stat 4.17 4.15
BIC - Simultaneous System -10881 -7103
R-sq 0.22 0.22
Observation 930 930
Panel B: Office Stock
Independent Variable R1 R2
Constant 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
∆ln(RRIl,t−12)a 0.00003 -0.009
∆ln(RSIl,t−12) -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
∆ln(ROPEXl,t−12) 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
∆SELl,t−1 0.0004 0.0005
(0.001) (0.001)
∆MR(1)l,t−1 -0.0004*
(0.0002)
∆MR(2)l,t−1 -0.00005
(0.00003)
∆CMl,t−2 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Recession Period -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003)
ATH -0.003*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
HUl 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
ATH ×HUl 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0005)
ATH ×∆ln(RRIl,t−12) 0.033** 0.033**
(0.014) (0.014)
HUl ×∆ln(RRIl,t−12) 0.023 0.028
(0.056) (0.052)
ATH×HUl ×∆ln(RRIl,t−12) -0.041 -0.039
(0.028) (0.028)
TTWDl 0.0004 0.0005
(0.001) (0.001)
TTWDl ×∆ln(RRIl,t−12) -0.041 -0.002
(0.049) (0.044)
F-Stat 4.79 4.77
R-sq 0.34 0.34
Observation 930 930
Notes:
(a) Median values.
MR(1) is the mismatch rate computed by (available but occupied stock / total stock). MR(2) is the mismatch rate computed by (available but occupied stock / vacant stock).
***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table 3.16b: First Difference Models of Long Run Relationships: Mismatch Rate & Search Effort Level - Dataset30
Panel C: Mismatch Rate
Independent Variable R1 R2
Constant -0.122 -1.745
(0.168) (1.281)
∆ln(Sl,t−1) -14.817*** -71.392**
(4.774) (36.355)
∆ln(RIPCl,t−1) 0.322 22.823
(1.937) (14.759)
∆ln(EMPl,t−1) -2.101 -17.857
(2.846) (21.687)
∆ln(POPIl,t−1) 73.057*** 562.121***
(26.620) (202.846)
Recession Period 0.004 -0.005
(0.049) (0.373)
F-Stat 1.8 1.09
R-sq 0.11 0.07
Observation 930 930
Panel D: Search Effort Level
Independent Variable R1 R2
Constant -0.017 -0.017
(0.028) (0.028)
∆ln(RRIl,t−1) -0.038 -0.036
(0.183) (0.183)
∆ln(Sl,t−1) 0.013 0.012
(0.960) (0.960)
∆ln(RIPCl,t) 0.025 0.019
(0.428) (0.428)
Recession Period -0.013 -0.013
(0.010) (0.010)
F-Stat 2.59 2.59
R-sq 0.15 0.15
Observation 1333 1333
Notes:
MR(1) is the mismatch rate computed by (available but occupied stock / total stock) which is used in model R1. MR(2) is the mismatch rate
computed by (available but occupied stock / vacant stock) which is used in model R2.
***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table 3.17: Long Run Relationships - Likelihood of Change in Frictional Vacancy with Different Gross Rental Gap (4 Quarter Lag)
GRG10 GRG20 GRG30 GRG40 GRG50 GRG60
Panel A: Supply(ln(Sl,t))
MRl,t 0.001 -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
GRGl,t−4 0.020** -0.009** 0.017*** 0.040*** 0.034*** -0.025
(0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.044)
GRGl,t−4 ×MRl,t -0.003**** 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 0.003
(0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
MSA dummy × ln(RRIl,t−12) Y Y Y Y Y Y
F-Stat 83666 82101 85556 87056 83497 81969
R-sq 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Panel B: Mismatch Rate(MRl,t)
GRGl,t−4 0.468*** -0.115 0.089 0.356** 0.438** -0.263
(0.157) (0.079) (0.085) (0.142) (0.175) (0.346)
MSA dummy × ln(Sl,t−1) N N N N N N
F-Stat 31.72 31.60 31.51 31.75 31.75 31.56
R-sq 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
Interaction Terms in SEL N N N N N N
Fixed MSA Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
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Table 3.18: Long Run Relationships - Likelihood of Change in Frictional Vacancy with Different Gross Rental Gap (8 Quarter Lag)
GRG10 GRG20 GRG30 GRG40 GRG50 GRG60
Panel A: Supply(ln(Sl,t))
MRl,t -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
GRGl,t−8 -0.041*** -0.008** 0.001 0.014** 0.025* -0.054
(0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.014) (0.074)
GRGl,t−8 ×MRl,t 0.008*** 0.002** -0.0001 -0.001 -0.004* 0.006
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010)
MSA dummy × ln(RRIl,t−12) Y Y Y Y Y Y
F-Stat 80021 81140 82098 82832 82202 82084
R-sq 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Panel B: Mismatch Rate(MRl,t)
GRGl,t−8 0.194 0.124 -0.160* 0.222 0.762*** -0.384
(0.149) (0.077) (0.091) (0.151) (0.179) (0.429)
MSA dummy × ln(Sl,t−1) N N N N N N
F-Stat 31.56 31.64 31.64 31.60 32.14 31.57
R-sq 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.64
Interaction Terms in SEL N N N N N N
Fixed MSA Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
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Table 3.19: Long Run Relationships - Likelihood of Change in Frictional Vacancy with Different Gross Rental Gap
GRG40(n=4) GRG50(n=4) GRG40(n=6) GRG50(n=6) GRG40(n=8) GRG50(n=8)
Panel A: Supply(ln(Sl,t))
MRl,t -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
GRGl,t−n 0.040*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.014** 0.025*
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.014)
GRGl,t−n ×MRl,t -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.001 -0.004*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
MSA dummy × ln(RRIl,t−12) Y Y Y Y Y Y
F-Stat 87056 83497 85284 82580 82832 82202
R-sq 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Panel B: Mismatch Rate(MRl,t)
GRGl,t−n 0.356** 0.438** 0.455*** 0.783*** 0.222 0.762***
(0.142) (0.175) (0.148) (0.177) (0.151) (0.179)
MSA dummy × ln(Sl,t−1) N N N N N N
F-Stat 31.75 31.75 31.85 32.19 31.60 32.14
R-sq 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.65
Interaction Terms in SEL N N N N N N
Fixed MSA Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Signs ***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
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Chapter 4
Modelling Interactive
Mortgage Termination
Strategies
4.1 Abstract
We build an installment option valuation model to price two types of early termi-
nation options written on commercial mortgages: default and prepayment. The
key feature of our model is the introduction of MSA-specific supply constraints
into the underlying real estate price process, which determines the value of early
termination options. Our main contribution lies in the analogy between early
mortgage termination and installment options with straddle like payoff, so as to
enable the modelling the borrowers’ ability to choose default (put) or prepay-
ment (call) at a specific time. Our simulations find higher values of prepayment
options relative to mortgage default that implies greater probability to prepay
mortgages with intermediate balloon payments. We also price the default option
as American continuous installment put options (if ignoring prepayment) and
prepayment in cash as American continuous installment call options (if ignoring
default), and we prove that tightening real estate supply constraints rises the
value of early termination options by pricing their analogous options. Therefore,
we suggest an alternative risk management measure for mortgage markets to be
found in controlling real estate supply constraints.
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4.2 Introduction
As US financial institutions face tightening requirements of risk-based capital
for multifamily mortgages and heightening risk-based capital charges on high-
volatility commercial real estate loans 1 starting from 2015 due to the implemen-
tation of the Basel Accord III, the risk exposure in commercial mortgages has
been receiving more and more attention in financial markets. Unlike residential
mortgages, more complicated designs in commercial mortgages bring more types
of early termination options - default, restructuring, prepayment and defeasance2
- that quantify mortgage risks. A significant impact on credit stability of financial
institutions varying by types of early termination option in terms of loss exposure
could be foreseen because commercial mortgage outstanding accounts for more
than 15% of bank credits (equivalent to more than 45% of overall mortgages).
This is also one of reasons for the potential need of a radical reform in regulations
on commercial mortgages.
Theoretical models of residential mortgage default are mainly built up from
changes in utility and consumption along the life-cycle of borrowers (Campbell
and Cocco 2015 [35]; Gerardi, Rosen and Willen 2010 [83]; Piskorski and Tchistyi
2010 [136] and 2011 [137]). Due to the different nature of demand for leverage in
commercial real estate investment, the theoretical framework of early mortgage
terminations can be modelled as options using the Black & Scholes pricing model
[28]. In the existing literature, the decisions to prepay and default are regarded
as a call option and European put options respectively (Vandell 1995 [171], Am-
brose, Buttimer and Capone 1997 [10]). 3 Particularly, the interaction between
default and prepayment are investigated as a pair of competing risks (Deng,
Quigley and Van Order 2000 [55]; Clapp, Deng and An 2006 [49]; Pennington-
Cross 2010 [134]). We suggest that early mortgage termination is analogous to
an installment option with straddle or strangle payoff that describes the choice
between default and prepayment based on their option values. This approach
helps capturing the interaction between default and prepayment. Moreover, we
suggest that execution costs for mortgage default and prepayment are added to
1They are defined as loans for the purposes of acquisition, construction and development
with 80% higher loan-to-value ratio and contributed capital from a borrower would account for
less than 15% of the project’s value according to the Mortgage Bankers Association.
2Defeasance value is estimated based on another project return which involves leverage of
another mortgage. Restructuring involves modified mortgages that change boundary conditions
of default and prepayment via interest rate reduction and maturity extension. As it requires
complex assumptions in modelling, we relegate defeasance and restructuring for further research.
3In a series of papers, Kau, Keenan, Muller and Epperson suggested treating a mortgage
contract as a compound option, however did not explain the principle in depth (1987 [112], 1992
[114] and 1995 [111]).
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strike prices of default put and prepayment call options and the relative option
values are computed considering execution costs.
Besides, Shiller et al. (2017 [155]) advocate continuous workout mortgages for
reducing mortgage default. 4 Alternative mortgage products growing in the mar-
ket offer flexibility to borrowers by altering payment schedules. The paradox of
alternative home mortgage products enhancing benefits for borrowers is through
smoothing consumption but this also embeds a significant default risk which was
at origin of the recent mortgage crisis (Cocco 2010 [50]; LaCour-Little and Yang
2010 [118]). And the impact of deferred amortization can make the leverage effect
even more hazy. Although we do not consider alternative mortgage products in
this research, our new approach to quantify mortgage risks could also offer an
insight into the design of these products. Moreover, mortgage modification or
restructuring could create value for both borrowers and lenders by enhancing the
efficiency (Agarwal et al. 2011 [5]; Piskorski and Tchistyi 2011). Our model can
be easily extended to value mortgage restructuring options.
Our work contributes to the existing literature on the pricing of early termination
options with three new approaches. First, we apply an American installment
option valuation to value mortgage default and prepayment risks, where early
mortgage termination is analogous to an installment option embedded with a
straddle or strangle payoff and including stopping and early exercise boundaries,
which indicate the maximum amount of negative equity that is tolerable before
defaulting and the minimum of net property values that trigger prepayment. Sec-
ond, we introduce constraints driven by the real estate supply elasticity of the
collateral in the log normal stochastic process, so as to enhance pricing models for
early termination options of commercial mortgages by considering more realistic
real estate market dynamics. More specifically, we link the supply elasticity with
the volatility of real estate prices. Third, we capture execution costs into the
installment option valuation model by adding these to the strike prices of under-
lying options. We estimate implicit bankruptcy costs of mortgage default and
for a range of imposed explicit prepayment penalties as execution costs for pre-
payment. This covers the entire decision paths of borrowers who intend to early
terminate mortgages by valuing costs and benefits driven by different execution
methods (i.e. default and prepayment).
We start developing a theoretical model, and then simulate option values of early
mortgage terminations for constant payment mortgages (CPM) and interest only
4The continuous workout mortgage consists of fixed rate mortgage and negative equity insur-
ance. The pricing model of a continuous workout mortgage considers prepayment and default
options.
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mortgages (IOM), as well as constant amortization mortgages (CAM) with inter-
mediate balloon payments by Monte Carlo method. Early mortgage termination
involves both default and prepayment, and its value is the sum of separate de-
fault and prepayment option values. In other words, joint default and prepayment
generate benefits to mortgage borrowers as they can strategically select the best
execution approach (default or prepayment) after valuing costs and benefits, as
well as uncertainty of default and prepayment. All our simulation cases sug-
gest that the prepayment option value is greater than the default option for all
types of mortgages. Furthermore, we find that tightening underlying collateral
property supply constraints increases the value of early termination options. An
alternative risk management tool for mortgage markets could seek to control real
estate supply constraints of the underlying collateral.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a literature re-
view related to early termination options. Section 4.4 presents our theoretical
model. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 describe the setup of simulations and parameteriza-
tion, whose results and analysis are reported in section 4.7. Finally, we conduct
scenario analysis for the two dimensional model and particularly discuss the im-
pact of real estate supply elasticity on early mortgage termination, and we discuss
our main conclusion in the last section.
4.3 Literature Review
If we exclude Kau et al. (1987[112], 1992[114] and 1995[111]), in the existing
literature treating a mortgage contract as a series of interacting put and call
options, mortgage default is regarded as a collection of European put options
(Epperson et al. 1985 [65]): at each mortgage payment date, one put option
with a strike price which is determined by contemporaneous net equity values is
virtually written on a mortgage contract during origination and could be exercised
only on a payment date. A borrower will exercise an option if property values
are smaller than mortgage values or insolvency occurs. However, this analogy
ignores actual linkages between options and hence it could mis-state values of
default options.
The dynamic model to analyze decisions of home mortgage borrowers which in-
clude options to default, prepay or refinance a loan constructed by Campbell
and Cocco (2015 [35]) emphasizes the role of negative home equity for mortgage
default and the differential impact of heterogeneous characteristics of borrowers,
for instance labour income growth and risk on termination decisions. This study
shows that higher labour income risk leads to higher probabilities of default and
114
cash out prepayment for both adjustable and fixed rate mortgage borrowers and
even higher if labour income risks are correlated with real interest rates. Labour
income growth would not bring significant changes in probabilities of default,
cash out and refinancing since effects of lower “incentives to save” cancel off the
benefits from improving affordability. Apart from borrowers, heterogeneity of
originators and special servicers could determine mortgage default particularly
for commercial mortgages. Originators would adjust credit spreads to mortgage
rates according to their financial conditions - those facing a sudden fall in their
stock prices in quarters would levy higher credit spreads that generate higher
probabilities of default (Titman et al. 2010[163] and Black et al. 2012[30]).
Special servicers would make initial workout strategic decisions that alter the
likelihood of mortgage default (Chen et al. 2012[37]). These reflect important
roles of originators and special servicers in managing mortgage risks. Since the
heterogeneity of real estate supply constraints the underlying collateral is never
discussed, our work address its role in pricing early termination options.
Kau et al. (1987 [112], 1992 [114] and 1995 [111]) build generalized models
for default and prepayment of fixed rate mortgages by using extended Black &
Scholes model (1973 [28]) in which stochastic interest rates are assumed. In the
exposition of the mortgage pricing problem, they briefly suggest the treatment
of embedded options in a mortgage contract as a compound option, but they do
not seem to specify the exact types of compound options. Ultimately, they set
up boundary conditions and solve the Black-Scholes partial differential equation
numerically for different scenarios that are used to deduce values of prepayment
and default. They find that prepayment values are greater than default values in
general. In this study, we argue that early mortgage termination options should
be analogous to American continuous installment options because the options are
still alive once scheduled mortgage payments as installments are made.
Unlike conventional competing risk analysis between prepayment and default
(Ambrose and Sanders 2003 [15], Ciochetti et al. 2002 [44] and 2003 [45], Deng,
Quigley and Van Order 2000 [55], Grovenstein et al. 2005 [95], Seslen and
Wheaton 2010 [154] and An et al. 2013 [16]), the dynamic model built by
Campbell and Cocco (2015 [35]) does not consider a risk interaction between
prepayment and default, but they separately capture conditions of prepayment
in terms of negative interest rates and accumulated positive home equity values,
and conditions of default in terms of negative home equity. Our model, how-
ever, considers the interactions and obtains separate boundary conditions for the
denial of mortgage obligations and early prepayments. Moreover, we compare
boundary conditions of installment options with a straddle or strangle like payoff
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(as interaction between default put and prepayment call options).
We describe the decision paths of mortgage borrowers opting for early mortgage
termination with the detailed analysis of relative costs and benefits. This process
is undertaken by borrowers who catch the opportunities to “strategic default",
which refers to the borrower’s decision to stop making payments despite having
the ability to do so (Bradley et al. 2015 [32], Favara et al. 2012 [71], Guiso et
al.2013 [96], Mayer et al. 2014 [124]). The existing literature concludes that a
negative equity position is the key driver of strategic default, but moral and so-
cial considerations as well as herding behaviour (e.g. neighbourhood with other
strategic defaults) affect decisions to strategic default. In our research, we in-
vestigate what level of negative equity triggers default with the consideration
of implicit bankruptcy costs. This also allows us to contribute to the literature
related to strategic default.
Furthermore, options to prepay are usually regarded as American call options,
since a borrower considers full prepayment in cash when market interest rates
linked to refinancing are lower than mortgage rates. However, we argue that the
feature of fixed exercise prices is not the most appropriate due to the time-varying
nature of the remaining mortgage balance. American continuous installment call
options are then suggested as the most appropriate tool.
The literature on the valuation of installment options is limited. Underlying as-
sets for installment options are mostly foreign currencies, and installment options
are usually classified as discrete or continuous cases (Ciurlia and Roko 2005[48],
Griebsch et al. 2008[93], Ciurlia 2011[47]). Our study is the first attempt to apply
installment options in the pricing of early mortgage termination. As scheduled
mortgage payments are made monthly, we price American continuous installment
options to estimate the values of mortgage default and prepayment.
4.4 Theoretical Model
A mortgage termination option is analogous to an installment option with a
straddle or strangle like payoff, as borrowers continuing to make scheduled mort-
gage payments are effectively keeping mortgage termination options alive until
obligation denial or prepayment occur. An American chooser option consists of
a right to choose or abandon an American call on an asset or an American put
on the same asset, where the strike price and expiry date of an American call
and put are not necessarily the same. A special case of an American chooser
option is when the expiry date for the American chooser option coincides with
the expiry date of the underlying options. In this case the chooser is identical
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Figure 4.1: Payoff of American Continuous Installment Option with Straddle like
Payoff
Note: The graph describes the payoff of straddle option (long positions of call
and put options) which is the same as the payoff of chooser option. Ft and Gt
are lower and upper critical property prices, Kt is strike price. However, an
American continuous installment option is not identical to a chooser option, as
in a chooser the option holder can separate the call from the put once he makes
the decision. For an installment option, we cannot separate call and put.
to self-closing American straddle (Detemple and Emmerling (2009[56]), Qiu and
Mitra (2018[140])). The option analogy of early mortgage termination is similar
to this special case of American chooser option but the difference is that install-
ment option can shift its maturity but American chooser option fix its maturity.
Comparing with general chooser options, an installment option with a straddle
like payoff captures the interaction between put and call options throughout the
maturity but a general chooser option abandons either put or call once the option
holder chooses to keep put or call before or at the maturity of the chooser option
(there are no way to change after making the decision). Therefore, we conclude
that early mortgage termination should be modelled as an installment option
with a straddle or strangle like payoff (Figure 4.1) - i.e. long obligation denial
(put) and prepayment (call) options - instead of American chooser option.5
We develop the theoretical model to price installment put options for obligation
denial, installment call options for prepayment, and installment options with
straddle or strangle like payoff (considering both put and call options). If we
consider execution costs for each type of early mortgage termination options, we
5Installment options and chooser options are different and we cannot combine them together.
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can also add the execution costs to strike prices of each type of option (this makes
strike prices of each type of option different) and compute net option values.
Default as American continuous installment put option
A defaulting borrower surrenders the collateral and does not repay the remaining
mortgage balance until maturity. Epperson et al. (1985[65]) model a mortgage
as a compound of European put options. However, we argue that an American
continuous installment put option is more appropriate to describe the decision to
default because of a better match in the decision paths of payments when prepay-
ment is ignored. Option values represent the gross benefit a borrower’s gain by
defaulting. Since significant implicit opportunity costs driven by inaccessibility
of new borrowing after bankruptcy cannot be ignored, we further compute the
net benefit by adding bankruptcy costs to the strike price of the underlying put
option. In our analogy, borrowers are regarded as holders of American continu-
ous installment put options since mortgage origination. When borrowers make
scheduled mortgage payments, they keep the option alive. Otherwise, the option
ceases to exist if they default once property values drop below the outstanding
loan balance. They then exercise the option, making mortgage default occur.
Prepayment as American continuous installment call option
Similar to default, borrowers are regarded as holders of American continuous
installment call options since mortgage origination while default is ignored. At
every mortgage payment date, borrowers decide whether they should make the
mortgage payment (i.e. installment) or fully prepay (i.e. exercise the call option),
and the exercise price depends on the remaining mortgage balance. In addition,
another incentive for full prepayment is the reduction of interest expenses. How-
ever, we assume that volatility in interest rates may not significantly affect the
mortgage option; therefore we do not set the criteria of interest rate movement
to estimate the value of full prepayment options in a one-dimensional model. We
also build a two-dimensional model with a stochastic interest rate process and
then compare the results to verify our assumptions on volatility of interest rates.
In this case, execution costs consist of a prepayment penalty and net benefits are
computed as option values after adding the prepayment penalty to the exercise
price.
4.5 The Setup of Simulation
We conduct Monte Carlo simulations to price early mortgage termination options
which are analogous to American continuous installment options, with a straddle
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like payoff if strike prices of put and call options are the same, and strangle like
payoff when strike prices of put and call options are different. We separately price
mortgage default and prepayment and then compare with a case which jointly
considers all types of early termination options. The simulation setup involves
numerous steps including risk-free discounting, creating property and interest
rate processes (for two-dimensional model), setting up mortgage terms, comput-
ing early exercise and stopping boundaries for installment options, estimating
execution costs etc.
4.5.1 Risk free discounting
Hull (2012 [106]) mentions that Treasury yields are artificially low and many
financial institutions refer to overnight indexed swap rates and treat them as risk
free rates. Thus, we follow the norm and base our analysis on overnight indexed
swap rates as the risk free rate to discount the expected payoff of each option.
4.5.2 Property price process under risk neutral measure
We set up the log normal process for property prices under risk neutral measure
(equation 4.1). The volatility of real estate prices is determined by property
supply elasticities (SE) where con is a constant term based on historic volatility.
dp = (µp × p)dt+ (σp × p)dWp (4.1)
µp = r − q (4.2)
σp = con× e(1−SE) (4.3)
µp : Drift on p
σp : Volatility of p
r: Risk free rate
q: Rental yield (i.e. service flow rate)
Wp : W-Wiener process of p under risk neutral measure
4.5.3 Interest rate process under risk neutral measure
For the two-dimensional model, an interest rate (rt) is assumed to be a mean
reverting stochastic process with a non-negative boundary, as developed by Cox,
Ingersoll and Ross (1985 [51]):
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dr = γr · (µr − r)dt+ σr
√
rdWr (4.4)
γr : Speed of reversion of r
µr : Drift on r
σr : Volatility of r
Wr : W-Wiener process of r under risk neutral measure
We also assume that real estate prices correlate with interest rates, where ρdt =
dWpdWr and ρ is the correlation coefficient.
4.5.4 Deterministic mortgage terms
Assuming that a fixed-rate constant payment mortgage is originated, the initial
loan size (L0), fixed monthly mortgage payments (M) and unpaid principal on
payment date j (Uj) can be computed as follows:
L0 = LTV0 × p0 (4.5)
M = L0 · hm(1 + hm)
n
(1 + hm)n − 1 (4.6)
with
L0 = M
n∑
i=1
1
(1 + hm)i
Uj = (1 + hm)Uj−1 −M = M(
n∑
i=1
(1 + hm)j−i − (1 + hm)
j − 1
h
) (4.7)
where LTV0 is the initial LTV ratio, p0 the initial property value, hm the monthly
fixed rate and n represents the number of amortization periods expressed in
months.
Besides constant payment mortgages, we also analyze interest-only mortgages
and constant amortization mortgages with intermediate balloon payments.
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4.5.5 Valuing American continuous installment call options with
early exercise and stopping boundaries
Prepayment is analogous to American continuous installment call options. We
price prepayment by computing American continuous installment call options
where early exercise and stopping boundaries are considered. Referring to Ciurlia
and Roko (2005[48]), we denote lower critical property price, upper critical prop-
erty price and the initial premium of American continuous installment call options
as At, Bt and CAL(pt,t;x) respectively. For each time t, there exists At below
which it is beneficial to terminate mortgage payments by stopping the option con-
tract and Bt above which it is optimal to early exercise the prepayment option.
The initial premium function satisfies the inhomogeneous Black Scholes PDE in
the continuation region as follow.
∂CAL(pt, t;x)
∂t
+µppt
∂CAL(pt, t;x)
∂p
+ 12σ
2
pp
2
t
∂2CAL(pt, t;x)
∂p2
−rCAL(pt, t;x) = x
(4.8)
It is subject to the following terminal and boundary conditions.
CAL(pT , T ;x) = 0 (4.9)
lim
pt ↓ At CAL(pt, t;x) = 0 (4.10)
lim
pt ↓ At ∂CAL(pt, t;x)
∂p
= 0 (4.11)
lim
pt ↑ Bt CAL(pt, t;x) = Bt −Kt (4.12)
lim
pt ↑ Bt ∂CAL(pt, t;x)
∂p
= 1 (4.13)
If we price the option for CPM, at maturity the value of call option is zero.
We apply a value matching condition such as Newton method to compute early
exercise and stopping boundaries.
4.5.6 Valuing American continuous installment put options with
early exercise and stopping boundaries
Denial obligation is analogous to American continuous installment put options.
To price denial obligation, we follow the valuation of American continuous install-
ment put options. Referring to Ciurlia and Roko (2005[48]), there are stopping
and early exercise boundaries which are the time paths of lower and upper crit-
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ical property prices Ct and Dt and divide the domain into a stopping region,
a continuation region and an exercise region. The initial premium function of
the American continuous installment put is denoted as PUT(pt,t;x) where p is
property price and x is continuous installment rate (i.e. M/L0). The function
satisfies the inhomogeneous Black Scholes PDE in the continuation region.
∂PUT (pt, t;x)
∂t
+µppt
∂PUT (pt, t;x)
∂p
+12σ
2
pp
2
t
∂2PUT (pt, t;x)
∂p2
−rPUT (pt, t;x) = x
(4.14)
It is subject to the following terminal and boundary conditions.
PUT (pT , T ;x) = 0 (4.15)
lim
pt ↓ Ct PUT (pt, t;x) = Kt − Ct (4.16)
lim
pt ↓ Ct ∂PUT (pt, t;x)
∂p
= −1 (4.17)
lim
pt ↑ Dt PUT (pt, t;x) = 0 (4.18)
lim
pt ↑ Dt ∂PUT (pt, t;x)
∂p
= 0 (4.19)
We should note that the put option on CPM at terminal T is worthless as the
mortgage is fully repaid. Same with prepayment, we apply value matching bound-
ary condition such as Newton method to compute early exercise and stopping
boundaries in Monte Carlo simulation.
4.5.7 Valuing American continuous installment options with early
exercise and stopping boundaries
Early mortgage termination involves the options to deny or prepay and it is
analogous to an American continuous installment option embedded straddle (if
strike prices of underlying put and call options are the same) or strangle (if strike
prices are different) payoff. In fact, we can treat the option as a call option
(prepayment) where the denial feature (stopping payments at a lower boundary)
acts as a put option (default). To price early mortgage termination, we follow the
valuation of American continuous installment options. Referring to Ciurlia and
Roko (2005 [48]), early exercise and stopping boundaries represent the time paths
of lower and upper critical property prices Ft and Gt and they divide the domain
into an exercise region, a continuation region and a stopping region. The lower
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critical property prices can indicate the maximum amount of negative equity
that is tolerable before defaulting. The upper critical property prices can reflect
the minimum of property values that trigger prepayment. The initial premium
function of the American continuous installment option is denoted as V(pt,t;x)
where p is property price and x is the continuous installment rate (i.e. M/L0
where M is mortgage payment and this payment relative to original mortgage
balance proxies the installment rate). The function satisfies the inhomogeneous
Black Scholes PDE in the continuation region.
∂V (pt, t;x)
∂t
+ µppt
∂V (pt, t;x)
∂p
+ 12σ
2
pp
2
t
∂2V (pt, t;x)
∂p2
− rV (pt, t;x) = x (4.20)
It is subject to the following terminal and boundary conditions:
V (pT , T ;x) = 0 (4.21)
lim
pt ↓ Ft V (pt, t;x) = Kt − Ft (4.22)
lim
pt ↓ Ft ∂V (pt, t;x)
∂p
= −1 (4.23)
lim
pt ↑ Gt V (pt, t;x) = Gt −Kt (4.24)
lim
pt ↑ Gt ∂V (pt, t;x)
∂p
= 1 (4.25)
At maturity, the constant payment mortgage (CPM) is fully repaid and options
are worthless; on the other hand, for the interest only mortgage (IOM), the
boundary conditions will look different (i.e. VT = max(pT−(L0+InterestT ), 0)).
For CPM, the strike price Kt is time varying as repayments at time t are con-
sidered. For IOM, strike prices remain unchanged at the original mortgage prin-
cipal. Furthermore, if we consider execution costs (bankruptcy cost and prepay-
ment penalty), these will be added to the strike price and, therefore, call and
put options will show different strike prices. We apply value matching bound-
ary conditions via the Newton method to compute early exercise and stopping
boundaries in the Monte Carlo simulation.
The payoff of American continuous installment option is straddle like and looks
similar to a chooser option payoff. At the same time, an American continuous
installment option is not identical to a chooser option, as in a chooser the option
holder can separate the call from the put once he makes the decision. In our
case however, we are unable to separate call and put in the American continuous
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installment option.
4.5.8 Option valuation with least squares Monte Carlo method
Longstaff and Schwartz (2001 [121]) introduce the least squares Monte Carlo
method to price American options by estimating the continuation values and
subsequently early exercise cash flow. Ciurlia and Roko (2005[48]) extend the
method to accommodate the pricing of the American continuous installment op-
tions. The continuation value of American continuous installment options (yji )
is e−r∆tV ji+1(p
j
i+1) − xr (1 − e−r∆t), where i and j are time step and number of
replication, V ji+1(p
j
i+1) = max{f(pji+1), Ei+1(e−r∆tV ji+2(pji+2)|pji+1)}, f represents
the payoff function and xr (1 − e−r∆t) is the present value of installment premia
paid up to the time of termination (which is one of components of the solutions
to the free boundary value problems related to equation 4.20).
Ciurlia and Roko (2005) separate the set of replication paths into two subsets JEi
(paths in the money) and JSi (paths out of the money), but in our study we need
to combine subsets of put and call options. We apply a least squares regression to
estimate the conditional expectation and set up decision rules for early exercise
at time i (i.e. f(pji ) ≥ yˆij where j in JEi ) and stopping the option (i.e. yˆij ≤ 0
where j in JSi ). The conditional expectation is estimated separately on different
subsets. The initial value of the continuous installment option conditional on pji
is summarized as follows:
V ji (p
j
i ) =
{
max{f(pji ), (Ei(e−r∆tV ji+1(pji+1)|pji )− xr (1− e−r∆t))} if j ∈ JEi
max{0, (Ei(e−r∆tV ji+1(pji+1)|pji )− xr (1− e−r∆t))} if j ∈ JSi
4.6 Parameterization
We model interest rate and property price processes, as well as mortgage terms.
Subsequently, we estimate execution costs and add them to the strike price of
underlying options (default and prepayment) to compute gross and net option
values under different assumptions.
4.6.1 Interest Rate Process
We collect 1-year overnight indexed swap rates’ data between January 2004 and
December 2018 from the Thomson Reuters and estimate average and standard
deviation values, which are used in the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross model (1985[51])
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respectively as the drift and volatility terms. As real world density is differ-
ent from risk neutral density, risk transformation by adjusting the drift of the
stochastic process is needed (Giordano and Siciliano 2015 [85]). Theoretically,
Radon-Nikodym derivative and Girsanov Theorem are applied to transform real
world probability to risk neutral probability. Due to a long period of unchanged
target rates by the Fed since the Global Financial Crisis and cautious long-term
monetary policies, we assume that interest rates move steadily, with mean rever-
sion of rates at moderate speed (0.2).
Figure 4.2: Overnight Indexed Swap Rate
Source: Thomson Reuters
4.6.2 Property Price Process
As our model analyzes the early termination of commercial mortgages, we use
average office values and rental yields (akin to dividend yields of stocks) among
42 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA hereafter) from the 2nd quarter 1993 to
the 4th quarter 2015 (source: CBRE Econometric Advisors, a US consultancy
firm with a proprietary dataset of real estate fundamental metrics across MSAs).
Similar to interest rates, risk transformation is needed for building the stochastic
process under the risk neutral measure with real world histories by adjusting
the drift of the process (Giordano and Siciliano 2015 [85]). Following Hull (2012
[106]), the drift links to the risk free interest rate in the risk neutral world.
We apply a log normal model to the property price process. The volatility of
property prices is determined by property supply elasticity, thus we estimate
office supply elasticities by error correction models for 42 MSAs in Chapter Three.
The volatility formula also involves a constant term computed as the historical
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average volatility.
We show office prices in New York City (i.e. perfectly supply inelastic) and
Houston (i.e. less inelastic) in Figure 4.3 and find that New York City has greatest
fluctuation due to the Global Financial Crisis (around -90% in New York City vs
-80% in Houston).
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Figure 4.3: Office Prices in the US Cities
Note: Greatest fluctuation in office prices are found in New York City where
supply is perfectly inelastic. (Source: CBRE Econometric Advisor)
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4.6.3 Mortgage Terms
Our model is applicable to any type of mortgages. In our study, we compare
results for two common mortgage contracts with 10 year maturity generated by
one dimensional model: constant payment mortgage (CPM) and interest only
mortgages (IOM). When we apply a two dimensional model, we compare simula-
tion results for CPM and constant amortization mortgage with an intermediate
balloon payment of 50% of original principal (at the fifth year). Assuming an
initial loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 50%, we normalize the property values at $1.
We restrict our analysis to 42 MSAs because supply elasticities of office markets
are only available for this sample, which covers 50% of the entire US population
and 60% of the US population in office employment.
4.6.4 Execution Costs
Bankruptcy Costs. Overall bankruptcy costs could be estimated by the oppor-
tunity cost of losing future capital returns during the bankruptcy period caused
by the lack of access to funds. These are implicit costs that borrowers have to
bear. We analyze about 1,000 bankruptcy records provided in UCLA-Lo Pucki
Bankruptcy Research Database since October 1979 and estimate bankruptcy du-
ration as the length of period from bankruptcy filing to the confirmation of effec-
tive plans. On average, bankruptcy last for 18 months. We proxy the post-trough
return using the total return in office markets for the 42 MSAs sourced from
CBRE Econometric Advisors. As we observe a trough in 2009, we take average
annual returns from 2010 to 2011 as post-trough returns for the 18 months to
estimate bankruptcy costs.
Prepayment Penalty. Based on over 10,000 securitized mortgages containing
covenants of prepayment penalty sourced from Bloomberg, we find lenders mostly
charging at a rate of 9% for 9.5 months. In our model, we set up the penalty
with this rate on the remaining unpaid principal balance.
Table 4.1 summarizes the parameter values used in our baseline case.
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Table 4.1: Baseline Parameters
Description Parameter Initial µ σ γ
Interest Rates r 0.04 0.05 0.2 0.2
Property Value p 1 µr-q e(1−SE) ∗ 0.1
Rental Yield q 0.03
Supply Elasticity SE 0.1325
Correlation between Interest Rate and Property Value ρ +0.25
Mortgage Terms
Initial Loan-to-Value Ratio LTV0 0.5
Maturity (Months) n 120
Execution Costs
Bankruptcy Duration (Months) 17.685
Post-Trough Return 0.03
Prepayment Penalty Rate 0.09
Penalty Period (Months) 9.5
Notes:
µ: mean; σ: standard deviation; γ: reverting speed.
We set up two stochastic processes: interest rates and property values. All types of mortgages (CPM, IOM, CAM with intermediate balloon
payments) are assumed to have maturity of 10 year and LTV of 50%. Bankruptcy duration and post-trough return are used to estimate
bankruptcy costs. Prepayment penalty rate and penalty period are used to estimate prepayment penalty.
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4.7 Simulation Results and Analysis
4.7.1 Comparison of Simple European Option Values with Ana-
lytic Solution
Before valuing American installment options, we construct simple European op-
tions of mortgage default (put), prepayment(call) and straddle (i.e. long positions
of put and call) and simulate their values by Monte Carlo method and compare
them with analytic solutions obtained with a Black and Scholes formula. Table
4.2 summarizes the comparison. We conduct several simulations with increas-
ing number of simulation paths from 100 to 10,000. Referring to the simulations
with 10,000 paths for CPM, estimates of European put option (mortgage default)
equal zero, same as for the analytic solution obtained with a Black and Scholes
formula. The European call option (prepayment) also shows simulated values
similar to the analytic solution (i.e. 0.05% deviation). We draw the same con-
clusion on simulated straddle option values (joint default and prepayment). For
IOM, deviations of simulated values from analytic solutions of all three types of
European options are greater than the deviations for CPM.
Increasing the number of simulation paths allows the school to improve the accu-
racy of Monte Carlo simulation in general, even if processing times increase at the
same time. We present the graphs showing the relationship between simulated
option values and number of simulation paths in Figure 4.4. We confirm that
the simulated option prices generally converge to the values computed with the
Black and Scholes formula.
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Table 4.2: European Options (Comparison of Monte Carlo Simulation with Analytical Solutions)
Option CPM IOM
MC(n=10000) Black Scholes MC(n=10000) Black Scholes
Put (Default) 0 0 2.3× 10−5 3.45× 10−6
Call (Prepayment) 0.7369 0.7373 0.389 0.4057
Straddle (Joint Default and Prepayment) 0.7369 0.7373 0.389 0.4057
Notes:
We check the convergence of Monte Carlo simulation values for each type of option. We increase number of paths from 100 to 10,000. For
simulation with 10,000 paths, the Monte Carlo simulation values are close to the values computed with Black & Scholes formula. Therefore,
we conclude that simulation values are convergent to the analytical solutions.
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Figure 4.4: European Option Values vs Number of Simulation Paths
Note: Values of each type of option (put, call, and straddle) converge to
analytical solutions (dash lines) by increasing number of simulation paths.
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4.7.2 Valuing Mortgage Default Options When Prepayment Is
Ignored
We ignore prepayment and then value mortgage default options as American
continuous installment put options. Under the baseline scenarios in the one di-
mensional model, mortgage default options for CPM and IOM are worth $0.5401
and $0.0288 respectively. After considering the execution costs (i.e. bankruptcy)
by adding it to the strike price of underlying options, net default options for
CPM and IOM are valued at $0.1051 and $0.0277. We price American install-
ment options by modifying the least squares Monte Carlo simulation introduced
by Longstaff and Schwartz (2001[121]) to involve estimations of continuation val-
ues, early exercise and stopping boundaries. To estimate continuation values (the
formula is shown in the section of the setup of simulation), we regress discounted
immediate exercise payoff minus discounted installments on Laguerre polynomial
functions of property prices as follows:
L0(p) = e−p/2 (4.26)
L1(p) = e−p/2(1− p) (4.27)
L2(p) = e−p/2(1− 2p+ p
2
2 ) (4.28)
We compare continuation values with immediate exercise payoffs to decide if it
is optimal to immediately exercise mortgage default options. The comparison
implies that for the majority of 1,000 paths immediate exercises occur for CPMs,
but less likelihood of immediate exercise default options for IOMs is seen. Early
exercise and stopping boundaries can indicate the maximum amount of negative
equity that is tolerable before missing a payment. For CPMs, as the remaining
mortgage balance decreases with time, the maximum amount of tolerable negative
equity also decreases. The reduced equity values range from 0.3% to 49% of an
initial property value and after deducting the remaining mortgage principal, the
maximum values of tolerable net negative equity range from 0.0006% to 0.2%
of an initial property value. For IOMs, as the outstanding loan balance does
not change over time, the maximum amount of tolerable negative equity remains
unchanged over time and it is valued at 50% of the initial property value. As
CPM borrowers have less tolerance to negative equity than IOM borrowers, they
will be more likely to default. Therefore, the value of mortgage default options
for CPMs should be higher than for IOMs.
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4.7.3 Valuing Prepayment Options When Mortgage Default Is
Ignored
We value prepayment options as American continuous installment call options
while mortgage default is ignored. Under the baseline scenarios in the one di-
mensional model, prepayment options for CPMs and IOMs are worth $2.0664 and
$1.3178 respectively. After considering the execution costs added to the strike
price of underlying options, net prepayment options for CPMs and IOMs are
valued at $2.0311 and $1.2858. We also estimate continuation values, early exer-
cise and stopping boundaries for prepayment options and similarly for mortgage
default. We then compare continuation values with immediate exercise payoffs
to decide the optimality of an immediate prepayment option exercise.
We find that the majority of simulation paths suggest immediate exercises.
The early exercise premia for CPMs and IOMs are approximately worth at $1.3
and $0.9 respectively.
To understand the minimum equity amount that triggers refinancing, we compute
early exercise and stopping boundaries of prepayment options. We find that
for CPMs the threshold level varies with the outstanding loan balance and the
minimum net equity amount ranges from 100% to 150% of the initial property
value. For IOMs, the minimum net equity amount is valued at 150% of the initial
property value. In other words, the property value of the collateral reaches the
minimum level of $1.5 (normalized initial property value at $1) and subsequently
the IOM borrower decides to refinance. We discuss the impact of interest rate
movements on the threshold level of equity that triggers refinancing using a two-
dimensional model in the next section.
4.7.4 Valuing Early Termination Options: Joint Mortgage De-
fault and Prepayment Options
Joint mortgage default and prepayment options are analogous to American con-
tinuous installment options with a straddle or strangle payoff. Under the baseline
scenario in a one dimensional model, joint options for CPM and IOM are valued
at $2.6065 and $1.3466 respectively. Considering execution costs, the net joint
options for CPMs and IOMs are worth at $2.0833 and $1.3136 respectively. The
strategic boundaries of joint options come from the early exercise and stopping
boundaries of mortgage default and prepayment options by taking the maxi-
mum of two kinds of boundaries. As discussed in the previous section, stopping
payment at the lower boundary for a joint option is the same as the stopping
boundary showing the path of lower critical property prices for an one-sided de-
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fault put option. The early exercise boundary for a joint option is the same as the
path of upper critical property prices for an one-sided prepayment call option.
We conclude that the maximum amount of tolerable negative equity based on the
joint options is the same as the one driven by mortgage default one-sided options.
Moreover, the minimum equity amount that triggers refinancing based on joint
options is also the same as the threshold for prepayment one-sided options.
The values of early termination options are the sum of values of mortgage de-
fault and prepayment options. Early termination options (joint mortgage default
and prepayment options) gain benefits by obtaining the rights to select between
mortgage default and prepayment and to replicate payoff of both options. Thus,
the benefits can be maximized in different scenarios. When both options are
considered jointly, this straddle or strangle strategy can help to capture the gains
from large movements of the underlying property prices although the direction
of the movement is uncertain and not known apriori. We compare the values of
mortgage default and prepayment options and exercise one option where the pay-
off values are highest. Prepayment negates the value of default, and ceases to be
of value when default occurs. On the other hand, mortgage default also negates
the prepayment value and its value turns to zero when prepayment occurs. In
other words, if the prepayment value is greater than the default value, prepay-
ment is more likely to occur, and an inverse relationship between prepayment
and mortgage default value exists.
4.7.5 One Dimensional vs Two Dimensional Model
As real estate prices are stochastic, we develop a two dimensional model to cap-
ture stochastic interest rates. To do this, we setup a loop to replicate the steps
generating correlated stochastic variables by using the Cholesky decomposition
method (Glasserman 2004 [89]) and then simulating the interest rate (Cox, In-
gersoll and Ross model) and property price process (geometric Brownian motion)
with correlated stochastic variables. Simulated paths are input to another loop
to value early mortgage termination options. Table 4.3 summarizes the values
of mortgage default (one-sided when prepayment is ignored), prepayment (one-
sided when default is ignored) and early termination options (considering both
default and prepayment) in different scenarios of interest rate parameters. In
general, the results generated by the two dimensional model are similar to those
from the one dimensional model for CPMs. We also evaluate early termination
options for a constant amortization mortgage (CAM) with an intermediate bal-
loon payment and note that, after deducting execution costs, one-sided mortgage
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default options for IOMs are worth zero in every scenario.
When the volatility of interest rates decreases from 0.4 to 0.2, changes in values of
mortgage default and prepayment and early termination options occur in different
directions. For the majority of scenarios without considering execution costs
for CPMs, a positive relationship between the volatility of interest rates and
values of mortgage default options is found. If we consider execution costs, this
positive relationship is even more significant and clearer. We also find a positive
relationship with prepayment option values for CPMs but cannot draw a clear
conclusion for CAMs with an intermediate balloon payment. If interest rates are
less volatile, the likelihood of prepayment for CPMs decreases. In addition, hazy
relationships between volatility of interest rates and early mortgage termination
options (joint default and prepayment options) for CPMs and CAMs with an
intermediate balloon payment are obtained.
Regarding the relationship between speed of reversion in interest rates and early
termination options (both one-sided and joint options), we find that speed of
reversion in interest rates negatively correlates with the value of one-sided options
for the majority of scenarios without including execution costs for CAMs with
an intermediate balloon payment, but unclear relationships are found for joint
options. However, the deduction of execution costs makes results stronger and
it confirms a negative relationship for joint options. For CPMs we cannot find a
consistent relationship for one-sided and joint options, whatever type of execution
costs are considered.
We also conduct a scenario analysis on the correlation between property prices
and interest rates. However, nonlinear relationships between the correlation and
early mortgage termination options for the majority of scenarios are found. The
striking feature lies in the linear relationship between volatility of interest rates
= 0.4 and speed of reversion = 0.4. Without the inclusion of execution costs,
increases in correlation (-0.25 to +0.25) increase values of default, prepayment
and early mortgage termination options (strangle options) for CPMs by 62%,
47% and 1% respectively, while for CAMs with an intermediate balloon pay-
ment, values of default, prepayment and early mortgage termination options are
increased by 55%, 41% and 3% respectively. Including execution costs, values of
default and prepayment as well as early mortgage termination options increase
by respectively 22%, 47% and 34% for CPMs, while values of prepayment and
joint early termination options increase by 40% for CAMs with an intermediate
balloon payment.
Overall, there are almost no clearcut linear relationships between interest rate
related parameters and early mortgage termination options.
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Table 4.3: Scenario Analysis on Early Mortgage Termination by Using Two Di-
mensional Model
σr γr ρ Default Prepayment Strangle
CPM CAM CPM CAM CPM CAM
Without Inclusion of Execution Costs
0.2 0.2 -0.25 0.540 0.317 2.207 1.987 2.747 2.304
0.4 0.2 -0.25 0.347 0.216 1.515 1.431 2.759 2.289
0.2 0.4 -0.25 0.313 0.193 1.409 1.362 2.758 2.311
0.4 0.4 -0.25 0.337 0.208 1.517 1.424 2.745 2.263
0.2 0.2 0 0.320 0.197 1.433 1.394 2.740 2.296
0.4 0.2 0 0.538 0.316 1.485 1.391 2.738 2.268
0.2 0.4 0 0.322 0.200 2.209 1.988 2.751 2.307
0.4 0.4 0 0.346 0.216 1.547 1.439 2.755 2.286
0.2 0.2 +0.25 0.540 0.317 2.208 1.988 2.748 2.305
0.4 0.2 +0.25 0.343 0.214 2.229 2.007 2.776 2.330
0.2 0.4 +0.25 0.329 0.204 1.441 1.382 2.749 2.304
0.4 0.4 +0.25 0.545 0.322 2.227 2.006 2.773 2.327
With Inclusion of Execution Costs
0.2 0.2 -0.25 0.056 0 2.172 1.952 2.228 1.952
0.4 0.2 -0.25 0.062 0 1.493 1.410 1.729 1.410
0.2 0.4 -0.25 0.047 0 1.393 1.344 1.800 1.344
0.4 0.4 -0.25 0.061 0 1.495 1.405 1.691 1.405
0.2 0.2 0 0.045 0 1.416 1.374 1.765 1.374
0.4 0.2 0 0.059 0 1.468 1.373 1.692 1.373
0.2 0.4 0 0.057 0 2.173 1.952 2.231 1.952
0.4 0.4 0 0.063 0 1.528 1.419 1.745 1.419
0.2 0.2 +0.25 0.056 0 2.173 1.952 2.228 1.952
0.4 0.2 +0.25 0.074 0 2.194 1.972 2.268 1.972
0.2 0.4 +0.25 0.059 0 1.423 1.362 1.799 1.362
0.4 0.4 +0.25 0.074 0 2.192 1.970 2.266 1.970
Note: For each scenario, we simulate 1000 paths. We set up different cases with volatility
of interest rates (σr=0.2 or 0.4), speed of reversion (γr=0.2 or 0.4) and correlation
between interest rates and property values (ρ= -0.25, 0 or +0.25). For cases without
considering execution costs (bankruptcy costs for mortgage default and prepayment
penalties for prepayment), joint default and prepayment options are analogous to
straddle which is a special example of strangle. Regarding cases considering execution
costs, joint options are analogous to strangle which have long positions for both default
and prepayment options. Other parameters in the model are same as the setup of the
baseline scenario.
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4.7.6 Impact of Balloon Payments on Early Termination Options
Kau et al. (1987 [112] and 1990 [113]) price a commercial mortgage, which has a
30-year amortization schedule with a 15-year balloon payment. In our study, we
model the 10-year constant amortization mortgage with an intermediate balloon
payment of 50% of original mortgage principal. Compared to CPMs, the value
of early termination options embedded in CAMs with an intermediate balloon
payment are lower for any type of execution costs. In general, prepayment values
are higher than default values and this finding is consistent with the overall
simulation results presented in Kau et al. (1990 [113]).
4.7.7 Impact of Property Supply Constraints on Early Termina-
tion Options
Property supply constraints determine volatility of property prices. The more
elastic the real estate supply is, the less volatile property prices are. We set up
four scenarios of property supply constraints: perfectly inelastic (SE=0), inelas-
tic (SE=0.5), unitary elastic (SE=1) and elastic (SE=2). Referring to Table 4.4,
our simulation results are in line with theoretical expectations. When property
supply is perfectly inelastic, option values for both CPMs and CAMs with an
intermediate balloon payment are greater than those in less inelastic property
supply markets. Comparing among three options (one-sided mortgage default,
one-sided prepayment, and joint default and prepayment options), a decrease in
one sided mortgage default option value is greatest by relaxing property supply
constraints (i.e. increasing property supply elasticities) and the value turns to
zero while property supply is elastic (i.e. SE=2). Thus, the likelihood of mort-
gage default is significantly reduced. Increasing property supply elasticities (SE
from 0 to 2) also causes joint default and prepayment option values decrease by
28% for CPMs and 17% for CAMs with an intermediate balloon payment and
hence lower overall probability of early mortgage termination. After including ex-
ecution costs, net option values of mortgage default, prepayment and early mort-
gage termination (joint default and prepayment) for CPMs decrease by 100%,
10% and 13% respectively when property supply becomes more elastic (from 0 to
2). Decrements in option values for CAMs with an intermediate balloon payment
are smaller than for CPMs except for one-sided mortgage default which is worth
zero in each scenario. Results generated by our one and two dimensional models
are consistent. Therefore, we conclude that controlling supply constraints could
represent an alternative risk management tool to alter mortgage borrowers’ deci-
sion which may reduce mortgage risks for lenders. Consequently, regulators may
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consider the preferences of differentiating capital requirements for banks lending
in more or less constrained real estate markets.
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Table 4.4: Impact of Property Supply Constraints on Early Mortgage Termina-
tion
SE Default Prepayment Strangle
CPM CAM CPM CAM CPM CAM
Without Inclusion of Execution Costs
0 0.540 0.319 2.252 2.023 2.815 2.342
0.5 0.090 0.056 2.222 1.996 2.312 2.052
1 0.005 0.003 2.165 1.957 2.170 1.960
2 0 0 2.036 1.952 2.036 1.952
With Inclusion of Execution Costs
0 0.052 0 2.217 1.988 2.292 1.988
0.5 0.011 0 2.187 1.961 2.198 1.961
1 0.0006 0 2.130 1.922 2.131 1.922
2 0 0 2.001 1.909 2.001 1.909
Note: For each scenario, we simulate 1000 paths by a two dimensional model.
We set up four different levels of property supply elasticities (SE = 0, 0.5, 1
and 2) and compare values of early mortgage termination options. For cases
without considering execution costs (bankruptcy costs for mortgage default and
prepayment penalties for prepayment), joint default and prepayment options are
analogous to straddle which is a special example of strangle. Regarding cases
considering execution costs, joint options are analogous to strangle which have
long positions for both default and prepayment options. Other parameters in
the model are same as the setup of the baseline scenario.
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4.8 Conclusion
We contribute to the research area of early mortgage termination by pricing in-
stallment options. We contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First,
we revise the option analogy to price early mortgage termination and assimilate it
to an American continuous installment option equipped with straddle or strangle
payoff as options keep alive when scheduled mortgage payments as installments
are made. Second, we include a property price process depending upon the sup-
ply constraints of the real estate market where the collateral is located. Third,
we capture execution costs (i.e. bankruptcy costs for mortgage default and pre-
payment penalties for prepayment) in the option pricing model by adding them
to the strike price of underlying options.
Without the inclusion of execution costs, prepayment options are more valuable
than denial options for both CPMs and IOMs. Values of early termination options
(joint mortgage default and prepayment options) are the sum of one sided options.
This implies that a straddle strategy brings benefits by offering the right to
select an option to exercise. When we include execution costs in strike prices
of corresponding underlying options, prepayment options are still more valuable
and values of early termination options are the sum of one-sided options for both
CPMs and IOMs. We also find the maximum amount of tolerable negative equity
which is valued at 50% of the initial property price and the minimum net equity
amount that triggers prepayment at 150% (percentage of the original property
price).
Finally, we illustrate that supply constraints play a key role in determining the
option exercise. The option values of mortgage default, prepayment and early
mortgage termination decrease by 100%, 10% and 28% for CPMs if underlying
property markets become more elastic (i.e. supply elasticity increases from 0 to
+2). The decrease is smaller for CAMs with an intermediate balloon payment
than for CPMs. With the inclusion of execution costs, net option values also
decrease with supply elasticities but the decrease in early termination option val-
ues (joint mortgage default and prepayment options) is less than when execution
costs are excluded.
Overall, we argue that bank regulators should consider the proportion of bank
lending granted to more or less supply constrained real estate markets. From
a policy maker’s point of view, the adoption of metrics of property supply elas-
ticities for banks’ mortgage portfolios could form part of the risk assessment
and compliance process, where higher (lower) capital requirements are applied
to banks with collateral in more (less) supply constrained markets. Finally, the
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existence of a significant exposure of the banking system may be risk managed
by suggesting a temporary or more permanent relaxation of supply constraints
within those areas, or at least by avoiding a tightening in correspondence of
financial distress.
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Chapter 5
Empirical Investigation of
Borrowers’ Strategic Choices
5.1 Abstract
Using a dataset of around 12,000 US office mortgages in 42 MSAs covering 60%
of the US service labour force from 2001 to 2017, we shed light on the role played
by supply constraints of underlying real estate markets on the exercise of mort-
gage termination options. Particularly, we empirically test the two-stage decision
framework using a multinomial logit model for prepayment and denial options
in the first stage and a logit model in the second stage for prepayment in cash
vs defeasance and default vs mortgage restructuring. We find that MSAs with
less restrictive supply constraints show a more frequent exercise of prepayment
options, especially through defeasance rather than cash, but less frequent ex-
ercise of denial options. For partial prepayment, collateral assets in less supply
constrained markets reduce the likelihood of an exercise. As a result a greater un-
certainty present in supply inelastic real estate markets stimulates partial rather
than full prepayment as borrowers act strategically by cashing in a fixed gain
of the equity surplus in the partial prepayment, but decide to keep the option
open on the remaining balance for potential further uplifts. Therefore, we argue
that regulators need to monitor lending to supply constrained markets and policy
makers should consider controlling property supply constraints as an alternative
risk management tool to influence mortgage termination decisions.
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5.2 Introduction
Over the last decade, we have witnessed a revolutionary shift in the nature of of-
fice space demand from individual offices to collaborative space based on several
phenomena. Firstly, all major corporations started to adopt shared and open
work space as well as work-from-home policies. Furthermore, smaller companies
have been sharing office facilities and repetitive work is sometimes superseded by
automation. These shifts often translate into negative demand shocks in office
markets. As most office investment is funded with leverage, lenders, investors
of commercial mortgage backed securities and policymakers are duly concerned
about the borrower’s exercise of denial options under those conditions. As of
2017, 16% of mortgages collateralized with office properties have defaulted and
4% were restructured. Moreover, recent long term quantitative easing measures
promote extremely low interest rates and stimulate prepayment in cash and de-
feasance1. As a result, nearly 60% of commercial mortgages collateralized with
office properties are prepaid in cash and 15% are defeased as of 2017.2
In Chapter Four, we present a theoretical model to price early mortgage ter-
mination options. Following from those insight, we hereby develop a two-stage
theoretical model to price four early termination options grouped as two pairs of
competing options with different triggering conditions: (a) default vs restructur-
ing and (b) prepayment in cash vs defeasance. The theoretical model suggests
that tightening collateral underlying property supply constraints increases val-
ues of early mortgage termination options and this represents our main research
hypothesis in this work.
We provide an empirical evidence of the impact of several risk factors includ-
ing property supply constraints on the likelihood of these four early mortgage
termination options using a database of around 12, 000 commercial mortgages
collateralized with office properties in the period of March 2001 to August 2017.
Following the development of the two-stage theoretical model, we adopt a multi-
nomial logit model in the first stage and a logit model in the second stage to
estimate the probabilities of early mortgage termination options. We also exam-
ine the partial prepayment behaviour by adding an extra outcome in the first
stage and a pair of competing options (curtailment3 vs partial defeasance) in the
second stage.
1Defeasance refers to a prepayment type where the borrower terminates the mortgage con-
tract by transferring Treasury securities which replicate the cash flow structure of the relative
commercial mortgage.
2Source: Trepp, leading provider of performance data on US securitised and unsecuritised
mortgage loans.
3Curtailment refers to partial prepayment in cash
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We find that default is more likely than restructuring and a cash settlement is
more likely than defeasance. In the first stage, we show that mortgage rates,
mortgage type (interest only mortgage, i.e. IOM), debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and credit tenant lease significantly impact on the exercise of both pre-
payment and denial options. Consistent with previous theoretical findings, we
emphasize the role of supply constraints of underlying real estate markets in this
decision process, where one unit increase in property supply elasticities reduces
the likelihood of denying obligations by 55% and raises the likelihood of prepay-
ments more than three times. In the second stage, we show that an increase in
property supply elasticities significantly lowers the probabilities of restructuring
relative to mortgage default, but increases the probability of defeasance relative
to prepayment in cash. Therefore, we find confirmation of the need for regula-
tors to monitor the geographical composition of lending particularly in supply
constrained real estate markets and for policymakers to consider managing the
risk of mortgage termination options by relaxing/tightening supply constraints
in underlying property markets.
To our knowledge this also represents the first empirical study on the partial
prepayment behaviour, which is significantly affected by negative amortization
rate, mortgage rate, mortgage type, cross collateralization, DSCR and property
supply elasticities. Interestingly, an increase in property supply elasticities sig-
nificantly reduces the likelihood of partial prepayment. Greater uncertainty in
supply inelastic property markets lowers the appetite of borrowers to make a full
prepayment as they prefer to partly keep the option of further market uplifts
open by choosing to only partially prepay (with preference for curtailment).
This chapter is organized as follows: the next section provides a literature review
related to the geographical variation of early mortgage termination options and
the role played by property supply elasticity. Section 5.4 presents our conceptual
framework, while section 5.5 includes a data description and outlines our empir-
ical strategy and the two-stage logistic model framework. Sections 5.6 discusses
the main results and reports robustness checks. Finally, we draw our conclusions
in the last section.
5.3 Literature Review
The majority of empirical studies about early mortgage termination focus on
mortgage default in the United States. However, only few studies note the geo-
graphical variation of default rates in commercial mortgage markets. Ciochetti
et al. (2002)[44] gather commercial mortgage data in the period of 1974-1990
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from an anonymous multiline insurance company and the Council of Real Estate
Investment Fiduciaries and the American Council of Life Insurance. The regional
variation in loan termination behaviour is examined with a proportional hazard
model. Mortgages originated in the Southwest region exhibit the greatest default
risk, while in contrast, the default probability in East North Central, Mideast and
Pacific is the lowest. Yildirim (2008)[180] uses a combination of data sources (incl.
WOTN, Trepp and American Council of Life Insurers foreclosure databases) to
examine the default likelihood of CMBS loans by disentangling the probability
of “long-term survivorship” and the timing of default occurrence within a logis-
tic framework. The Southwest and Pacific regions show respectively the largest
and lowest default probability. An et al. (2010)[18] acquire a CMBS loan panel
dataset for the 1998-2007 period from Intex and use a hazard model with newly
introduced factors (e.g. prepayment lock out and natural disaster) to examine
the regional variation in default rates of CMBS loans. After controlling for the
duration effect of default risk, hazard ratios suggest that East South Central,
West South Central and East North Central have over 2 to 4 times higher default
rates than Mid Atlantic. Default in East South Central is the highest, while in
Pacific it is only half of that in Mid Atlantic. Furthermore, An et al. (2013)[16]
emphasize the important role of both micro- and macro-location (e.g. zip-code
level house price indices, MSA level commercial land price indices, county level
unemployment rates) in explaining CMBS loan default. They obtain data for
over 30,000 CMBS loans from Morningstar in the period between 1998 and 2012
and analyze the dataset by using a Cox proportional hazard model. Mortgage
default is found to be highest in the Mountain, West South Central and East
North Central regions. Tong (2014)[164] focuses on the role of property supply
constraints on commercial mortgage default and adopts the linear probability
model with interaction terms to analyze around 6,000 commercial mortgages col-
lected from Bloomberg. She concludes that commercial mortgages collateralized
by properties located in more severly supply constrained markets bear greater
default risk. However, as supply elasticities by property types are not estimated
with econometric models, results may not be reliable.
The geographical variation of prepayment risk in commercial mortgages is rarely
investigated. Ciochetti et al. (2002)[44] and Ambrose and Sanders (2003)[15]
employ competing risk models to simultaneously estimate default and prepay-
ment risk by region. The former study finds the lowest prepayment rate in the
Southwest region while the latter shows that mortgages on properties located in
the mid-west are more likely to prepay relative to the western region.
Property supply constraints can account for geographical variation in the likeli-
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hood of early mortgage termination. In residential mortgage studies, the effects of
property supply elasticities are investigated in depth using housing supply elastic-
ities produced by Saiz (2010)[149] - see Adelino et al. (2014[3], 2016[2]), Alimov
(2016[8]), Ambrose, Conklin and Yoshida (2016[13]), Bogin et al. (2017[31]),
Chetty, Sandor and Szeidl (2017[40]), Dagher and Kazimov (2015[52]), Favara
and Imbs (2015[69]), Han, Park and Pennacchi (2015[100]) and Saiz (2010[149])).
As property supply is inelastic, higher property demand translates into mostly
higher real estate prices rather than more construction. Moreover, real estate
prices fall slower in supply inelastic cities compared to elastic cities if a negative
demand shock is permanent. Therefore we can clearly establish a link between
property supply elasticity and mortgage performance. An expansion of credit
supply imposes greater effects of real estate prices in more supply inelastic mar-
kets relative to elastic markets, and home equity values determined by property
supply constraints affect borrowers’ decisions. As we study commercial mort-
gages, we use office supply elasticities estimated in Chapter Three and offer an
insight into their impact on early mortgage termination options. To our knowl-
edge, this study represents the first empirical attempt to cover mortgage default,
restructuring and prepayment as well as defeasance simultaneously with a focus
on geographic variation due to supply constraints.
As far as mortgage restructuring is concerned, Agarwal et al. (2011)[5] and
Piskorski et al. (2010)[135] show that securitization reduces the likelihood of
renegotiation and increases the likelihood of foreclosure. Modifications of bank
held loans is more efficient as bank-held loans have lower post-modification de-
fault rates relative to securitized residential mortgages. Furthermore Favara and
Giannetti (2017[68]) find that lenders are more inclined to renegotiate troubled
mortgages before they become seriously delinquent, while Scharlemann and Shore
(2016[152]) and Scheiser and Gross (2016[153]) obtain similar results and show
that liquidity-constrained borrowers likely enrol in mortgage modification pro-
grams, which help to reduce the default probability and/or the likelihood to
re-default. Downs and Xu (2015[60]), and Black et al. (2017[29]) focus on com-
mercial mortgages and emphasize the important role of special servicers in de-
cision making processes of modification vs foreclosure, considering that CMBS
loans cannot be modified until after they have been transferred to a special ser-
vicer. Banks are more likely to extend bank loans relative to securitized loans
in distress. At the same time, so far the role of property supply constraints on
restructuring is ignored and we contribute to this important issue.
Furthermore, if we then analyze the second pair of competing options, defea-
sance is either investigated theoretically by Dierker, Quan and Torous (2005[59])
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and Varli and Yildirim (2015[173]) or assumed to be equivalent to prepayment
and hence treated jointly with prepayment in cash to estimate the likelihood of
early mortgage termination as in An et al. (2013[16]). We improve this aspect
of the literature by distinguishing between defeasance and prepayment in cash,
considering that prepayment is not allowed in the lock-out period. The analy-
sis of competing options between defeasance and prepayment in cash can help
to understand the conditions needed to reduce the likelihood of early mortgage
termination and hence lenders can design optimal mortgage contracts during
origination.
Finally, our research is the first empirical study analyzing partial prepayment
behaviour in commercial mortgage markets. In residential markets, Dagher and
Kazimov (2015[52]) conclude that banks more reliant on wholesale funding cur-
tail their credit significantly more than retail funded banks. McCollum et al.
(2015[125]) find that curtailment is more likely for borrowers with higher credit
scores, shorter loan terms, lower leverage at origination, current positive equity
and prepayment penalty. We translate their findings into our hypotheses.
5.4 Conceptual Framework
In Chapter Four, we develop a theoretical model to price early mortgage termina-
tion options by installment option valuation approach. In this research, we fur-
ther intensify the conceptual framework by building two-stage theoretical model
as represented in Figure 5.1 and underpin the empirical work of our study. We
build the conceptual framework underpinning the empirical work of our study on
this model. Initially, we set up the estimation of the first stage by distinguishing
the conditions of denying obligations and prepayments. For denying obligations,
the triggering condition is reflected in the property price at the payment date j
(pj) being smaller than the remaining mortgage balance (Uj+1):
pj < Uj+1 (5.1)
For prepayment options, the triggering conditions include: (1) property price at
date j is greater than the remaining mortgage balance; (2) monthly market rates
(rm) are smaller than mortgage contract rates (hm):
pj > Uj+1 (5.2)
rm < hm (5.3)
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Figure 5.1: Two-stage Theoretical Option Pricing Model
In the second stage of the theoretical model, we price the values of two pairs of
competing options (i.e. default vs restructuring and prepayment in cash vs de-
feasance) under the first stage conditions of denying obligations and prepayment
by estimating net benefits (i.e. option values - execution costs). Theoretically,
we analogically define early mortgage termination options with four kinds of fi-
nancial options (default: installment put option, restructuring: exchange option
between mortgages with different cash flow structure, prepayment: installment
call option, defeasance: exchange option of less liquid assets with more liquid as-
sets). These analogies suggest different mechanisms of pricing early termination
options, so that different risk factors are expected to empirically determine the
exercise of each kind of early mortgage termination. Therefore, we estimate the
probabilities of two pairs of competing options by setting two groups of mort-
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gages where borrowers decide to either deny the obligation or prepay in the first
stage and opt for different ways to exercise such options in a second stage.4
Finally, as far as the partial prepayment behaviour is concerned, we combine it
with early mortgage termination although the mortgage is not fully terminated
and we treat it as a decision involving unscheduled balloon payments. Two types
of partial prepayment behaviour exist: curtailment (or partial prepayment in
cash) and partial defeasance. Therefore, when we identify the two-stage model,
we add partial prepayment as one of the outcomes in the first stage, as well
as an extra pair of competing options (curtailment vs partial defeasance) in the
second stage. Moreover, we capture the impact of Treasury yields in the empirical
model to investigate whether defeasance costs proxied by Treasury yields affect
the likelihood of prepayment in cash and defeasance either partially or in full.
5.5 Empirical Strategy
5.5.1 Empirical Models
We follow the theoretical framework to build a two-stage model. In the first
stage, we employ a multinomial logit model to estimate the likelihood of denying
obligations and prepayment, either partially or in full. In the second stage, we
employ a logit model to analyze three pairs of competing options: (1) default
vs restructuring; (2) prepayment in cash vs defeasance; and (3) curtailment vs
partial defeasance. For the multinomial logit model in the first stage, we classify
each mortgage m by its status ms: 0 for performing mortgages, 1 for denying
obligations (i.e. combination of default and restructuring), 2 for full prepayment
(i.e. combination of prepayment in cash and defeasance) and 3 for partial prepay-
ment (i.e. combination of curtailment and partial defeasance). We then assess
the likelihood of option exercise pi using key microeconomic variables described
in Table 5.2. The empirical model for the first stage is represented as follows:
log
pi(l,ms = 1, 2, 3)
pi(l,ms = 0) = a0ms + a1msLTVm,t + a2msTTMm,t + a3msBPRm,t
+a4msNARm,t + a5msMRm,t + a6msMTm + a7msCCm + a8msPPYMm,t
+a9msDSCRm,t + a10msPAm,t + a11msORm,t + a12msCTLm
+a13msPSEm + a14ms∆PARm,t + a15ms∆FMRm,t + a16ms∆ITYm,t (5.4)
4Compared with the theoretical option pricing model, our empirical models ignore execution
costs because panel data related to bankruptcy costs, modification fees and defeasance fees
(except that we use Treasury yield to proxy defeasance costs for analyzing full and partial
prepayment behaviour) is not available.
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In the second stage, three logit models are estimated separately to study the like-
lihood of restructuring (1) relative to default (0), defeasance relative to prepay-
ment in cash (respectively 1 and 0), and partial defeasance relative to curtailment
(respectively 1 and 0). Table 5.2 describes the independent variables used in the
three models represented as follows:
log
pim
1− pim = b0ms + b1msLTVm,t + b2msTTMm,t + b3msBPRm,t
+b4msNARm,t + b5msMRm,t + b6msMTm + b7msCCm + b8msPPYMm,t
+b9msDSCRm,t + b10msPAm,t + b11msORm,t + b12msCTLm
+b13msPSEm + b14ms∆PARm,t + b15ms∆FMRm,t + b16ms∆ITYm,t (5.5)
where pi is probability of mortgage m being restructured (default vs restructur-
ing), fully defeased (prepayment in cash vs defeasance), or partially defeased
(curtailment vs partial defeasance) in three separate models.
We design this two stage model to estimate the probability of denying obligations
and full prepayments as well as partial prepayments in the first stage and then
combine the likelihood of four types of early mortgage termination options and
two types of partial prepayment options in the second stage as conditional prob-
abilities. Furthermore, we can estimate the probabilities of four types of early
mortgage termination options in separate conditions (i.e. P(denying obligations
and default), P(denying obligations and restructuring), P(prepayment and cash
settlement) and P(prepayment and defeasance)) as well as the probabilities of two
types of partial prepayment options - i.e. P(partial prepayment and curtailment)
and P(partial prepayment and partial defeasance).
5.5.2 Factors Driving the Exercise of Termination Options
The hypotheses are tested using relative risk ratios in a multinomial logit model.
The concept of relative risk refers to the likelihood of early mortgage termination
options and partial prepayment behaviour relative to performing mortgages. If
the relative risk ratio is greater (smaller) than 1, the probability of early mortgage
termination or partial prepayment will be increased (decreased) by the variable
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of interest relative to performing loans. Table 5.1 summarizes the hypothesized
relative risk ratio of independent variables, whose theoretical support is explained
below.
Loan-to-value (LTV) represents the ratio between outstanding loan balance
(unpaid mortgage) and the original property value as no update on the initial val-
uation is available. Its inverse proxy represents a situation of over-collateralization
which can help to reduce mortgage default (Fabozzi 2006[67]). For denying obli-
gations, the relative risk ratio is expected to be greater than 1, with an increase in
LTV augmenting the likelihood of obligation denial. On the other hand, high debt
levels stimulate deleveraging via prepayments. Therefore a positive relationship
between the likelihood of prepayment and LTV is expected. Furthermore, incen-
tives to deleverage also lead to curtailment and partial defeasance as it makes
refinancing with higher loan amounts easier. Thus, the relative risk ratio of LTV
is expected to be greater than 1 for partial prepayment too.
Time to maturity: based on credit risk studies such as Fabozzi (2006), credit
default is highest at maturity. When the mortgage is far away from the maturity
date, a lower default risk is expected, but no clear expectation for prepayment
can be formed. Considering the partial prepayment behaviour, future savings in
reduced interest payments may offer financial benefits for borrowers with longer
terms, so a relative risk ratio greater than 1 is expected for partial prepayment -
see McCollum et al. (2015 [125]).
Balloon payment ratios: Goldberg and Capone (2002[91]) explain that a part
of principal is required to repay earlier, and thus the risk of denying the obligation
should be higher. A positive relationship between the balloon payment and the
likelihood of denying obligations is expected, but there is no conclusion on either
full or partial prepayment.
Negative amortization rate: negative amortization refers to deferred pay-
ment. Brueggeman et al.(2011) point out that higher payments should be made
near the maturity of mortgages, but lower payments are made before maturity.
Therefore, a lower probability of denying obligations before maturity is expected,
but the probability should increase at maturity. Finally, no theoretical support
clearly suggest a unique relationship between negative amortization and either
full or partial prepayment risk.
Mortgage rate: Ciochetti et al. (2002[44]) and Chen and Deng (2013[37])
conclude that a higher borrowing rate leads to a greater mortgage payment and
higher borrowing costs cause higher likelihood of default and prepayment. There-
fore, both relative risk ratios are expected to be greater than 1. Similarly, higher
borrowing costs stimulate partial prepayment.
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Interest only type, i.e. IOM: Corcoran (2000) and Brueggeman et al. (2011)
point out that no principal is repaid until maturity for interest-only mortgages
and therefore a lower and higher likelihood of denying obligations is expected
respectively before and at maturity. The relationships between IOMs and pre-
payment risk cannot be inferred a priori.
Cross-collateralization: it represents a type of credit enhancement term to
reduce default risk. The mechanism is that all properties serving as collateral
for individual loans will serve to collateralize the entire debt as represented by
a cross-collateralization agreement. The lender is allowed to call each mortgage
within the pool when any one defaults (Fabozzi 2006[67], Brueggeman et al.
2011[33]). Endogeneity in the underwriting process (i.e. a lender assigning cross
collateralization in mortgage contracts for less credible borrowers) may make
the role of cross-collateralization ambiguous. Therefore, we do not form any
expectations about the relationship between cross-collateralization and default
and prepayment risks.
Prepayment penalty / yield maintenance: negative relationships are ex-
pected between prepayment penalty / yield maintenance and prepayment risk.
Elliehausen et al. (2008[62]) show that the default risk premium is inversely
related to the presence of a prepayment penalty for fixed-rate and variable-rate
mortgages and directly related to prepayment penalty for hybrid mortgages. This
shows an unclear relationship between prepayment penalty and denying obliga-
tions. As far as the partial prepayment behaviour is concerned, if prepayment
penalty / yield maintenance is too high for prepayment in full, borrowers will
choose to partially prepay to reduce future interest payments. Thus, the relative
risk ratio is expected to be greater than 1 for partial prepayment.
Debt service coverage ratio (DSCR): the ratio between periodical income
and mortgage payment represents the borrower’s financial ability to repay period
after period. Therefore, the DSCR negatively correlates with the probability of
default and the relative risk ratio should be smaller than 1 for denying obligations.
This hypothesis is supported by findings in An et al. (2013[16]), Goldberg and
Capone (2002[91]) and Seslen and Wheaton (2010[154]). Moreover, higher debts
stimulate borrowers to prepay to achieve a reduction in debt level when they
are financially capable to do so. Therefore, no unique relationship is expected
between DSCR and (full and partial) prepayment risk.
Property age: older properties require more maintenance and hence operat-
ing costs may increase. They are also risky as the cost is more uncertain - see
Archer et al. (2002 [20]). This reduces the incentive to early terminate mort-
gages. On the other hand, mortgages for developments are also risky. As a result,
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a non-linear relationship between property age and probability of denying obliga-
tions and prepayments are expected. Therefore, we cannot exactly infer unique
expectations on relative risk ratios for prepayment.
Occupancy rate: income-producing properties rely on a stable income flow to
maintain solvency. The occupancy rate can be used to determine income stability
as explained by An et al. (2013 [16]) and Chen and Deng (2013 [37]). A higher
occupancy rate is expected to reduce the likelihood of denying obligations. Stable
income can provide credits to mortgage borrowers and encourage prepayments.
So, the higher the occupancy rate, the greater the prepayment risk. If borrowers
earn greater income driven by higher occupancy, they will be more capable of
prepaying partially or in full. So relative risk ratios are expected to be greater
than 1.
Credit Tenant Lease: Brueggeman et al. (2011) mentions that credit tenant
lease reduces the risk of mortgage default as credit tenants are unlikely to default
and therefore the relative risk ratio is expected to be smaller than 1. No conclu-
sion can be reached for the expected impact of credit tenant lease on prepayment
risk instead.
Property supply elasticity: Hilber and Vermeulen (2016[105]) find that prop-
erty supply constraints negatively affect fluctuations in property prices, with
more inelastic markets showing higher volatility. Hence, mortgage default is more
likely to occur in supply inelastic areas. As a result, relative risk ratios should
be smaller than 1 for denying obligations. Moreover, as supply inelastic property
markets are more volatile, a greater uncertainty of property prices is expected
and borrowers cannot easily predict future movements. Therefore, on one hand
they may decide to cash in realised gains from capital appreciation by refinanc-
ing with higher outstanding loan balance (assuming available LTVs are confirmed
as for the previous origination) and distributing the excess value. On the other
hand, however, borrowers may prefer to retain the opportunity of further price
appreciation by only partially prepaying. In other words, we argue that borrowers
strategically prepay a partial amount of the outstanding loan balance to cash in
a guaranteed minimum capital gain, but they want to keep the option of further
uplift for the remaining part which is not prepaid. As a result, a positive and
negative relationship between property supply elasticity and respectively full and
partial prepayments is expected.
Property absorption rate: intuitively, less property take-up causes a gloomier
outlook on commercial property and a higher mortgage default risk is expected.
A negative relationship is expected between office using employment and the
probability of denying obligations. This is supported by the findings in An et al.
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(2013 [16]). Greater demand may reflect higher income and higher occupancy,
thus a greater prepayment risk is expected (i.e. a positive relationship between
property absorption rate and prepayment risk). As far as partial prepayment
behaviour is concerned, the greater the likelihood of prepayment in full, the less
the likelihood of partial prepayment. In other words, a negative relationship
between property absorption rate and the likelihood of partial prepayment is
expected.
Fixed rate mortgage - FRM - market rate: it demonstrates the market
trend of interest rates, which is also discussed in Ambrose and Sanders (2003[15]).
In a low interest rate environment, the prepayment risk rises. That leads to the
expectation of a negative relationship between market interest rates and prepay-
ment risk. However, in general interest rates positively correlate with property
prices. If borrowers want to cash in realised profits through property price ap-
preciation using prepayment, they will more likely do this in an environment
with interest rates increasing. Hence, a negative relationship between market
interest rates and prepayment becomes unsure. Furthermore, if market interest
rates increase, the default risk may increase for adjustable rate mortgage (ARM)
borrowers but less so for FRM borrowers. Therefore, we assume the relationship
between the likelihood of denying obligations and market interest rates should be
empirically determined.
Inflation indexed Treasury yield: we only examine the impact of Treasury
yields on full and partial prepayment bahaviour. Dierker et al. (2005[59]) mention
that Treasury yields proxy for the cost of defeasance as it requires the submission
of Treasury securities which replicate cash flow patterns of mortgages. If Trea-
sury yields are high, a greater defeasance cost is determined and hence a lower
likelihood of full or partial defeasance is expected. Odd ratios in the second stage
model for full or partial defeasance are expected to be smaller than 1 relative to
full prepayment in cash or curtailment.
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Table 5.1: Hypothesis Tests
Acronym Variable Relative Risk Ratio
Denying obligations Full Prepayments Partial Prepayments
LTVm,t LTV ratio (%) >1 >1 >1
TTMm,t Time to Maturity (month) <1 ? >1
BPRm,t Balloon Payment Ratio (%) >1 ? ?
NARm,t Negative Amortization Rate (%) ? ? ?
MRm,t Mortgage Rate (%) >1 >1 >1
MTm Mortgage Type (Interest Only) ? ? ?
CCm Cross Collateralization ? ? ?
PPYMm,t Prepayment Penalty & Yield Maintenance (%) ? <1 >1
DSCRm,t Debt Service Coverage Ratio (%) <1 ? ?
PAm,t Property Age (Year) ? ? ?
ORm,t Occupancy Rate (%) <1 >1 >1
CTLm Credit Tenant Lease <1 ? ?
PSEm Property Supply Elasticity <1 >1 <1
PARm,t Property Absorption Rate in MSA <1 >1 <1
FMRt Fixed Rate Mortgage Market Rate (%) ? ? ?
ITYt Inflation Indexed Treasury Yield (%) ? ? ?
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5.5.3 Data and Data Sources
Securitized commercial mortgage databases are compiled by four main institu-
tions - namely Trepp, Intex, Morningstar and Bloomberg. In this research, we ob-
tain data support from Trepp, which maintains the most comprehensive database
in the coverage of 15,266 commercial mortgages starting from 1998. More than
500 loan specifications are recorded for each loan. In total, there are more than
two million observations. As we focus on mortgages collateralized by office build-
ings in 42 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA thereafter)5, we therefore trim
the dataset by selecting relevant mortgages and filtering the records with missing
data such as origination date, maturity date, LTV ratio, debt service coverage ra-
tios (DSCR), mortgage rates, property occupancy rates and collateral’s location
etc. We also delete mortgage records with multiple statuses, for example “si-
multaneous” default and prepaid loans, and records with changing loan statuses
after being in default, prepaid in cash and defeased. Furthermore, we identify
and remove outliers based on following conditions: (1) LTV ratio greater than
1000%, (2) balloon payment ratio greater than 500%, (3) mortgage rate greater
than 500%, (4) DSCR with negative sign6 . As a result, 12,453 commercial mort-
gages totalling 989,851 observations are available for our empirical analysis on
early termination options. The unbalanced panel dataset is compiled for the
time period between March 2001 and August 2017.
Table 5.2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for 17 variables, with property
supply elasticities obtained in Chapter Three. The data series of property de-
mand factor (e.g. property absorption rate by MSA) are obtained from CBRE
Econometric Advisor. Other mortgage related data are sourced from Trepp. In
general, the extremely large skewness and kurtosis reflect fat tailed distributions
on several variables including LTV ratio, balloon payment ratios, negative amor-
tization rate, mortgage rate, prepayment penalty and yield maintenance and debt
service coverage ratios.
For our main analysis, table 5.3 reports the descriptive stats of our variables for
the seven types of mortgage status: defaulted, restructured, prepaid, defeased,
curtailed, partially defeased and performing. To define mortgage default, we
check the delinquency status. If the delinquency lasts longer than 90 days or
a mortgage is classified as “real estate owned" or “foreclosed", the mortgage is
5As our estimations of property supply elasticity covers 42 MSAs, we compile the dataset of
mortgages granted in these MSAs.
6Garmaise (2015[80]) and Griffin and Maturana (2016[94]) point out the misreporting be-
haviour in mortgage markets which is associated with higher likelihood of mortgage delinquency.
Thus, we pay attention on outliers to avoid distorting the estimation results.
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classified as “defaulted". Of four types of early mortgage termination options,
most mortgages are prepaid (7,031), while restructuring is the least to occur
(501). As far as mortgage terms are concerned, defaulted mortgages have the
highest LTV ratios and holding time. That means that highly levered loans
are more likely to default, but borrowers take the longest time to make deci-
sions. In terms of amortization, it is surprising that prepaid mortgages do not
have balloon payments and negative amortization driven by deferred interests.
Defeased mortgages have absolutely enormous balloon payments but no nega-
tive amortization. Prepayment in cash and defeasance are sensitive to market
interest rates as borrowers consider the costs of interest in the property boom
period. Prepaid and defeased mortgages have the highest mortgage rates com-
paring with performing mortgages. By intuition, borrowers would save interest
payments by early terminating mortgages. In contrast, restructuring by reduc-
ing mortgage rates obtain the lowest mortgage rates. Interestingly prepayment
penalty and yield maintenance tend to zero for prepaid and defeased mortgages
and this enhances incentives to prepay. On the other hand, borrowers more likely
deny obligations for interest only mortgages, particularly through restructuring.
Considering collateral terms, default mortgages have the lowest DSCR, property
age and occupancy rates. Concerning property supply constraints, restructured,
prepaid and defeased mortgages have lower supply elasticities than performing
mortgages, and only defaulted mortgages have the highest supply elasticities.
This may be explained by a much longer decision time in supply inelastic mar-
kets where greater fluctuations in property prices are unrealized. In other words,
borrowers with collateral in more elastic markets make quicker decisions to de-
fault although fluctuations in property prices are smaller. In terms of property
demand factors, higher property absorption rates are found in restructured and
prepaid mortgages. This may suggest a stronger demand force encouraging re-
structuring when borrowers decide to deny obligations and prepayment in cash
when borrowers want to prepay. To confirm these findings, we will estimate the
models previously presented and discuss main results in the next section.
Finally, to investigate partial prepayment behaviour, we identify curtailment and
partial defeasance based on the related signals given in the Trepp database, where
we observe only 301 curtailed mortgages and 6 partially defeased ones. We jointly
analyze partial prepayment and early mortgage termination, because borrowers
may consider both of them during low interest rate periods to reduce service
charges. Therefore, we add an extra outcome (i.e. partial prepayment) in the
first stage model and an extra pair of competing options (i.e. curtailment vs
partial defeasance) in the second stage model. Comparing descriptive statistics,
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longer time to maturity, higher balloon payment ratios, lower mortgage rates,
more IOMs and greater property supply elasticities are found in curtailed than in
fully prepaid mortgages. Higher LTV ratios, balloon payment ratios, and lower
mortgage rates and Treasury yields are found in partially than fully defeased
mortgages.
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Table 5.2: Data Summary Statistics For All Mortgages
Acronym Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
LTVm,t LTV ratio (%) 71.926 31.263 1.34 994.62 7.141 95.004
HTm,t Holding Time (month) 63.911 36.357 0 360 0.478 3.389
TTMm,t Time to Maturity (month) 72.536 63.151 1 477 2.21 8.898
BPRm,t
(a) Balloon Payment Ratio (%) 79.539 33.526 −1.23× 10−5 500 -1.696 5.336
NARm,t
(b) Negative Amortization Rate (%) -0.001 0.1002 -16.601 22.897 -93.857 17678.71
MRm,t Mortgage Rate (%) 6.271 1.486 0.0001 398.292 111.429 29294
MTm
(c) Mortgage Type (Interest Only) 0.453 0.721 0 2 1.254 3.049
CCm Cross Collateralization 0.033 0.178 0 1 5.262 28.684
PPYMm,t
(d) Prepayment Penalty & Yield Maintenance (%) 0.006 0.292 0 56.724 67.546 6297.755
DSCRm,t Debt Service Coverage Ratio (%) 1.549 0.816 0.001 154.61 21.016 2684.099
PAm,t Property Age (Year) 33.524 27.436 0 278 1.752 6.799
ORm,t Occupancy Rate (%) 91.314 12.317 1.059 100 -2.263 9.989
CTLm Credit Tenant Lease 0.005 0.073 0 1 13.626 186.656
PSEm Property Supply Elasticity 0.111 0.107 0 0.377 1.079 3.41
PARm,t Property Absorption Rate in MSA (%) 0.322 0.74 -4.152 5.724 0.305 5.865
FMRt Fixed Rate Mortgage Market Rate (%) 4.536 1.171 2.658 6.508 -0.086 1.555
ITYt Inflation Indexed Treasury Yield (%) 1.251 0.921 -0.77 2.89 -0.43 2.176
Notes: 12453 mortgages consist of 989851 observations. The unbalanced panel data starts from March 2001 and ends at August 2017. (a)
Balloon payment ratio is computed as scheduled balloon payment divided by mortgage balance. (b) Negative amortization is computed as
deferred interest or negative amortization divided by mortgage balance. (c) Mortgage type is category variables (i.e. fully interest only=2,
partial interest only=1, none=0). (d) This is the ratio of prepayment penalty and yield maintenance to mortgage balance.
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Table 5.3: Data Summary Statistics By Mortgage Status
Default Restructured Prepaid Defeased Curtailed Partial Defeased Performing
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
LTVm,t 163.506 90.853 124.803 62.323 78.538 48.976 66.957 10.892 71.98 36.965 75.408 6.339 67.506 15.451
HTm,t 88.264 30.798 91.611 25.413 86.88 59.317 92.59 27.26 98.993 32.289 75.042 22.081 59.41 34.34
TTMm,t 43.298 54.251 37.901 42.761 69.484 65.21 52.225 70.53 145.908 107.436 68.982 77.738 75.799 62.081
BPRm,t 92.408 23.302 92.486 36.8 0 0 78.222 36.875 90.979 42.179 84.294 30.503 81.549 30.616
NARm,t -0.001 0.031 -0.065 0.878 0 0 0 0 -0.023 0.074 0 0 -0.0001 0.0123
MRm,t 6.23 0.895 5.719 1.352 6.734 1.373 6.769 1.16 6.063 1.306 6.151 0.971 6.227 1.523
MTm 0.838 0.763 1.424 0.78 0.368 0.687 0.225 0.524 0.788 0.824 0.97 0.446 0.442 0.716
CCm 0.039 0.194 0.064 0.244 0.038 0.191 0.037 0.189 0.013 0.114 0 0 0.031 0.174
PPYMm,t 0.002 0.131 0.003 0.177 0 0 0 0 0.012 0.301 0 0 0.007 0.314
DSCRm,t 1.052 0.467 1.358 1.22 1.515 0.952 1.491 0.489 1.767 1.064 1.229 0.59 1.577 0.827
PAm,t 31.398 22.927 34.799 23.636 35.472 27.38 40.379 30.378 29.395 17.927 41.916 35.853 33 27.356
ORm,t 75.776 20.674 82.656 16.176 89.857 15.646 94.337 7.978 92.982 12.478 82.212 8.824 91.899 11.408
CTLm 0.002 0.049 0.0001 0.009 3.54× 10−5 0.006 0.002 0.041 0 0 0 0 0.006 0.077
PSEm 0.131 0.107 0.095 0.098 0.108 0.107 0.106 0.109 0.135 0.107 0.067 0.051 0.111 0.107
PARm,t 0.283 0.631 0.341 0.6 0.465 0.691 0.194 0.704 0.268 0.629 0.471 0.645 0.328 0.75
FMRt 3.57 0.762 3.489 0.866 4.62 1.329 4.689 1.166 3.617 0.904 3.613 0.8 4.579 1.158
ITYt 0.518 0.76 0.433 0.761 1.264 0.994 1.348 0.9 0.536 0.823 0.557 0.777 1.288 0.909
Number of Loans 1953 501 7031 1855 301 6 12129
Observations 35089 12597 28268 65985 1753 166 845993
Notes: LTVm,t: LTV ratio, HTm,t: Holding Time, TTMm,t: Time to Maturity, BPRm,t: Balloon Payment Ratio, NARm,t: Negative Amortization Rate, MRm,t: Mortgage Rate, MTm:
Mortgage Type (Interest Only), CCm: Cross Collateralization, PPYMm,t: Prepayment Penalty & Yield Maintenance, DSCRm,t: Debt Service Coverage Ratio, PAm,t: Property Age, ORm,t:
Occupancy Rate, CTLm: Credit Tenant Lease, PSEm: Property Supply Elasticity, OEm,t: Office Using Employment in MSA, PARm,t: Property Absorption Rate in MSA, FMRt: Fixed Rate
Mortgage Market Rate.
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5.5.4 Data Issues
Possibility of Outliers
Although we have dropped outliers as aforementioned, the data summary (Table
5.2) still indicates the possibility of an impact from outliers on five variables:
LTV ratios, balloon payment ratios, mortgage rate, DSCR and property age. In
order to eliminate this possibility, we winsorize these five variables at 5% level
for each tail. Table 5.4 summarizes the statistics of winsorized variables. The
statistics show that outliers are eliminated by winsorization.
Multicollinearity
We compile a correlation matrix for 16 variables in Table 5.5. As all correlation
coefficients among 16 variables are low. This indicates that the risk of multi-
collinearity is low in our model set up.
Unobserved Heterogeneity
In order to deal with unobserved heterogeneity, the study by Seslen and Wheaton
(2010[154]) includes fixed loan age effects in the models. However, we argue that
this approach cannot fully capture time-varying unobserved factors as same loan
ages exist in different time periods. Therefore, we apply conventional fixed time
effects in regression models to consider time varying unobserved heterogeneity.
Furthermore, locational unobserved heterogeneity may exist as there may be
different requirements related recourse loans by states and we then apply fixed
state effects. Along with significant fixed time effects, we also find statistically
significant results for state dummies which implies significant effects of locational
unobserved heterogeneity on early mortgage termination (Table 5.6).
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Table 5.4: Data Summary for Winsorized Variables
Acronym Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max.
LTVm,t LTV ratio (%) 68.167 10.798 42.3 83.5
BPRm,t Balloon Payment Ratio (%) 79.239 32.993 0 100
MRm,t Mortgage Rate (%) 6.282 1.022 4.806 8.370
DSCRm,t Debt Service Coverage Ratio (%) 1.504 0.460 0.750 2.617
PAm,t Property Age (Year) 32.834 24.950 5.000 96.000
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Table 5.5: Correlation Matrix
LTV TTM BPR NAR MR MT CC PPYM DSCR PA OR CTL PSE PAR FMR ITY
TTM -0.06 1
BPR 0.11 -0.39 1
NAR -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 1
MR -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.007 1
MT 0.07 -0.12 0.49 -0.008 -0.37 1
CC 0.05 -0.01 -0.004 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 1
PPYM -0.01 -0.02 -0.002 -0.003 0.02 -0.01 0.002 1
DSCR -0.39 0.09 -0.06 0.01 -0.13 -0.003 -0.02 0.007 1
PA -0.13 -0.10 0.08 -0.002 -0.05 0.10 -0.03 0.003 0.02 1
OR -0.08 0.14 -0.1 -0.005 0.07 -0.11 -0.002 0.001 0.29 -0.15 1
CTL -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.002 -0.05 0.02 0.001 -0.002 0.02 0.02 0.003 1
PSE 0.21 -0.01 -0.01 -0.001 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.09 -0.16 -0.10 0.004 1
PAR -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.002 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.001 -0.06 1
FMR -0.06 0.31 -0.26 0.02 0.32 -0.39 0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.13 0.12 -0.05 -0.01 0.06 1
ITY -0.07 0.31 -0.27 0.02 0.34 -0.37 0.02 0.01 0.09 -0.13 0.12 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.21 1
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Table 5.6: Fixed State Effects
State D or R P or Df C or PD
California -0.525*** -0.391*** -1.040***
Colorado -0.121** -0.334*** -0.202
Connecticut -0.682*** -0.306*** -0.822***
District of Columbia -1.350*** 0.308*** -1.337***
Delaware -0.502*** -0.626*** -0.389
Florida -0.231*** -0.306*** -1.039***
Georgia -0.069* -0.388*** -0.980***
Illinois -0.433*** -0.636*** 0.500***
Indiana -0.138** -0.730*** 0.492**
Kansas -0.641*** -0.716*** -3.243***
Kentucky -0.336** -0.744*** -27.565
Massachusetts -0.653*** -0.104*** -1.210***
Maryland -0.825*** -0.292*** -0.537***
Michigan -0.276*** -1.267*** -0.925***
Missouri 0.091* -0.620*** -1.253***
North Carolina -0.701*** -0.505*** -2.846***
New Hampshire -1.781*** -0.674*** -26.302
New Jersey -0.220*** -0.341*** -0.484***
New York -0.212*** 0.186*** -1.818***
Ohio -0.347*** -1.026*** 0.269*
Pennsylvania -0.314*** -0.387*** -0.965***
South Carolina -0.871*** 1.520*** -27.208
Texas -0.532*** -0.816*** -1.611***
Virginia -0.966*** -0.116*** -0.465***
Vermont -17.956 -27.781 -29.318
Washington -0.492*** -0.353*** -3.646***
West Virginia -22.964 2.082*** -27.668
Notes:
D, R, P, Df, C and PD mean Default, Restructured, Prepaid, Defeased, Curtailed
and Partially Defeased.
The results are generated by Model M4 and the reported values are the
coefficients of state dummy variables.
***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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5.6 Estimation Results and Discussion
In line with theoretical models, we employ a two-stage regression model in our em-
pirical analysis. In the first stage, we adopt a multinomial logit model (performing
= 0; denying obligations = 1; prepayment options = 2; partial prepayment = 3).
In the second stage, we use a logit model to investigate borrowers’ decisions when
they deny obligations (default vs restructuring), fully prepay (prepayment in cash
vs defeasance), or partially prepay (curtailment vs partial defeasance).
5.6.1 Early Mortgage Termination
In the first stage, default or restructuring is equivalent to denying obligations,
prepayment in cash or defeasance represent prepayment options, and partial pre-
payment includes curtailment or partial defeasance. We set up four models where
we: (1) exclude property demand factors, mortgage market rates and Treasury
yield; (2) include property demand factors only; (3) include mortgage market
rates and Treasury yield; (4) include all property demand factors, mortgage mar-
ket rates and Treasury yield.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 report the main results. Findings are consistent with theoret-
ical expectations except for the effect of credit tenant lease on the likelihood of
denying obligations and the impact of occupancy rate on the likelihood of partial
prepayment. Based on the Bayesian Information Criteria, Model 4 is the best fit.
Among mortgage terms, negative amortization rate, mortgage rates and mort-
gage type (interest only), exhibit statistically and economically significant impact
on the likelihood of obligation denial: a 1% increase in each of these variables
determines respectively a 91% decrease and 110% and 63% increase in the prob-
ability. Despite cross-collateralization being a protection covenant for lenders,
we find that this phenomenon does not reduce the likelihood of obligation denial
while, instead, a 1% increase in cross-collateralization makes the probability in-
crease by 18%. This result reflects the endogeneity of the underwriting process.
Furthermore, prepayment penalty / yield maintenance works as a tool to prevent
prepayment as it causes a 2% reduction in the likelihood of obligation denial.
Importantly, the LTV ratio shows a significant impact on the decision to deny
obligations, with a 1% change causing a 34% shift in the probability of default.
Hence, the careful consideration banking regulators assign to this metric is justi-
fied, especially considering the impact on banking losses in case of option exercise.
Furthermore, other collateral related terms also exert a significant impact on the
decision of denying obligations: a 1% increase in DSCR reduces the likelihood of
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denying obligation by 21%.
Finally, we find evidence of our main hypothesis that property supply constraints
is important and consequently banking regulators should carefully consider the
geographical composition of the lending portfolio. If the supply elasticity of a
market increases by one unit, the likelihood of denying obligation drops by 55%.
Therefore, relaxing supply constraints can reduce the possibility of denying obli-
gation and can be seen as an alternative risk management tool to control systemic
default risk and spillover effects.
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Table 5.7: Two-Stage Model (Winsorized): The First Stage -Multinomial Logit Model Results - Coefficients
Independent Variables M1 M2 M3 M4
D or R P or Df C or PD D or R P or Df C or PD D or R P or Df C or PD D or R P or Df C or PD
LTVm,t 0.127*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.127*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.289*** 0.010*** 0.021*** 0.289*** 0.010*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.003)
TTMm,t -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.010*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.010*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 0.010*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 0.010***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
BPRm,t 0.005*** -0.018*** -0.002** 0.005*** -0.018*** -0.002** 0.007*** -0.018*** -0.001 0.007*** -0.018*** -0.001
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.001)
NARm,t -2.069*** 0.091 -2.260*** -2.061*** 0.092 -2.252*** -2.251*** 0.080 -2.491*** -2.252*** 0.080 -2.492***
(0.253) (0.079) (0.259) (0.253) (0.079) (0.259) (0.287) (0.081) (0.291) (0.287) (0.081) (0.291)
MRm,t 0.478*** 0.474*** 0.410*** 0.477*** 0.474*** 0.410*** 0.741*** 0.529*** 0.591*** 0.741*** 0.530*** 0.591***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.033) (0.009) (0.004) (0.033) (0.010) (0.004) (0.033) (0.010) (0.004) (0.033)
MTm 0.609*** -0.237*** 0.380*** 0.609*** -0.237*** 0.380*** 0.490*** -0.223*** 0.402*** 0.490*** -0.223*** 0.402***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.033) (0.008) (0.007) (0.033) (0.009) (0.007) (0.034) (0.009) (0.007) (0.034)
CCm 0.191*** 0.163*** -0.879*** 0.191*** 0.163*** -0.879*** 0.166*** 0.169*** -0.871*** 0.166*** 0.170*** -0.871***
(0.028) (0.020) (0.219) (0.028) (0.020) (0.219) (0.031) (0.020) (0.222) (0.031) (0.020) (0.222)
PPYMm,t -0.030 -215.5425 0.040 -0.030 -203.265 0.040 -0.022 -340.769 0.043 -0.022 -340.807 0.043
(0.034) (3920.91) (0.045) (0.034) (3319.07) (0.045) (0.036) (22545) (0.046) (0.036) (22544) (0.046)
DSCRm,t -0.589*** -0.282*** 0.528*** -0.585*** -0.282*** 0.527*** -0.240*** -0.232*** 0.800*** -0.240*** -0.231*** 0.800***
(0.017) (0.010) (0.062) (0.017) (0.010) (0.062) (0.019) (0.010) (0.062) (0.019) (0.010) (0.062)
PAm,t -0.002*** 0.007*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.007*** -0.003*** -0.0001 0.007*** -0.004*** -0.0001 0.007*** -0.004***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.001)
ORm,t -0.033*** 0.018*** 0.007*** -0.033*** 0.018*** 0.007*** -0.037*** 0.013*** -0.004** -0.037*** 0.013*** -0.004**
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.002)
CTLm -0.326*** -1.409*** -19.742 -0.326*** -1.409*** -19.375 0.031 -1.393*** -26.267 0.031 -1.393*** -26.268
(0.118) (0.098) (4204.59) (0.118) (0.098) (3496.88) (0.134) (0.099) (113345) (0.134) (0.099) (113357)
PSEm -0.999*** 1.487*** -0.908*** -0.982*** 1.491*** -0.907** -0.814*** 1.519*** -0.647 -0.800*** 1.523*** -0.647
(0.088) (0.065) (0.461) (0.089) (0.066) (0.461) (0.098) (0.066) (0.473) (0.098) (0.066) (0.473)
∆PARm,t−3 -0.001*** -0.0007** 0.0004 -0.0007** -0.0006** -0.00002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.0983) (0.0003) (0.003)
∆FMRt−3 3.989*** 3.942*** 3.989*** 3.990*** 3.943*** 3.990***
(0.302) (0.191) (0.827) (0.302) (0.191) (0.827)
∆ITYt−3 -0.078*** -0.076*** -0.071*** -0.078*** -0.076*** -0.071***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.021) (0.008) (0.005) (0.021)
Constant -8.669 4.454 -12.046 -8.667 4.451 -12.049 -13.670*** 5.828*** -0.161 -13.660*** 5.827*** -0.162
(368.935) (58.346) (2092.91) (368.192) (58.336) (2090.51) (0.898) (0.577) (2.456) (0.898) (0.577) (2.456)
Fixed State Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
BIC 754364 754379 725464 725341
Log Likelihood -372619 -372606 -358350 -358268
LR Chi Square 276988 276717 287774 287649
Observations 989851 989471 964144 963766
Notes:
LTVm,t: LTV ratio, TTMm,t: Time to Maturity, BPRm,t: Balloon Payment Ratio, NARm,t: Negative Amortization Rate, MRm,t: Mortgage Rate, MTm: Mortgage Type (Interest Only),
CCm: Cross Collateralization, PPYMm,t: Prepayment Penalty & Yield Maintenance, DSCRm,t: Debt Service Coverage Ratio, PAm,t: Property Age, ORm,t: Occupancy Rate, CTLm:
Credit Tenant Lease, PSEm: Property Supply Elasticity, OEm,t: Office Using Employment in MSA, PARm,t: Property Absorption Rate in MSA, FMRt: Fixed Rate Mortgage Market Rate.
D, R, P, Df, C and PD mean Default, Restructured, Prepaid, Defeased, Curtailed and Partially Defeased.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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Table 5.8: Two-Stage Model (Winsorized): The First Stage - Multinomial Logit Model Results - Relative Risk Ratio
Independent Variables M1 M2 M3 M4
D or R P or Df C or PD D or R P or Df C or PD D or R P or Df C or PD D or R P or Df C or PD
LTVm,t 1.136*** 1.007*** 1.010*** 1.136*** 1.007*** 1.010*** 1.335*** 1.010*** 1.022*** 1.336*** 1.010*** 1.022***
TTMm,t 0.995*** 0.995*** 1.010*** 0.995*** 0.995*** 1.010*** 0.996*** 0.995*** 1.010*** 0.996*** 0.995*** 1.010***
BPRm,t 1.005*** 0.982*** 0.998** 1.005*** 0.982*** 0.998** 1.007*** 0.982*** 0.999 1.007*** 0.982*** 0.999
NARm,t 0.126*** 1.096 0.104*** 0.127*** 1.096 0.105*** 0.105*** 1.083 0.083*** 0.105*** 1.083 0.083***
MRm,t 1.612*** 1.606*** 1.507*** 1.612*** 1.606*** 1.507*** 2.098*** 1.698*** 1.805*** 2.099*** 1.698*** 1.806***
MTm 1.838*** 0.789*** 1.463*** 1.838*** 0.789*** 1.462*** 1.632*** 0.800*** 1.495*** 1.632*** 0.800*** 1.495***
CCm 1.210*** 1.176*** 0.415*** 1.211*** 1.177*** 0.415*** 1.181*** 1.185*** 0.419*** 1.181*** 1.185*** 0.419***
PPYMm,t 0.970 0 1.041 0.970 0 1.041 0.978 0 1.044 0.978 0 1.044
DSCRm,t 0.555*** 0.754*** 1.695*** 0.557*** 0.755*** 1.694*** 0.786*** 0.793*** 2.225*** 0.786*** 0.793*** 2.226***
PAm,t 0.998*** 1.007*** 0.997*** 0.998*** 1.007*** 0.997*** 1.000 1.007*** 0.996*** 1.000 1.007*** 0.996***
ORm,t 0.967*** 1.018*** 1.007*** 0.967*** 1.018*** 1.007*** 0.964*** 1.013*** 0.996** 0.964*** 1.013*** 0.996**
CTLm 0.722*** 0.244*** 0 0.722*** 0.244*** 0 1.031 0.248*** 0 1.032 0.248*** 0
PSEm 0.368*** 4.422*** 0.403*** 0.375*** 4.441*** 0.404** 0.443*** 4.568*** 0.524 0.449*** 4.585*** 0.524
∆PARm,t−3 0.999*** 0.999** 1.0004 0.999** 0.999** 1.000
∆FMRt−3 54.001*** 51.542*** 54.023*** 54.079*** 51.566*** 54.038***
∆ITYt−3 0.925*** 0.927*** 0.932*** 0.925*** 0.927*** 0.932***
Constant 0.0002 85.963 5.87×10−6 0.0002 85.720 5.86×10−6 1.16×10−6*** 339.648*** 0.851 1.17×10−6*** 339.242*** 0.850
Fixed State Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes:
LTVm,t: LTV ratio, TTMm,t: Time to Maturity, BPRm,t: Balloon Payment Ratio, NARm,t: Negative Amortization Rate, MRm,t: Mortgage Rate, MTm: Mortgage Type (Interest Only),
CCm: Cross Collateralization, PPYMm,t: Prepayment Penalty & Yield Maintenance, DSCRm,t: Debt Service Coverage Ratio, PAm,t: Property Age, ORm,t: Occupancy Rate, CTLm:
Credit Tenant Lease, PSEm: Property Supply Elasticity, OEm,t: Office Using Employment in MSA, PARm,t: Property Absorption Rate in MSA, FMRt: Fixed Rate Mortgage Market Rate.
D, R, P, Df, C and PD mean Default, Restructured, Prepaid, Defeased, Curtailed and Partially Defeased.
***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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At the same time, significant impacts of mortgage terms are obtained in prepay-
ment options. The likelihood of prepayments respectively increases by 71% when
rates increase by 1% and decreases by 20% for interest-only mortgages. Further-
more, as zero prepayment penalty and yield maintenance are found in prepaid
and defeased mortgages (refer to table 5.3), we obtain some “zero” relative risk
ratios. This finding is consistent with market practice, where prepayment in cash
normally happens during the last few months of the contract when the bank does
not ask for penalties and normally renegotiates the contract if the property is
not sold. Similar to obligation denial, collateral related terms such as DSCR and
credit tenant lease generate significant impact on the prepayment probability (re-
duction of 21% and 75% for respectively a 1% increase in DSCR and when an
agreement is signed.
Finally, if property supply elasticity rises up by one unit, the prepayment prob-
ability will be raised to more than three times. This reflects that borrowers in
elastic supply area have stronger willingness to fully prepay in order to maximise
their profits because they can predict to a less degree of uncertainty than in sup-
ply constrained markets.
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 report the estimation results for the second stage: default
vs restructuring, prepayment in cash vs defeasance, and curtailment vs partial
defeasance. Model M4a shows how a borrower’s choice between the two denial
obligation options are affected by mortgage and collateral related terms. LTV
ratios, time to maturity and balloon payment rate have minimal impact, while a
1% change in negative amortization rate and mortgage rate significantly affect the
likelihood of restructuring vs default (respectively by 49% and 42%). Importantly,
interest only mortgages show a probability which is three times bigger due to
the high level of outstanding loan balance present at the time of exercising the
option in comparison with constant payment mortgages. Moreover, if a mortgage
contract includes a cross-collateralization covenant, the likelihood of restructuring
relative to default is 23% higher. As far as collateral related terms are concerned,
increasing the DSCR by 1% increases the likelihood of restructuring by 47%.
Furthermore, property supply constraints also exert a significant impact and a
73% reduction in the probability of restructuring is obtained when the supply
elasticity increases by one unit. As the restructuring becomes less likely to occur
for a mortgage collateralized with an office building in supply elastic markets, we
infer that lenders probably expect a greater bounce of property prices in supply
inelastic markets and they are therefore willing to modify the loan structure for
temporary insolvent borrowers more than for collateral assets in supply elastic
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markets (where lenders do not expect a significant rebound).
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Table 5.9: Two-Stage Model (Winsorized): The Second Stage - Logit Model Results - Coefficients
Independent Variables M1a M1b M1c M2a M2b M2c M3a M3b M3c M4a M4b M4c
LTVm,t -0.079*** 0.003 0.128*** -0.079*** 0.003 0.128*** -0.048*** 0.003* 0.127*** -0.072*** 0.003* 0.128***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002) (0.002) (0.021)
TTMm,t 0.0002 -0.0007*** -0.002 0.0002 -0.0007*** -0.002 −9.48× 10−6 -0.0007*** -0.002 0.0001 -0.0006*** -0.002
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.002)
BPRm,t -0.004*** -0.017*** -0.004*** -0.017*** -0.004*** -0.017*** -0.004*** -0.017***
(0.0006) (0.005) (0.0006) (0.005) (0.0006) (0.005) (0.0006) (0.005)
NARm,t -0.682*** 21.785* -0.682*** 21.908* -0.642*** 21.565* -0.670*** 21.704*
(0.092) (12.636) (0.092) (12.704) (0.092) (12.620) (0.092) (12.686)
MRm,t -0.610*** 0.225*** 0.610*** -0.610*** 0.224*** 0.605*** -0.359*** 0.228*** 0.608*** -0.539*** 0.227*** 0.603***
(0.024) (0.015) (0.171) (0.024) (0.015) (0.172) (0.022) (0.015) (0.171) (0.024) (0.016) (0.171)
MTm 1.096*** -0.625*** 0.894*** 1.097*** -0.625*** 0.898*** 1.095*** -0.627*** 0.879*** 1.099*** -0.626*** 0.884***
(0.020) (0.034) (0.208) (0.020) (0.034) (0.209) (0.020) (0.034) (0.208) (0.020) (0.034) (0.209)
CCm 0.201*** 0.430*** 0.2003*** 0.431*** 0.198*** 0.430*** 0.205*** 0.430***
(0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062)
PPYMm,t -0.002 -0.001 0.009 0.001
(0.082) (0.081) (0.076) (0.080)
DSCRm,t 0.343*** 0.111** -1.500*** 0.342*** 0.111** -1.501*** 0.506*** 0.119** -1.470*** 0.383*** 0.118*** -1.471***
(0.035) (0.052) (0.297) (0.035) (0.052) (0.296) (0.034) (0.052) (0.297) (0.035) (0.052) (0.296)
PAm,t 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.021*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.021*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.021*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.021***
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.005) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.004)
ORm,t 0.015*** 0.016*** -0.056*** 0.015*** 0.016*** -0.056*** 0.016*** 0.015*** -0.055*** 0.016*** 0.015*** -0.055***
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.009)
CTLm -1.229 3.801*** -1.225 3.798*** -1.135 3.801*** -1.025 3.798***
(1.024) (1.320) (1.024) (1.319) (1.024) (1.318) (1.026) (1.317)
PSEm -1.359*** 1.837*** -13.273*** -1.355*** 1.844*** -13.498*** -1.151*** 1.827*** -13.071*** -1.291*** 1.834*** -13.292***
(0.210) (0.237) (1.906) (0.210) (0.237) (1.925) (0.209) (0.238) (1.897) (0.212) (0.238) (1.916)
∆PARm,t−3 -0.001 -0.001 0.023 -0.001 -0.001 0.023
(0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017)
∆FMRt−3 -0.008 1.167 5.779** -0.072 1.166 5.787**
(0.131) (0.872) (2.925) (0.123) (0.872) (2.932)
∆ITYt−3 0.001 -0.023 -0.119 0.006 -0.023 -0.119
(0.014) (0.023) (0.077) (0.013) (0.023) (0.077)
Constant 6.449*** -6.224*** -5.286** 6.444*** -6.219*** -5.170** 0.606 -3.019 10.461 4.047*** -3.016 10.603
(0.983) (0.465) (2.526) (0.983) (0.465) (2.528) (0.384) (2.622) (8.987) (0.374) (2.622) (9.005)
Fixed State Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Log Likelihood -20146 -16234 -306 -20140 -16227 -305 -20016 -16132 -304 -19825 -16126 -303
LR Chi Square 14667 11813 467 14665 11802 468 14036 11674 456 14406 11663 457
Observations 47512 36739 1652 47500 36728 1652 46731 36382 1626 46719 36371 1626
Notes:
LTVm,t: LTV ratio, TTMm,t: Time to Maturity, BPRm,t: Balloon Payment Ratio, NARm,t: Negative Amortization Rate, MRm,t: Mortgage Rate, MTm: Mortgage Type (Interest Only),
CCm: Cross Collateralization, PPYMm,t: Prepayment Penalty & Yield Maintenance, DSCRm,t: Debt Service Coverage Ratio, PAm,t: Property Age, ORm,t: Occupancy Rate, CTLm:
Credit Tenant Lease, PSEm: Property Supply Elasticity, OEm,t: Office Using Employment in MSA, PARm,t: Property Absorption Rate in MSA, FMRt: Fixed Rate Mortgage Market Rate.
The outcomes of M1a, M2a, M3a and M4a are default=0 and restructured=1. The outcomes of M1b, M2b, M3b and M4b are prepaid in cash=0 and defeased=1. The outcomes of M1c, M2c,
M3c and M4c are curtailed=0 and partially defeased=1.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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Table 5.10: Two-Stage Model (Winsorized): The Second Stage - Logit Model Results - Odd Ratios
Independent Variables M1a M1b M1c M2a M2b M2c M3a M3b M3c M4a M4b M4c
LTVm,t 0.924*** 1.003 1.136*** 0.924*** 1.003 1.137*** 0.954*** 1.003* 1.136*** 0.930*** 1.003* 1.136***
TTMm,t 1.0002 0.9993*** 0.998 1.0002 0.9993*** 0.998 1.000 0.9993*** 0.998 1.0001 0.9994*** 0.998
BPRm,t 0.996*** 0.983*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.983*** 0.996*** 0.983***
NARm,t 0.505*** 2.89×109* 0.505*** 3.27×109* 0.526*** 2.32×109* 0.511*** 2.67×109*
MRm,t 0.543*** 1.252*** 1.841*** 0.543*** 1.251*** 1.832*** 0.698*** 1.256*** 1.837*** 0.583*** 1.255*** 1.828***
MTm 2.993*** 0.535*** 2.445*** 2.995*** 0.535*** 2.455*** 2.989*** 0.534*** 2.409*** 3.001*** 0.534*** 2.420***
CCm 1.222*** 1.537*** 1.222*** 1.538*** 1.219*** 1.537*** 1.228*** 1.538***
PPYMm,t 0.998 0.999 1.009 1.001
DSCRm,t 1.409*** 1.118** 0.223*** 1.408*** 1.117** 0.223*** 1.658*** 1.126** 0.230*** 1.466*** 1.125** 0.230***
PAm,t 1.005*** 1.006*** 1.022*** 1.005*** 1.006*** 1.021*** 1.005*** 1.006*** 1.022*** 1.005*** 1.006*** 1.021***
ORm,t 1.015*** 1.016*** 0.946*** 1.015*** 1.016*** 0.945*** 1.017*** 1.016*** 0.947*** 1.016*** 1.016*** 0.946***
CTLm 0.293 44.766*** 0.294 44.626*** 0.321 44.732*** 0.359 44.599***
PSEm 0.257*** 6.276*** 1.72×10−6*** 0.258*** 6.324*** 1.37×10−6*** 0.316*** 6.214*** 2.1×10−6*** 0.275*** 6.260*** 1.69×10−6***
∆PARm,t−3 0.999 0.999 1.023 0.999 0.999 1.023
∆FMRt−3 0.992 3.212 323.425** 0.930 3.210 326.109**
∆ITYt−3 1.001 0.978 0.888 1.006 0.978 0.888
Constant 632.359*** 0.002*** 0.005** 629.184*** 0.002*** 0.006** 1.833 0.049 34938 57.206*** 0.049 40242
Fixed State Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes:
LTVm,t: LTV ratio, TTMm,t: Time to Maturity, BPRm,t: Balloon Payment Ratio, NARm,t: Negative Amortization Rate, MRm,t: Mortgage Rate, MTm: Mortgage Type (Interest Only),
CCm: Cross Collateralization, PPYMm,t: Prepayment Penalty & Yield Maintenance, DSCRm,t: Debt Service Coverage Ratio, PAm,t: Property Age, ORm,t: Occupancy Rate, CTLm:
Credit Tenant Lease, PSEm: Property Supply Elasticity, OEm,t: Office Using Employment in MSA, PARm,t: Property Absorption Rate in MSA, FMRt: Fixed Rate Mortgage Market Rate.
The outcomes of M1a, M2a, M3a and M4a are default=0 and restructured=1. The outcomes of M1b, M2b, M3b and M4b are prepaid in cash=0 and defeased=1. The outcomes of M1c, M2c,
M3c and M4c are curtailed=0 and partially defeased=1.
***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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As far as the decision between prepayment in cash and defeasance (model M4b)
is concerned, a 1% change in mortgage rates, interest-only mortgages and the
presence of cross-collateralization respectively determine an increase of 26% and
reduction of 47% and 54% in the likelihood of defeasance. Similar results are
found for this second pair of competing options for collateral terms: a 1% in-
crease in DSCR and the existence of an underlying credit tenant lease increases
defeasance occurrence by respectively 13% and more than 40 times.
Looking at property supply constraints, one unit increase in elasticity raises the
probability of defeasance by five times, showing that mortgages are more likely
and significantly to be defeased than prepaid in cash if the collateral is an office
property in supply elastic markets. In fact lenders more likely offer defeasance
provisions for mortgages collateralized in supply elastic market as property prices
remain reasonably stable and the risk differential between holding Treasury se-
curities and properties is reduced significantly.
In the second stage model, capturing changes in property absorption rates and
market interest rates as well as Treasury yield does not bring any statistically sig-
nificant changes in estimated results. Therefore we conclude that property supply
factors are more important than demand side factors in explaining behaviour of
early mortgage terminations. Our results confirm the research hypothesis and
suggest the use of relaxation vs. tightening property supply constraints as a
further risk management tool to control the exercise of mortgage termination
options.
5.6.2 Partial Prepayment Behaviour
For some mortgage contracts, both partial prepayment (equivalent to curtail-
ment) and partial defeasance are allowed. Therefore, we examine the partial
prepayment behaviour of borrowers, adding to a literature that overlooked at
this important decision so far.
Overall, the estimated results in the first stage are reported in the tables 5.7 and
5.8 and they are consistent with theoretical expectations for partial prepayment.
Across mortgage terms in the first stage, negative amortization rate, mortgage
rate, mortgage type and cross collateralization reveal the greatest impact on par-
tial prepayment, with the likelihood of partial prepayment increasing by 50%
for IOMs as borrowers are more likely capable of making extra payments than
CPM borrowers, especially if they further reduce the outstanding loan balance
and hence periodical payments with a partial prepayment. A 1% increase in
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mortgage rate raises the likelihood of partial prepayment by 81%, while A 1% in-
crease in negative amortization rate and the presence of a cross-collateralization
covenant reduce the likelihood of partial prepayment by 92% and 58% respec-
tively. A cross-collateralization implies the ownership of at least two assets and
at least two mortgages guaranteed by both assets. Therefore a higher amount
of mortgage payments can insist on the collateral and borrowers may be less ca-
pable of making extra payments lowering the probabilities of partial prepayments.
In contrast, we find moderate and positive (but statistically insignificant) impact
of LTV ratios and prepayment penalty / yield maintenance (1% change leads
to respectively 2% and 4% probability shift) on the likelihood of partial prepay-
ment. This finding reflects the potential substitution between full and partial
prepayment. As prepayment penalties are extremely high for full prepayment,
borrowers still look for opportunities to reduce interest costs and turn to partial
prepayment where only a portion of prepayment penalty / yield maintenance is
charged and found to be positively related to partial prepayment. Among collat-
eral related terms, DSCR and collateral underlying property supply elasticities
affect the likelihood of partial prepayment increasing it by respectively 123% with
a 1% increase in DSCR (i.e. increasing incomes encourage partial prepayment for
lowering debt level) and a reduction of 48% with a one unit increase in supply elas-
ticity. Greater uncertainty of property market in supply inelastic area encourage
partial prepayment instead of full prepayment, as borrowers need more time to
observe the market trend and have less confidence to cash in maximized profits by
full prepayment. For mortgage market rates (see model M4), the positive impact
on partial prepayment is also very significant. Mortgage market rates positively
correlate with property prices, and hence rising market rates are associated with
upward trends in property prices. This encourages partial prepayment.
Finally, we analyze the likelihood of partial defeasance relative to curtailment
(second stage) - see tables 5.9 and 5.10. Based on model M4c, a 1% increase in
mortgage rates increases the probability by 83%, while its sensitivity to changes
in negative amortization rates is even higher. IOMs show probability of partial
defeasance increased by 142% and, among collateral related terms, DSCR and
property supply elasticities show significant impact on the probability of par-
tial defeasance (respectively 77% and 100% reduction for 1% or 1 unit increase).
Borrowers with lower debt service and hence lower debt levels may play a more
important role in lowering the incentives to further reduce debt by partial de-
feasance. Finally, as treasury yields reflecting the cost of defeasance, we find a
short term increase in Treasury yields reduces the likelihood of partial defeasance
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by 11% to pre-empt rises in future interest rates making defeasance less attractive.
5.6.3 Probabilities of Early Mortgage Termination and Partial
Prepayment
Table 5.11 summarizes our estimated probabilities of four types of early mortgage
termination and two types of partial prepayment options. We employ model M4
to estimate the probabilities, but similar results are also confirmed using other
models. Firstly, we estimate the probabilities of denying obligations and full
prepayments as well as partial prepayments employing the first-stage model and
the conditional probabilities of four types of early mortgage termination and two
types of partial prepayments from the second-stage models - i.e. P(default |
denying obligations), P(restructuring | denying obligations), P(cash settlement |
prepayment), P(defeasance | prepayment), P(curtailment | partial prepayment)
and P(partial defeasance | partial prepayment). Secondly, we multiply the prob-
abilities of denying obligations with the probability of default (restructuring),
conditional to the probability of obligation denial from the fist stage to compute
the probabilities of default and denial. For full and partial prepayments, we take
a similar approach and estimate the probabilities by multiplying probabilities of
full prepayment and cash settlement, full prepayment and defeasance, as well
as the probability of partial prepayment and curtailment and the probability of
partial prepayment and partial defeasance.
For early mortgage termination, the estimates show that default is more likely
to occur relative to restructuring and a cash settlement is more likely to occur
than defeasance. For denying obligations, lenders may not be willing to offer
favourable restructuring plans with significant adjustments in interest rates and
loan maturities, and borrowers choose to default. Considering lenders’ decisions,
the probability of default is higher than mortgage restructuring. However, we
suggest that lenders consider an optimization process to set up covenants in mort-
gage contracts for their own risk management and subsequently obtain benefits
through restructuring.
For partial prepayment, probabilities are much lower than those of early mort-
gage termination in full. Borrowers prefer to fully prepay and curtailment is ten
times more likely occurs than partial defeasance as the latter might be perceived
as more complicated than paying in cash.
To conclude, we suggest regulators and policymakers to consider relaxation and
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tightening of property supply constraints as a potential risk management tool to
control the exercise of early mortgage termination options in the first stage (i.e.
higher property supply elasticities are associated with much lower probabilities
of denying obligations although higher likelihood of full prepayment is found).
In the second stage, default options and defeasance options in property supply
elastic markets are more frequently exercised. Lenders and policymakers should
carefully consider the level of collateral underlying property supply elasticities
and precisely adjust regulatory constraints so that early mortgage terminations
can be reduced or lenders and borrowers can make mutually optimal solutions to
early mortgage termination particularly mortgage default based on simulations
obtained in our theoretical framework.
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Table 5.11: Summary of Estimated Probabilities of Early Mortgage Termination and Partial Prepayment (Winsorized)
Probability Mean S.D. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
P(Denying Obligations and Default) 0.037 0.107 0 0.969 4.516 25.946
P(Denying Obligations and Restructuring) 0.013 0.042 0 0.992 6.233 57.511
P(Prepayment and Cash Settlement) 0.183 0.125 0 0.711 0.685 2.642
P(Prepayment and Defeasance) 0.111 0.127 0 0.732 1.825 6.366
P(Partial Prepayment and Curtailment) 0.003 0.007 0 0.293 10.681 197.0996
P(Partial Prepayment and Partial Defeasance) 0.0003 0.001 0 0.059 23.389 976.696
Notes:
We estimate P(Denying Obligations) and P(Prepayment) as well as P(Partial Prepayment) by the first stage model (M4) and then multiple
the conditional probabilities estimated by the second stage models (M4a and M4b as well as M4c) to compute the probabilities: P(Denying
Obligations and Default), P(Denying Obligations and Restructuring), P(Prepayment and Cash Settlement), P(Prepayment and Defeasance),
P(Partial Prepayment and Curtailment) and P(Partial Prepayment and Partial Defeasance).
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5.6.4 Robustness Check
Firstly, we ignore partial prepayment and conduct the analysis solely for early
mortgage termination in full. We summarize the main results of the first stage
in tables 5.12 and 5.13. Consistent with our main findings, an increase in prop-
erty supply elasticity significantly reduces the likelihood of obligation denial but
increases the probability of full prepayments.
Tables 5.14 and 5.15 report the main results of the second stage without partial
prepayment. Default and defeasance are more likely to occur when underlying
property markets are more supply elastic and we find confirmation of our main
conclusions.
Secondly, we focus on the impact of collateral underlying property supply elas-
ticities on early termination option. As supply constraints are mainly due to
physical land unavailability and regulatory constraints, we also consider other
two measures of property supply elasticity available constructed in residential
markets for each of the aforementioned criteria: Saiz (2010[149]) measure of land
unavailability (i.e. undevelopable area corresponding to steep slopes, oceans,
lakes, wetlands, and other water features) and the Wharton residential urban
land regulation index developed by Gyourko et al. (2008[99]) through a survey
to US municipalities. We replace our estimated office supply elasticities with
these two series to empirically test the consistency of our results. Both elasticity
proxies show a positive and negative relationship between supply elasticity and
the likelihood of respectively denying obligations and prepayment. Both these
findings violate our theoretical expectations and we then conclude that office
supply elasticities cannot be directly proxied with measures from the residential
market, also because land availability and regulations between the two sector
may differ within the same MSA (e.g. different location for housing stock and
the CBD market, existence of sector-specific zoning, etc.).
179
Table 5.12: Two-Stage Model: The First Stage - Multinomial Logit Model Results - Coefficients (Winsorized, Exclude Partial
Prepayment)
Independent Variables R1 R2 R3 R4
Def or Res Prep or Dfes Def or Res Prep or Dfes Def or Res Prep or Dfes Def or Res Prep or Dfes
LTVm,t 0.126*** 0.007*** 0.127*** 0.007*** 0.126*** 0.007*** 0.130*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004)
TTMm,t -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
BPRm,t 0.004*** -0.018*** 0.004*** -0.018*** 0.004*** -0.018*** 0.004*** -0.018***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
NARm,t -1.057*** 0.088 -1.054*** 0.088 -1.056*** 0.088 -1.041*** 0.088
(0.167) (0.079) (0.168) (0.079) (0.167) (0.079) (0.167) (0.079)
MRm,t 0.493*** 0.494*** 0.495*** 0.494*** 0.493*** 0.494*** 0.499*** 0.497***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
MTm 0.614*** -0.229*** 0.615*** -0.229*** 0.614*** -0.229*** 0.612*** -0.228***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
CCm 0.190*** 0.164*** 0.191*** 0.164*** 0.189*** 0.164*** 0.190*** 0.164***
(0.028) (0.020) (0.028) (0.020) (0.028) (0.020) (0.028) (0.020)
PPYMm,t -0.031 -236.371 -0.031 -282.505 -0.031 -236.999 -0.030 -476.308
(0.034) (5199.79) (0.034) (9628.02) (0.034) (5242.32) (0.034) (121428)
DSCRm,t -0.551*** -0.265*** -0.569*** -0.268*** -0.551*** -0.265*** -0.625*** -0.273***
(0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010)
PAm,t -0.002*** 0.007*** -0.002*** 0.007*** -0.002*** 0.007*** -0.002*** 0.007***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
ORm,t -0.037*** 0.017*** -0.037*** 0.017*** -0.037*** 0.017*** -0.037*** 0.016***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
CTLm -0.335*** -1.409*** -0.327*** -1.409*** -0.335*** -1.409*** -0.312*** -1.409***
(0.118) (0.099) (0.117) (0.099) (0.118) (0.099) (0.118) (0.099)
PSEm -1.026*** 1.495*** -1.010*** 1.496*** -1.025*** 1.495*** -1.027*** 1.497***
(0.089) (0.066) (0.089) (0.066) (0.089) (0.066) (0.089) (0.066)
∆PARm,t−3 -0.001*** -0.0006** -0.001*** -0.0006**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
∆FMRt−3 -0.323 -1.887 -0.323 -1.887
(72.376) (10.418) (72.618) (10.348)
Constant -8.584 4.070 -8.590 4.068 -11.097 -10.582 -11.156 -10.578
(350.798) (50.421) (347.531) (50.237) (211.237) (30.406) (211.942) (30.202)
Fixed State Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
BIC 728608 728330 728578 727570
Log Likelihood -361260 -361108 -361259 -360741
LR Chi Square 271901 271909 271903 272642
Observations 987932 987552 987932 987552
Notes:
LTVm,t: LTV ratio, TTMm,t: Time to Maturity, BPRm,t: Balloon Payment Ratio, NARm,t: Negative Amortization Rate, MRm,t: Mortgage Rate, MTm: Mortgage Type (Interest Only),
CCm: Cross Collateralization, PPYMm,t: Prepayment Penalty & Yield Maintenance, DSCRm,t: Debt Service Coverage Ratio, PAm,t: Property Age, ORm,t: Occupancy Rate, CTLm:
Credit Tenant Lease, PSEm: Property Supply Elasticity, PARm,t: Property Absorption Rate in MSA, FMRt: Fixed Rate Mortgage Market Rate.
Def, Res, Prep and Dfes mean Default, Restructured, Prepaid and Defeased.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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Table 5.13: Two-Stage Model: The First Stage - Multinomial Logit Model Results - Relative Risk Ratio (Winsorized, Exclude
Partial Prepayment)
Independent Variables R1 R2 R3 R4
Def or Res Prep or Dfes Def or Res Prep or Dfes Def or Res Prep or Dfes Def or Res Prep or Dfes
LTVm,t 1.135*** 1.007*** 1.136*** 1.007*** 1.135*** 1.007*** 1.139*** 1.008***
TTMm,t 0.995*** 0.995*** 0.995*** 0.995*** 0.995*** 0.995*** 0.995*** 0.995***
BPRm,t 1.004*** 0.982*** 1.004*** 0.982*** 1.004*** 0.982*** 1.004*** 0.982***
NARm,t 0.348*** 1.092 0.349*** 1.092 0.348*** 1.092 0.353*** 1.092
MRm,t 1.637*** 1.638*** 1.641*** 1.640*** 1.637*** 1.638*** 1.648*** 1.644***
MTm 1.848*** 0.795*** 1.849*** 0.795*** 1.849*** 0.795*** 1.844*** 0.796***
CCm 1.209*** 1.179*** 1.211*** 1.178*** 1.208*** 1.178*** 1.210*** 1.178***
PPYMm,t 0.970 0 0.970 0 0.970 0 0.970 0
DSCRm,t 0.576*** 0.767*** 0.566*** 0.765*** 0.577*** 0.767*** 0.535*** 0.761***
PAm,t 0.998*** 1.007*** 0.998*** 1.007*** 0.998*** 1.007*** 0.998*** 1.007***
ORm,t 0.964*** 1.017*** 0.964*** 1.017*** 0.964*** 1.017*** 0.963*** 1.017***
CTLm 0.716*** 0.244*** 0.721*** 0.244*** 0.715*** 0.244*** 0.732*** 0.244***
PSEm 0.358*** 4.458*** 0.364*** 4.462*** 0.359*** 4.459*** 0.358*** 4.470***
∆PARm,t−3 0.999*** 0.999** 0.999*** 0.999**
∆FMRt−3 0.724 0.152 0.724 0.152
Constant 0.0002 58.532 0.0002 58.436 0.00002 0.00003 0.00001 0.00003
Fixed State Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes:
LTVm,t: LTV ratio, TTMm,t: Time to Maturity, BPRm,t: Balloon Payment Ratio, NARm,t: Negative Amortization Rate, MRm,t: Mortgage Rate, MTm: Mortgage Type (Interest Only),
CCm: Cross Collateralization, PPYMm,t: Prepayment Penalty & Yield Maintenance, DSCRm,t: Debt Service Coverage Ratio, PAm,t: Property Age, ORm,t: Occupancy Rate, CTLm:
Credit Tenant Lease, PSEm: Property Supply Elasticity, PARm,t: Property Absorption Rate in MSA, FMRt: Fixed Rate Mortgage Market Rate.
Def, Res, Prep and Dfes mean Default, Restructured, Prepaid and Defeased.
***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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Table 5.14: Two-Stage Model: The Second Stage - Logit Model Results - Coefficients (Winsorized, Exclude Partial Prepayment)
Independent Variables R1a R1b R2a R2b R3a R3b R4a R4b
Def=0 & Res=1 Prep=0 & Dfes=1 Def=0 & Res=1 Prep=0 & Dfes=1 Def=0 & Res=1 Prep=0 & Dfes=1 Def=0 & Res=1 Prep=0 & Dfes=1
LTVm,t -0.079*** 0.003 -0.079*** 0.003 -0.079*** 0.003 -0.079*** 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
TTMm,t 0.0002 -0.0007*** 0.0002 -0.0007*** 0.0002 -0.0007*** 0.0002 -0.0007***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
BPRm,t -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
NARm,t -0.682*** -0.682*** -0.682*** -0.682***
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
MRm,t -0.610*** 0.225*** -0.610*** 0.224*** -0.610*** 0.225*** -0.610*** 0.224***
(0.024) (0.015) (0.024) (0.015) (0.024) (0.015) (0.024) (0.015)
MTm 1.096*** -0.625*** 1.097*** -0.625*** 1.096*** -0.625*** 1.097*** -0.625***
(0.020) (0.034) (0.020) (0.034) (0.020) (0.034) (0.020) (0.034)
CCm 0.201*** 0.430*** 0.200*** 0.431*** 0.201*** 0.430*** 0.200*** 0.431***
(0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062)
PPYMm,t -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (0.081)
DSCRm,t 0.343*** 0.111** 0.342*** 0.111** 0.343*** 0.111** 0.342*** 0.111***
(0.035) (0.052) (0.035) (0.052) (0.035) (0.052) (0.035) (0.052)
PAm,t 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006)
ORm,t 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016***
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.0008) (0.001)
CTLm -1.229 3.801*** -1.225 3.798*** -1.229 3.801*** -1.225 3.798***
(1.024) (1.320) (1.024) (1.319) (1.024) (1.320) (1.024) (1.319)
PSEm -1.359*** 1.837*** -1.355*** 1.844*** -1.359*** 1.837*** -1.355*** 1.844***
(0.210) (0.237) (0.210) (0.237) (0.210) (0.237) (0.210) (0.237)
∆PARm,t−3 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆FMRt−3 -0.090 -0.018 -0.090 -0.017
(0.224) (0.565) (0.224) (0.565)
Constant 6.449*** -6.223*** 6.444*** -6.219*** 5.800*** -6.274*** 5.792*** -6.270***
(0.983) (0.465) (0.983) (0.465) (0.750) (1.430) (0.750) (1.430)
Fixed State Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Log Likelihood -20146 -16234 -20140 -16227 -20146 -16234 -20140 -16227
LR Chi Square 14667 11813 14665 11802 14667 11813 14665 11802
Observations 47512 36739 47500 36728 47512 36739 47500 36728
Notes:
LTVm,t: LTV ratio, TTMm,t: Time to Maturity, BPRm,t: Balloon Payment Ratio, NARm,t: Negative Amortization Rate, MRm,t: Mortgage Rate, MTm: Mortgage Type (Interest Only),
CCm: Cross Collateralization, PPYMm,t: Prepayment Penalty & Yield Maintenance, DSCRm,t: Debt Service Coverage Ratio, PAm,t: Property Age, ORm,t: Occupancy Rate, CTLm:
Credit Tenant Lease, PSEm: Property Supply Elasticity, PARm,t: Property Absorption Rate in MSA, FMRt: Fixed Rate Mortgage Market Rate.
Def, Res, Prep and Dfes mean Default, Restructured, Prepaid and Defeased.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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Table 5.15: Two-Stage Model: The Second Stage - Logit Model Results - Odd Ratios (Winsorized, Exclude Partial Prepayment)
Independent Variables R1a R1b R2a R2b R3a R3b R4a R4b
Def=0 & Res=1 Prep=0 & Dfes=1 Def=0 & Res=1 Prep=0 & Dfes=1 Def=0 & Res=1 Prep=0 & Dfes=1 Def=0 & Res=1 Prep=0 & Dfes=1
LTVm,t 0.924*** 1.003 0.924*** 1.003 0.924*** 1.003 0.924*** 1.003
TTMm,t 1.0002 0.999*** 1.0002 0.999*** 1.0002 0.999*** 1.0002 0.999***
BPRm,t 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.996***
NARm,t 0.505*** 0.505*** 0.505*** 0.505***
MRm,t 0.543*** 1.252*** 0.543*** 1.251*** 0.543*** 1.252*** 0.543*** 1.251***
MTm 2.993*** 0.535*** 2.995*** 0.535*** 2.993*** 0.535*** 2.995*** 0.535***
CCm 1.222*** 1.537*** 1.222*** 1.538*** 1.222*** 1.537*** 1.222*** 1.538***
PPYMm,t 0.998 0.999 0.998 0.999
DSCRm,t 1.409*** 1.118** 1.408*** 1.117** 1.409*** 1.118** 1.408*** 1.117**
PAm,t 1.005*** 1.006*** 1.005*** 1.006*** 1.005*** 1.006*** 1.005*** 1.006***
ORm,t 1.015*** 1.016*** 1.015*** 1.016*** 1.015*** 1.016*** 1.015*** 1.016***
CTLm 0.293 44.766*** 0.294 44.626*** 0.293 44.766*** 0.294 44.626***
PSEm 0.257*** 6.276*** 0.258*** 6.324*** 0.257*** 6.276*** 0.258*** 6.324***
∆PARm,t−3 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
∆FMRt−3 0.914 0.983 0.914 0.983
Constant 632.359*** 0.002*** 629.184*** 0.002*** 330.227*** 0.002*** 327.716*** 0.002***
Fixed State Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Time Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes:
LTVm,t: LTV ratio, TTMm,t: Time to Maturity, BPRm,t: Balloon Payment Ratio, NARm,t: Negative Amortization Rate, MRm,t: Mortgage Rate, MTm: Mortgage Type (Interest Only),
CCm: Cross Collateralization, PPYMm,t: Prepayment Penalty & Yield Maintenance, DSCRm,t: Debt Service Coverage Ratio, PAm,t: Property Age, ORm,t: Occupancy Rate, CTLm:
Credit Tenant Lease, PSEm: Property Supply Elasticity, PARm,t: Property Absorption Rate in MSA, FMRt: Fixed Rate Mortgage Market Rate.
Def, Res, Prep and Dfes mean Default, Restructured, Prepaid and Defeased.
***, ** and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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5.7 Conclusion
This research empirically examines the borrower’s strategic choice in mortgage
termination options. Following the theoretical framework, we have developed a
two-stage empirical model using a multinomial logit model in the first stage and
logit models in the second stage to analyze the likelihood of four types of early
mortgage termination options: default vs restructuring and full prepayment in
cash vs defeasance. Moreover, we also empirically estimate and model the likeli-
hood of partial prepayment by adding an extra outcome in the first stage and a
pair of competing options (i.e. curtailment vs partial defeasance) in the second
stage. As far as we know, this represents the first study to simultaneously investi-
gate these two pairs of mortgage termination options, to examine restructuring as
a “competitor" to mortgage default, and to provide empirical evidence on causes
of probabilities of restructuring relative to default and defeasance relative to pre-
payment in cash.
Based on our estimated probabilities, we show that default is more likely to oc-
cur than restructuring for obligation denial, while a cash settlement is more likely
than defeasance for prepayment. In the first stage, mortgage rates, mortgage type
(IOM), DSCR and credit tenant lease exert a significant impact on the decision
to deny obligations or prepay. In the second stage, changing negative amortiza-
tion rate, mortgage rate, mortgage type, cross-collateralization, DSCR and credit
tenant lease are important factors on the decision of restructuring relative to de-
faulting, also favouring the choice of defeasance over payment in cash.
Moreover, we particularly emphasize the role of property supply constraints on
early mortgage termination. One unit increase in property supply elasticity re-
duces the likelihood of denying obligations by 55% and increases the likelihood of
prepayments by more than three times in the first stage, results consistent with
theoretical expectations. In the second stage, an increase in property supply elas-
ticity significantly lowers the probability of restructuring relative to default, but
it increases the likelihood of defeasance relative to prepayment in cash.
This also represents the first attempt to empirically examine the partial prepay-
ment behaviour. Introducing this new aspect of borrowers’ choice, we show they
act strategically. In supply constrained real estate markets, they perceive that
a higher uncertainty in property prices may either lead to a further increase in
prices or sharp fall if the market cycle turns. Therefore they tend to cash in
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a minimum gain from partial prepayment (likelihood is increased as elasticity
decreases) but want to retain the opportunity of accessing further uplifts at the
same time (and therefore the likelihood of full prepayment decreases). In supply
inelastic property markets borrowers choose to curtail mortgages rather than to
partially defease.
In conclusion, property supply constraints play a pivotal role in determining the
likelihood of early mortgage termination behaviour, thus we should not ignore
this important driving force in mortgage studies as they modify the mortgage
risk borne by lenders. Therefore, regulators and policymakers should monitor
the amount of lending to property supply constrained markets as a measure
of risk exposure and use a relaxation or tightening of these constraints as an
alternative risk management tool for mortgage markets to control the exercise of
early termination options, and particularly default.
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Chapter 6
Final Conclusion
This research examines the impact of collateral underlying property supply con-
straints on early termination options embedded in commercial mortgages. After
introducing the motivation and overarching literature review related to our study,
in Chapter Three we estimate supply elasticities of office markets in 42 Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (MSA hereafter). Generally supply inelastic markets are
analyzed using a search and matching model and cross-sectional differences are
explained by differences in regulatory and geographical constraints. In Chapter
Four, we build a two-stage theoretical model to price early termination options
(default and prepayment) by installment option valuation approach. We con-
clude that tightening collateral underlying property supply constraints pushes up
value of early mortgage termination options. Chapter Five combines the previ-
ous two chapters conducting an empirical analysis on the impact of real estate
supply elasticities on early mortgage termination options. MSAs with less re-
strictive supply constraints see a more frequent exercise of prepayment options,
especially through defeasance rather than cash but less frequent exercise of denial
options. For partial prepayment, loosening collateral underlying property supply
constraints reduces the likelihood of an exercise.
Significant Role of Collateral Underlying Property Supply Constraints
Collateral underlying property supply constraints play an important role in de-
termining the degree of property market response to demand shocks. In Chapter
Four we apply an installment option pricing model to compute gross and net
option values of early mortgage termination options and find that tightening col-
lateral underlying property supply constraints increases option values of default
and prepayment (both one-sided and joint options). Our results are consistent
with theoretical prediction, with one unit decrease in demand causing a more sig-
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nificant drop in property prices in more supply constrained markets. Therefore,
values of early mortgage termination options become larger as supply becomes
more inelastic. In addition to zero values of mortgage default, early mortgage ter-
mination options are unlikely exercised in supply elastic markets. However, the
empirical study in Chapter Five find that increasing property supply elasticity
reduces the likelihood of mortgage default but rises the probability of prepay-
ment. The relationship between property supply elasticity and prepayment risk
is inconsistent with theoretical expectation in Chapter Four. This can be ex-
plained by the existence of partial prepayment. Greater uncertainty in volatile
property markets in supply inelastic area stimulate partial prepayment rather
than full prepayment as borrowers act strategically by cashing in a fixed gain
of the equity surplus in the partial prepayment, but decide to keep the option
open on the remaining balance for potential further uplifts. As far as mortgage
default is generally more concerned, controlling supply constraints could be an
alternative risk management tool for mortgage markets. Even if we acknowledge
the inelastic nature of real estate markets, we also find support for risk reduction
via shifts in supply constraints.
Contribution to Related Research Area
In the first part of our research, we estimate US office supply elasticities at the
MSA level. This represents the first empirical study to provide a precise esti-
mation of office supply elasticities by employing a search and matching process
in a simultaneous equation system. Our results are highly correlated with hous-
ing supply elasticities and constraint indices estimated by other scholars - Green
et al. (2005 [92]), Gyourko et al. (2008 [99]), Saks (2008 [150]), Saiz (2010
[149]), Wheaton et al. (2014 [176]). As we distinguish vacancy into three types
(i.e. cyclical, frictional and structural) by transferring concepts from labour eco-
nomics, the equilibrium conditions are also determined by frictional and struc-
tural vacancies. Our findings show that in equilibrium demand equals supply
after deducting both frictional and structural vacancies and we therefore shed
light upon the equilibrium conditions required to model the pricing process.
Furthermore, we develop an installment option pricing model to valuate mort-
gage termination options. We basically make three contributions to mortgage
studies. First, existing studies (Epperson et al. 1985 [65], Kau et al. 1992 [114])
mainly analogize mortgage default and prepayment as a collection of European
put options and American call options respectively. However, they do not con-
sider the stream of mortgage payments. In light of this, we revise the option
analogy for pricing early mortgage termination. The early terminations should
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be analogous to American continuous installment options equipped with strad-
dle or strangle payoff as options keep alive when scheduled mortgage payments
as installments are made and borrowers can exercise early termination options
anytime. Second, differently from extant works, we do not simply assume a log
normal property price process - Kau et al. (1987 [112], 1992 [114], 1995 [111]),
Ambrose and Capone (1998[11]) - and also include collateral underlying property
supply constraints. This helps to capture property market dynamics into mort-
gage risk pricing models. Third, we capture execution costs (i.e. bankruptcy
costs for mortgage default and prepayment penalties for prepayment) in the op-
tion pricing model by adding them to strike prices of underlying options. It is
the first study to estimate implicit bankruptcy costs and include in mortgage risk
models. We show that tightening property supply constraints increases option
values whatever execution costs are considered. Thus, we argue that controlling
supply constraints may lead to change in option exercise and can then be used
to manage risks in mortgage markets.
Finally, we provide empirical evidence of the impact collateral underlying prop-
erty supply constraints have on early mortgage terminations in the third main
paper of this thesis (Chapter Five). We simultaneously investigate four types of
early mortgage termination options (i.e. default, restructuring, prepayment in
cash and defeasance) for the first time using the two-stage model. In the first
stage, we find that one unit increase in property supply elasticity reduces the
likelihood of denying obligations by 55% but increases the probability of prepay-
ments by more than three times. In the second stage, an increase in property
supply elasticities significantly lowers the probabilities of restructuring relative
to mortgage default while it increases the probabilities of defeasance relative to
prepayment in cash. Moreover, this study represents the first empirical research
to investigate partial prepayment behaviour in commercial mortgage markets.
We show that real estate markets becoming more elastic reduce the likelihood of
partial prepayments and therefore, loosening property supply constraints reduces
the incentives to deny obligations and partially prepay.
Limitations of the Study
Although we offer several contributions to the research field of commercial real
estate market dynamics and early mortgage termination options, a few limitations
related to data issues and modelling should also be acknowledged. First, in
Chapter Three we identify “economic mismatch” by using data called “available
but occupied stock”. The data series starts from the first quarter of 2005, as data
prior to 2005 is unavailable. Studies about housing cycle and housing supply
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constraints (e.g. Green et al. 2005 [92], Glaeser et al. 2008 [87], Wheaton et
al. 2014 [176] and Hilber et al. 2016[105]) usually cover more than 20 years of
data, but they are mostly in annual basis. Although we cover 11 year of data,
quarterly basis is captured so that the time span is sufficient for estimating office
supply elasticity. Whatsoever, if more historical data were available, we would be
able to have a better understanding of changes in search and matching process
in office markets.
Second, we were able to estimate structural vacancy but as far as the frictional
component of the natural vacancy rate was concerned, we were only able to
model the probability of its occurrence only in chapter three as there are no
office renovation data proxying frictional vacancy. Although we do not estimate
frictional vacancy, a finding by alternatively modelling the probability of frictional
vacancy is insightful that economic mismatch is lower when refurbishment options
are more likely to be exercised.
Third, as MSA level data on construction costs for commercial real estate are
not available, we have an alternative approach by proxying this measure with
operating expenses in Chapter Three and check the robustness of our results
using residential construction costs under the assumption that costs for the two
property uses are highly correlated.
Fourth, theoretical relationships between property supply elasticity and prepay-
ment risk in Chapter Four is inconsistent with related empirical findings in Chap-
ter Five. This may be due to the fact that we do not consider the alternative
to full prepayment which is partial prepayment in the theoretical model. How-
ever, partial prepayment modelling is different from the models for pricing early
mortgage termination options (Taleizadeh et al. 2013 [160]), we cannot simply
extend the installment option pricing model to describe partial prepayment be-
haviour. Thus, the interaction between full and partial prepayment varied by
collateral underlying property supply constraints cannot be modelled which is
the weakness of our theoretical model.
Finally, we only have access to individual loan level data of securitized mortgages
to investigate the impact of collateral underlying property supply constraints on
early mortgage termination options in Chapter Five. There may be selection bias
if we only cover securitized mortgages. If bank-held or insurance company-held
loans were to be used for analysis, we may have further insight on this relation-
ship considering differences in loan terms that likely-to-be securitised mortgage
products have even though similar conclusions about competing risk are drawn
based on securitized and unsecuritized mortgages (Ambrose et al. 2003 [15] and
Ciochetti and Shilling 2013 [43]).
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Policy Implication
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, the Dodd Frank Act was passed
and the Federal Reserve started to require banks to be subject to more regular
stress tests. In fact, in early 2018, the Federal Reserve conducted a stress test
where a significant decline in commercial real estate prices (i.e.15%) was assumed.
This reflects the awareness of possible negative shocks in commercial real estate
markets which adversely affect commercial mortgage markets. When the Dodd
Frank Act was intended to substantially reform the securitization process with
focus on aligning the incentives of the securitizer of the loans and the bondholders,
the Act changed the current risk transfer model for commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) by launching a new risk retention regulation in the end of
2016. The company doing the securitization is required to retain 5 percent of the
risk for a period of five years. Underwriting standards in commercial mortgage
markets are expected to tighten by approving less interest only mortgages or
lowering leverage.
As far as credit risk of CMBS and commercial mortgage markets are concerned,
we would suggest policymakers an approach for enhancing preciseness of forecast-
ing the commercial real estate markets which are the main source of credit risk
of CMBS and commercial mortgage markets. Our estimations of office supply
elasticities in Chapter Three can help policymakers to more precisely forecast
the movements in commercial real estate prices, and be used within a stress test
framework, for example by measuring the exposure to more supply inelastic mar-
kets and allow for cross-sectional differences in the impact of possible demand
shocks (i.e. banks lending to more elastic markets may suffer less than others).
Furthermore, policymakers can consider adjustments in regulations in land or real
estate markets to control mortgage market risks and monitoring financial markets
as the related regulations determine tightness of property supply constraints.
Moreover, the Federal Reserve has launched a new metric to financial institutions
to manage operational risk. The supplementary leverage ratio is computed as
the ratio between a financial institution’s tier 1 capital and its total leverage
exposure, which includes all on-balance-sheet assets and several off-balance-sheet
exposures. Financial institutions debated the fairness of such measure which
also include risky commercial mortgages. As property supply elasticities are
not considered in risk management models, cross-sectional differences of risks in
commercial mortgage markets among MSAs are yet to be included. We therefore
suggest the introduction of property supply constraints into the property price
process to infer the impact of geographic variation of mortgage lending and adjust
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this metrics to reflect such differences which affect the operational risk of financial
institutions.
Policymakers are able to capture property supply elasticities into their risk man-
agement models given that related property supply elasticities have been esti-
mated. For office markets, we have already made the contribution by estimating
office supply elasticities. Policymakers can directly refer to our work and develop
the property supply elasticity adjusted credit risk management model. For other
commercial real estate markets, policymakers can offer the related data to aca-
demic or industry professionals for developing econometric models for estimating
supply elasticities of different commercial real estate markets. Then, after pol-
icymakers obtain all information of estimated property supply elasticities, they
can precisely manage credit risk of CMBS and commercial mortgage markets as
well as operational risk of financial institutions.
Future Research Direction
Beyond this thesis, we can extend our theoretical option pricing model to value
mortgage restructuring. This may involve complex assumptions such as time
varying boundary conditions. We intend to offer insight of measuring the like-
lihood of restructuring and risk management on mortgage default. Besides, we
can construct the option pricing model with the assumption of incomplete mar-
kets and simulate the impact of property supply constraints on mortgage risk.
This potentially helps to reinforce our suggestion of the possibility to control col-
lateral underlying property supply constraints to manage mortgage market risk
effectively.
As far as early mortgage terminations are concerned, we could also explore the
effectiveness and performance of mortgage restructuring by tracking the loan
status after the restructuring process, as well as the likelihood of full prepayments
for curtailed or partially defeased mortgages. Moreover, it may be interesting to
examine differential behaviours of early mortgage terminations for mortgages
originated or observed in boom and bust periods. For parsimonious reasons, we
haven’t covered this analysis in our current empirical study but will conduct it
shortly.
Besides, we will extend the current research field into relevant areas such as
systemic risk in mortgage markets and interactions between labour and real estate
markets. Regarding the systemic risk, we will examine the contagion risk of
commercial mortgages to disentangle the determinants of commercial mortgage
terminations from the impact of fundamental factors of collateral properties on
the termination of commercial mortgages (e.g. collateral underlying property
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supply constrained markets, credit tenant lease and lease tenure). We could
potentially offer insight on how to manage contagion risk if a contagion effect of
commercial mortgage terminations exists. Finally, as far as interactions between
labour and real estate markets are concerned, we intend to study the impact of
the resonance driven by labour market shocks and real estate market shocks on
both markets equilibria.
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